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Introduction: 
Identity and Solidarity in the 
Foreign Policy of East Central 
European EU Members: 
Renewing the Research 
Agenda
ELSA TULMETS
The core idea of this special issue is to investigate the link between identity and sol-
idarity in the foreign policy of members of the European Union (EU).1 The term
‘identity’ has various definitions in external relations. In a classical way, one may
state that ‘nationhood and national identity represent necessary myths which un-
derpin foreign policy. They constitute the distinction between the “national com-
munity” which the government represents abroad and the foreigners with whom it
deals’ (Wallace, 1991: 66). In a constructivist understanding, the self is thus defined
in relation to a specific other. Therefore, identity is not given; it is considered as the
process of self-identification of the individuals in a group (Bloom, 1990) or an
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983). In this vein, solidarity represents one of
the forms of expression of foreign policy identities. Like the self, it is subject to rel-
ative evolution and redefinition. 
Studying solidarity in foreign policy requires relying on other fields of academ-
ic literature than Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations. Solidarity is a
concept which has so far mainly been used in Sociology (of International Rela-
tions) and in the field of Law and Development, but it has known a limited use in
Foreign Policy Analysis as well. Furthermore, it is often mentioned without any
clear definition. It is generally mentioned in the literature on aid to development
countries (e.g. Lechervy and Ryfman, 1993; Folz, Musekamp and Schieder, 2008),
but it hardly appears in the literature on aid to transition countries (Bergman,
2006). In the literature, solidarity generally refers to mutual support, to the action
of (a group of) states, organisations and (a group of) individuals in the form of
symbolic and material support to another country, organisation or group of indi-
viduals. It therefore goes beyond the traditional approach of Foreign Policy Anal-
ysis, which generally focuses on the state, as solidarity also includes the activities
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of international organisations and non-governmental organisations and philan-
thropic actions. 
The concepts of identity and solidarity have become particularly relevant in the
context of regional integration. While solidarity is very present in the works of the
founding fathers of European integration and in the policies of the European
Union, recent academic publications have concentrated more on the foreign poli-
cy identity of EU members than on solidarity in their foreign policies (cf. Folz,
Musekamp and Schieder, 2008). Furthermore, larger comparative approaches to
this topic are even more rare, even after the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004/07.
The countries of East Central Europe (ECE)2 have attracted only little attention in re-
lation to these issues. Although many publications account for an interest in ECE
foreign policies, only few analysts have tackled them in a comparative perspective.
In fact, the study of ECE policies remained constrained by the political agenda of
accessions to the EU. The comparative literature has therefore largely investigated
the impact of EU accession on internal institutions, policies and structures (Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005), but the field of foreign policy remained under-
estimated. This may partly be due to the fact that the acquis communautaire re-
mains rather thin in EU external relations and that most security issues were dealt
with intergovernmentally during enlargement or in the framework of international
organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United Na-
tions (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Therefore, the literature on foreign policy identity in the European Union was so far
not very interested in or adapted to the context of post-communist countries. 
It is particularly relevant to investigate the relation between identity and solidari-
ty on the example of East Central European foreign policies, as these policies are
rather new and, in contrast to other EU members, most of the countries do not rely
on a long tradition of sovereignty. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ECE countries
have claimed their ‘return to Europe’ and defined accordingly their two main foreign
policy priorities – EU accession and NATO accession. After these main aims were
achieved, the ECE countries have formulated new foreign policies, among which the
post-communist countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe were men-
tioned as core priorities. Some of the ‘new’ EU members have particularly pushed
for further EU accessions and the definition of an EU policy in the Eastern neigh-
bourhood. Indeed, after its Eastern enlargement, the EU has gained new borders,
which it shares with an Eastern neighbourhood that is represented by Belarus,
Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. It has launched the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) – which Russia rejected – in 2003, and this policy is addressed to the three
countries of the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the
Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 2003, 2004).3 The Black Sea Syn-
ergy and the Eastern Partnership were launched in 2007 and 2009 respectively, and
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both of these policies were aimed at enhancing relations with the Eastern neigh-
bourhood. However, not all the ECE countries engaged equally in the region, and
the reasons for their engagements need to be elucidated. 
Therefore, the following research questions will be tackled: As the East Central
European countries’ priorities were mainly oriented towards the West until their
NATO and EU accessions, what are the reasons for the formulation of the ECE sol-
idarity towards the Eastern neighbourhood? Are the solidarity policies totally new
policies which have mainly been defined after the EU accession of 2004, or do
they draw on older foreign policy experiences which are now also partly chan-
nelled through the EU? 
We argue that both logics are at work. The ECE countries’ desire to transfer their
experience of transition and their support for EU and NATO accessions are often
mentioned as the main motivations for the development of their new ties with the
Eastern neighbourhood. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Belarus generally belong
to the priority countries. However, as we will see, there are other, less idealistic rea-
sons for this. For example, the ECE countries’ relations to Russia are mentioned in
this respect, although they are considered here as a separate issue. Russia will be
mentioned only briefly here – not only because it refused to be part of the ENP, but
also due to the fact that the policy of the ECE states in the post-communist space
is often defined as a way to take distance from the past of the Soviet Union and its
successor state Russia. 
In this issue, we consider that investigating solidarity is a way to complement the
constructivist research agenda on foreign policy identity. It is argued that solidarity
is conceived as stemming from a dual aspect of foreign policy identity which con-
sists of a political and a historical self, which are defined in relation to one or sever-
al others. To put it briefly, supporting transformation and a possible EU candidacy is
not only a way to promote the EU’s norms and values, but also a way to come along
with claims of a shared past with the Eastern neighbourhood, which could be only
the recent past or a much longer past. In making the neighbours’ domestic order
more compatible with the EU order, it is a way to reduce economic disparities and
minimise the position of ‘liminality’ of the ECE states in the EU. In looking at both the
official discourse on foreign policy identity and the effective means mobilised in the
East, the contributions thus question the relevance of analytical approaches which
would focus only on the self/other aspect of identity and foreign policy discourse.
The articles gathered here represent an occasion to identify the factors that have
lead to the formulation (or lack thereof) of the East Central European solidarity to-
wards the Eastern neighbourhood and to deconstruct East Central Europe as a ho-
mogeneous bloc. While the focus is on the link between identity and solidarity, most
of the contributions also acknowledge the relevance of rationalist accounts for ECE’s
engagement or lack of engagement in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
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By focusing on solidarity, this special issue proposes to complement the research
agenda on foreign policy identity and to adapt it to the East Central European
countries. As for this introductory chapter, first it explores the self/other dichotomy
in foreign policies and the dual aspect of identity. It then turns to the concept of
solidarity as a way to operationalise foreign policy identity and to investigate for-
eign policy implementation through an inductive approach and a specific method-
ology. Afterwards, it presents a short analysis with the results of the various contri-
butions gathered in this special issue. 
TOWARDS A DUAL IDENTITY IN FOREIGN
POLICIES
Most academic analyses of foreign policy identity, may they come from Foreign Pol-
icy Analysis or International Relations, insist on two issues: the relation between self
and other and the relation to the past. We followingly believe that one needs to re-
visit the self /other dichotomy in order to better explore the complexity of identity.
We also believe that foreign policy identity, the self, has to be conceived in duality:
it refers to both a political and a historical self, which both relate to one or various
others. As foreign policy mobilises different political forces and actors, the definition
of the political and the historical self can be contested and thus evolve over time. 
SELF AND OTHER IN FOREIGN POLICY
The core works on foreign policy identity are of a constructivist essence and con-
sider that the definition of a self is done in relation to a specific other (Wæver,
1990; Castells, 1997; Neumann, 1998; McSweeney, 1999; Rumelili, 2004; Diez,
2004). If one departs from a poststructuralist understanding, one may also consid-
er that identity is discursive, political, relational, and social (Hansen, 2006: 6; see
also Ehin and Berg, 2009). Critical constructivism thus focuses on differences be-
tween the outside and the inside of a certain group, and it views these differences
as central in the construction of meanings and identities (Rumelili, 2004: 30–34;
Bukh, 2010: 4). The relevance of others ‘may be “comparative” – “other than me”
or (with reference to one’s own past) “different from what I was yesterday” – but
not necessarily oppositional, as is too frequently assumed’ (Lucarelli, 2006: 312).
And as Diez argues, the others may gain importance in the construction of the self
in the sense that we take into consideration the image of the self that other rele-
vant actors reflect (Diez, 2004). 
The distinction between self and other is often used in studies on foreign policy
identity. For example, while analysing post-Cold War American foreign policy,
Campbell shows how the U.S. is continually constituted and reconstituted in its in-
teraction with others (Campbell, 1998: 69–70). Or to name another example, Bukh
uses the post-structuralist approach of self/other to show that modern Japanese
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foreign policy possesses various ‘others’, including Russia and the Soviet Union
(Bukh, 2010). However, the relation between self and other is not fixed and can
evolve. We may even consider the existence of a multi-layered self, which refers to
a variety of others.
The contributions to this special issue highlight the mix of elements which con-
stituted the foreign policy identity of the ECE countries during and after their ac-
cession to NATO and the European Union. The promotion of the experience of
democratic and economic transition, as well as of accession to the EU and
 NATO, represents particular priorities and assets in the region of Eastern Europe.
While turning to the West and promoting liberal norms and values builds a clear
part of the ECE self, one generally notices the definition of new priorities after EU
and NATO accession and a redefinition of the determining others in the ECE
countries. The articles by Made, Kesa, Szczepanik, and Najšlová on the policies
of the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia respectively show that
these states’ definitions of negative others have recently evolved. While Russia
was originally considered as a constitutive other in the definition of a policy to-
wards the West, this other was redefined after the formulation of new geostrate-
gic considerations and security concepts which took into account new kinds of
threats. Therefore, Russia progressively vanished as the main other in the foreign
policy strategies oriented towards the neighbourhood, and these states’ foreign
policy identity was more clearly defined against a common Soviet or communist
past in order to promote modernisation and Western norms. Other contribu-
tions, especially the ones on Hungary (Rácz) and Romania (Angelescu), inter-
estingly suggest that an ECE state may even consider some EU members as spe-
cific others when its policy towards the neighbourhood is thought through. This
is why we propose to dig deeper into the classical self / other dichotomy in or-
der to trace the complexity of foreign policy identity, and thus to partly explain
the expression (or lack thereof) of solidarity in foreign policy. To do so, one
needs to conceive identity in a dual way.
A DUAL IDENTITY IN FOREIGN POLICY
In the 1990s and 2000s, several constructivist studies have looked at EU member
states’ national identities and their relations to the European Union (Marcussen et
al., 1999; Hermann, Risse and Brewer, 2004; Wæver, 2005). For example, while fo-
cusing on France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Marcussen et al. (1999) ar-
gue that Europe resonates with identity constructions deeply embedded in nation-
al political institutions and political culture in order to constitute a legitimate polit-
ical discourse. Political elites select their ideas in an instrumental fashion from the
ideas available to them in the present or the past according to their perceived in-
terests, particularly during ‘critical junctures’ when national state identities are con-
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tested and challenged in political discourses. And once national state identities
emerge as consensus among the political majority, they are likely to be internalised
and institutionalised as a result of a socialisation process, and thus they tend to be-
come resistant to change (Marcussen et al., 1999). 
While this stimulating approach does not deal with foreign policy, we argue that
some of its analytical elements can be adapted to the context of foreign policy, but
they need to be reframed to fit the East Central European states, which have known
only relatively short periods of sovereignty in the past if any – and some of these
nations never experienced any period of sovereignty. We propose to conceive the
foreign policy identity of EU members as a dual identity composed of a ‘first order
identity’, the political self, which resembles Marcussen et al.’s ‘visions of political
order’ (Marcussen et al., 1999), and a ‘second order identity’, the historical self,
which refers to the past and sometimes still existing ‘national institutions and cul-
ture’ (ibid.). 
DEFINING THE POLITICAL SELF
The definition of a political identity, or a ‘political self’, is very much motivated by
dominant political priorities. It represents a ‘first order identity’ based on a set of
common (generally legitimate) norms and values. In this sense, it can be based on
a consensus at the national level or reflect various and sometimes conflicting po-
litical ideologies. Its temporality is rather a short term one. 
In European studies, there is a consensus that belonging to the European Union
and other (Western) international organisations implies sharing and promoting a
certain set of liberal-democratic norms and values. The debates on the Constitu-
tional Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights have generated a fruitful liter-
ature which has highlighted the genuine nature of the EU identity (Fossum, 2003).
In the same vein, academic studies have focused on the internal dimension of the
EU’s identity as a whole and the projection of its norms and values abroad (Teló,
2005; Manners and Lucarelli, 2006; Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008). However, some
authors believe that European integration facilitates the flourishing of diverse na-
tional identities rather than a convergence around a single homogeneous Euro-
pean Union identity, and thus that the process does not exclude further integration
(Cram, 2009). 
A few authors have thus looked at change and continuity in foreign policy in the
context of EU integration. Smith, Smith and White (1988) have highlighted the
changes in the foreign policy of the United Kingdom that were due to its interac-
tion with members of the European Community and further evolution in the field
of European foreign policy. Tonra specifically looked at the phenomenon of ‘Euro-
peanisation’ of foreign policies by exploring the top-down impact of the EU foreign
policy, especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on the Dutch,
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Danish and Irish foreign policies (Tonra, 2001).4 Furthermore, a recent analysis by
Jokela clearly indicates that the United Kingdom and Finland have developed very
different understandings of foreign policy identities in relation to European inte-
gration (Jokela, 2011). 
Although there were some exceptions (Hill and Wong, 2011), most of the com-
parative studies on the foreign policy of EU members thus far focused on members
of the EU 15 (Manners and Whitman, 2000). When one turns to the East Central
European EU members, one notices that publications on their foreign policy iden-
tities are rather rare. A major exception is the special issue of the Journal of Com-
munist Studies and Transition Politics coordinated by Rick Fawn (2003) on ‘ideolo-
gy and national identity in post-communist foreign policies’. This issue is particu-
larly interested in the role of ideology and minorities in shaping East Central Euro-
pean foreign policies. But the fact that it presents a large comparative sample in-
cluding Russia and countries from Central Asia excludes any analysis of ECE’s rela-
tion with the post-national EU level. Thus, in fact, so far no comparative perspec-
tive was offered on the foreign policy identities of the East Central European EU
members (cf. Šabič and Brglez, 2002).
The contributions to this issue exemplify the ambiguous relation between na-
tional and European identity. Not surprisingly, they highlight the fact that it is only
after having officially accessed the European Union in 2004/2007 that the East
Central European countries started to behave as EU members and promote the
EU’s norms. Here it is clearly evident that undergoing the socialisation process for
entry into EU institutions and obtaining a better understanding of EU norms and
values have allowed the newcomers to progressively add a new layer, the European
one, to their national foreign policy identity. But what is more astonishing is that af-
ter accession, they have all defined the Western Balkans and/or Eastern Europe as
priority regions, although in the 1990s and early 2000s the ECE countries – with
the exception of Poland – aimed to get away from them. Most of the contributions
to this special issue explain this by the fact that the ECE foreign policies have pro-
gressively become ‘Europeanised’ and tried to find a ‘niche’ in EU external relations
(see the articles by Made, Kesa, Szczepanik, Weiss, Najšlová, and Angelescu).
However, as the articles show, foreign policy identities are defined, adjusted and
legitimised in relation to the given country’s past. 
DEFINING THE HISTORICAL SELF
We argue further that the political self has to live with the historical self, a ‘second
order identity’ based on memory and narratives of a common history. As a matter
of fact, each country’s specific interpretation of values and principles is the result
of the shared meaning of its history and constitutional and legal practices (Lucarelli,
2006: 312). A historical identity thus reflects the legacies of the past, which are
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linked to the long-term development of the nation, the state and/or the nation-
state. It can take multiple forms and entail different temporalities, but the tempo-
ralities are generally of a long-term nature. 
For example, many scholars have shown that the legacies of World War II are still
very present in the formulation of the foreign policy identities of various EU and
non-EU countries. Germany’s post-World War II foreign policy was defined as that
of a ‘tamed power’ (Katzenstein, 1997) and a ‘civilian power’ (Maull, 1990). Ger-
many also intended to enhance the role of economic means rather than military
means, and to enhance the role of norms and values in its foreign policy. Besides
this, several authors have investigated why Japan has been reluctant to use military
force since the end of the Pacific War, and in their findings, they argued that post-
war Japan has developed a uniquely antimilitarist identity of domestic origin which
has constrained the national security agenda (Bukh, 2010: 4; Katzenstein, 1996;
Berger, 1996; Maull, 1990). To contrast, in Russia, ‘the Great Patriotic War (i.e. the
Soviet Union’s war against Nazi Germany in 1941–1945) is the fundamental narra-
tive on which the identity of the new Russia is being increasingly grounded’ (Mo-
rozov, 2008: 160; cf. Cygankov, 2010). 
But historical identity can also refer to political constructions which rely on a
longer past. For Wallace, the fact that British identity is rooted ‘in the evolution of
the English common law, the idea of Magna Charta as the charter of English liber-
ties, and above all the sovereignty of the Parliament’ largely influences the way the
UK foreign policy identity is defined (Wallace, 1991: 70). Waever and also Mar-
cussen et al. have highlighted France’s role as a ‘civilizing mission’ and Germany’s
culture of compromise in the two countries’ relations to the European Union (Mar-
cussen et al., 1999; Waever, 2005). However, a country’s relation to history is not
a static one; it is open to internal debates and thus does not exclude any ways of
coming out of long-term historical processes. This is what Kassianova states when
she argues that foreign policy should move away from a static view of history (Kas-
sianova, 2001: 824). It also echoes the warnings of historians who highlight the
malleability of history in foreign policy (Grosser, 2002). 
The articles gathered in this issue indicate the importance of the past in the con-
struction of ECE foreign policy identities. The Soviet or communist era is often men-
tioned as a common past that is shared by ECE and the Eastern neighbourhood. It
is in relation to this past, and in order to overcome it, that ECE countries are willing
to share their experiences of transition and EU accession (see Made, Kesa,
Szczepanik, Weiss, Najšlová, Rácz, and Angelescu in this issue). In the case of
Poland and Lithuania, and also that of Hungary and Romania, one or more ECE
countries’ relations to specific countries of the Eastern neighbourhood are defined
on the basis of a long-term common history. The time of the Commonwealth of
Poland and Lithuania is still mentioned by these two countries in their efforts to
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build stronger links with Ukraine and Belarus. Similarly, Hungary and Romania re-
call times when they had a larger territory in order to improve their links with
Ukraine and/or Moldova. Plus, as an example of the opposite tendency, the ab-
sence of longer historical relations between Slovenia and the Eastern neighbour-
hood and, to some extent, between Hungary and this region seems to explain why
the two countries were not interested in getting involved in the region before their
EU accession (see Šabič/Bunič and Rácz in this issue).
A POSSIBLE CLASH BETWEEN POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL IDENTITIES
According to the constructivist ontology, actors’ preferences are shaped along the
norms, beliefs and values which constitute their identity (Wendt, 1999). In case a
consensual or dominant identity is present, it can imply the adoption of a certain
foreign policy role (Maull, 1990). However, as stated above, we consider that iden-
tities are not fixed, are multi-layered and can evolve. In the field of foreign policy,
they can take the form of conflicting ideologies defended by a plurality of political
parties and actors (Drulák, 2006), which can be contradictory and clash (Kořan,
2007; Kösebalaban, 2008). When the consensus on the political self and on histo-
ry is not shared among all the domestic actors, there is larger leeway for reinter-
pretation and redefinition of the foreign policy identity and priorities. The various
political positions may be supported by different conceptions of national history,
relations to neighbours or relations to other countries. This is often reflected in the
divisions among the political elite, and also in the divisions between the govern-
ment, non-governmental actors and the public. 
Various works on Turkey and Japan very well highlighted the possible conflicts
on the definition of foreign policy identities. Kösebalaban, for example, indicates
that ‘the lack of national consensus in [Turkey and Japan] in regard to their sense
of belonging to a geographical location can be traced to an incomplete process of
civilizational identity formation marked by ongoing debates about the shift toward
modernity and the West at the domestic level’ (Kösebalaban, 2008: 6). He argues
that foreign policy decisions are made against the background of ideational fac-
tors, including identities and historical memory. Foreign policy emerges in the con-
text of clashes among domestic identity groups, and thus national identity needs
to be problematised as a contested space in which different interpretations of this
identity are expressed and interact with each other (ibid.: 7). Rumelili goes in the
same direction when she writes that ‘identities are socially constructed, negotiat-
ed, and contested’ (Rumelili, 2008: 97). 
When one looks at East Central European countries, one notices that despite the
relative consensus on the norms and values to promote – human rights, democra-
cy, market economy and the EU acquis communautaire – there are still lively de-
bates on the way to interpret history and the relations to the Eastern neighbour-
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hood in these countries. This is what the contribution by Szczepanik on the Polish
policy towards the East remarkably shows. While the other articles of this special is-
sue did not go into such details, the analyses by Made (on Estonia), Rácz (on Hun-
gary) and Angelescu (on Romania) give to understand that such national debates
would be worth analysing.
To summarise this part on foreign policy identity, one may state that once their
EU and NATO accessions were achieved, the ‘new’ ECE members have reframed
their foreign policies, and the Eastern neighbourhood has become one of their
core foreign policy priorities. On one side, EU accession and taking over EU norms
implied a redefinition of the political self, a ‘Europeanisation’ of East Central Euro-
pean foreign policies motivated by the ‘return to Europe’. But on the other side,
politicians have drawn on experiences from the past, the historical self, to define
and legitimise their own foreign policy and thus participate in and shape EU for-
eign relations. It is on this basis that solidarity could be expressed.
SOLIDARITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
Solidarity represents one of the forms of expression of foreign policy identities. Like
the self, it is subject to relative evolution and redefinition. It expresses a sense of
belonging (to the same community, ideology, group of thoughts, etc.). But solidar-
ity can also be defined against a specific other, may it be a past structure (like the
Soviet Union), a country or a group. This other does not have to be threatening –
it can just be different. The expression of solidarity very much depends, indeed, on
which elements of the political self and the historical self are brought to the politi-
cal agenda. It is on the basis of these identities that solidarity with other countries
and regions can be developed, that a bridge between the self and the other(s) is
made possible. Furthermore, it means that even if foreign policy is generally for-
mulated by the state and its agents, a row of other actors are free to adopt and pro-
mote the same or a similar identity and the same or similar ideals. Their activities
can be driven in cooperation with the state or in parallel – and sometimes in con-
tradiction – to its action. 
Using the concept of solidarity, we argue, mainly represents a way to opera-
tionalise foreign policy identity – as defined in foreign policy concepts and strate-
gies – and to understand its expression through foreign policy implementation. In
general, scholars interested in foreign policy identities have neglected the phase of
implementation of foreign policies. They may focus on the different actors (oppo-
sition, media) who contribute to making a foreign policy identity evolve (Hansen,
2006). Or from a different standpoint, making recourse to a sociology of foreign
policy, in analogy to the sociology of European policies (Saurugger, 2009; Saurug-
ger and Mérand, 2010), represents a way to explain the variety of discourses, their
positioning in the political sphere and the dominance, at a certain time, of one dis-
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course over another. But while the focus of the post-structuralist approach remains
on the text (in the wider meaning of the term), and the focus of sociology remains
on the positioning and power relations between actors, we believe that it remains
more fruitful to use theories and approaches as methodological lenses (Kratochvíl
and Tulmets, 2010). This means that both constructivism and rationalism can be
used as tools to shed light on the processes observed. In this method they are not
used in a separate way, as suggested by Fearon and Wendt (2005), or in a bridge-
building approach, like that which is argued for by Adler (1997) or Checkel (1999),
but in a complimentary approach (Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010). Indeed, because
of the approaches’ ontological and epistemological differences, each approach
poses a different set of questions and thus sheds light on and reveals types of in-
formation which another approach would not have explored otherwise. 
The ambition of this special issue is not to test theories, but, like in sociology, to
follow an inductive path: the contributions use theories and concepts as method-
ological lenses and focus on different empirical cases, which then allow for some
generalisation. They particularly look at the way solidarity allows for the translation
of foreign policy identity into foreign policy implementation by investigating the
underlying premises of solidarity (whether it is present in the political and histori-
cal selves) and their forms of expression (or their absence) in the Eastern neigh-
bourhood. 
When using a constructivist lens, the authors explore the way the given foreign
policy identity was constructed so as to allow (or not allow) for the formulation of
a responsible policy. There is indeed a difference between political declarations be-
ing made to support democratic processes in a region or a country, and defining
this region or country as a priority in a foreign policy strategy and/or actually chan-
nelling assistance (via an assistance policy) to that country. In the contributions,
solidarity was mostly assimilated to political support and aid policy. Like in their de-
velopment policy, the EU countries propose to ‘help the aid recipients to help
themselves’, to help the beneficiary countries develop their own values and insti-
tutions, or to help them overcome a crisis or a difficult situation. Solidarity is also
seen as a way to formulate plans for further engagement and to express the will to
include external actors in a(n) (‘imagined’) community, not only through symbolic
support, like EU and NATO accession, but also through material support. As the Eu-
ropean Union represents a specific post-national form of community, it thus re-
mains particularly interesting to investigate how identity and solidarity are shaped
and expressed in the foreign policy of its members. 
When looking through the rationalist lens, one may realise that a country could
have other, more selfish reasons for expressing solidarity with a group, another
country or a region by sending it political, human and material resources. One may
consider here, as the sociology of the EU suggests, that rationality is situational and
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needs to be contextualised (Jacquot and Woll, 2003). Here, the logic is reversed:
in this case, solidarity ‘helps the EU countries to help themselves’. Expressing soli-
darity with a region is a way for the EU members to gain some political advantages,
enhance their position in the (‘imagined’) communities they belong to, improve
their situation of geographical liminality, solve a conflict or simply strive for eco-
nomic and material gains. Nevertheless, we think that the one or the other ap-
proach does not hinder the fact that solidarity needs to be rooted in a certain form
of foreign policy identity. 
We thus consider solidarity as a useful concept for enlarging the scope of the re-
search on foreign policy and better operationalising the concept of foreign policy
identity. To summarise, solidarity is considered as a mirror expression of political
and/or historical identities, and thus at times it reflects a norm-following behaviour
and at other times it reveals a more rationalist behaviour. As foreign policy identi-
ty is of a dual nature and is subject to various interpretations, one may be able to
identify various forms of solidarity or various reasons for the expression (or ab-
sence) of solidarity. This is why a comparative approach is needed: we need it in
order to see if the given solidarity is being formulated because of a common (his-
torical) identity with a region, in this case the Eastern neighbourhood, because of
a common vision of political order (the EU and its norms), because of more strate-
gic reasons like the the donor country’s positioning vis-à-vis another politically in-
fluential country or within a community, or because of some other reasons or a
combination of two or more of the reasons listed above. 
The formulation of solidarity in foreign policy can thus be apprehended through
both the ideational and the rational reasons which are listed in table 1. On this ba-
sis, we believe that solidarity can be expressed both in discourse and in action,
and that the action that expresses solidarity can take both symbolic and material
forms. 
Table 1. Ideational and rational reasons for ECE solidarity with the Eastern
neighbourhood
Definition of foreign policy Foreign policy implementation
Ideational Political identity (short term: ideology, Political support, promotion of EU norms
factors ‘Europeanisation’) and values
Historical identity (long term: close Assistance policy (humanitarian aid, 
neighbourhood, legacies of the past) democracy promotion, etc.)
Rational To find a ‘niche’ in EU policy (to become Definition of EU policies in the Eastern 
factors ‘policy makers’) neighbourhood
Specific issues: economic, energy issues, Assistance policy (technical assistance in 
etc. trade, energy issues, etc.)
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If one wants to go beyond political declarations and speeches in order to make
the link between the foreign policy identity (entailed in foreign policy strategies)
and implementation, one needs to look at consistency (Duke, 1999; Tulmets,
2008). Consistency is understood here as the expression of adequacy and the ab-
sence of contradictions between discourse and action. In order to be consistent,
the solidarity expressed on the basis of a certain foreign policy identity needs to
be followed by symbolic and/or material actions which prove the strength of the
policy construction and the sincerity of the engagements. One can look at con-
sistency through the prism of political solidarity, i.e. one can look at the way politi-
cians have reacted (or have not reacted) bilaterally and multilaterally to some
events and the way they expressed (or did not express) consistency with their
country’s foreign policy identity (for example, in supporting the status of an EU
candidate; in showing support during specific negotiations during and after
events like the Orange Revolution, the war in Georgia, etc.). One can also look at
the political means used to move beyond scarce bilateral material means, like the
cooperation of the Visegrád Group, in order to influence the multilateral EU pol-
icy in the post-communist neighbourhood. Furthermore, holding the presidency
of the European Union might also be a test of the country’s capacity to remain
consistent with its foreign policy identity and develop further rhetorical means to
support this identity. 
Methodologically, this requires using both constructivism and rationalism as ‘an-
alytical lenses’ (Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010). Looking for consistency necessitates
examining whether actors have generally followed the logic of appropriateness or
the logic of consequentialism, or whether they sometimes followed one logic and
sometimes the other. The first logic is generally defined as ‘a perspective that sees
human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized
into institutions’ (March and Olsen, 2004: 2). In this logic, ‘rules are followed be-
cause they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate’ (ibid.). This con-
trasts with the logic of consequentialism, which insists on the rationality of action
as the result of check and balances (March and Olsen, 1998; see also Schim-
melfennig, 2001). The logics are not mutually exclusive. As stated in the literature
using this dichotomy, they are rather used alternatively to highlight different modes
of behaviour (Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010). 
In complementarity, the search for consistency between discourse and action
can be done by confronting discourse analysis (the analysis of speeches) and first
hand documents with semi-direct interviews, statistics on aid and trade, and anal-
yses of the media. Triangulation thus allows for checking whether the solidarity ex-
pressed in political speeches on the basis of a certain foreign policy identity is
complemented by a predominantly constructivist or a predominantly rationalist
mode of behaviour, while the solidarity takes the form of symbolic and/or mate-
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rial actions. One can also check if bilateral and multilateral non-governmental ac-
tivities are consistent with official foreign policy identities and what role(s) they
played in promoting geographical and political priorities in the Eastern neigh-
bourhood. 
In regard to this issue, Weiss, for example, shows that the Czech Republic’s ac-
tivities in the Eastern neighbourhood have remained rather consistent with the
traditional Czech discourse on democracy promotion and human rights, despite
the absence of historical boundaries between the Czech Republic and this re-
gion. In contrast, Šabič and Bunič highlight the absence of a Slovenian discourse
on solidarity towards Eastern Europe, which meant that they had to check for fur-
ther rational and ideational reasons for the presence of Slovenia’s assistance pol-
icy and trade in the Eastern neighbourhood. In turn, Rácz mainly analyses the
Hungarian policy in the East through the rationalist lens, thus highlighting Hun-
gary’s narrow understanding of the neighbourhood in comparison to the EU’s
understanding of it. Finally, for her part, Najšlová argues that Slovakia has initial-
ly followed the logic of consequentialism in order to find its place in the EU, but
afterwards it was able to express solidarity with other countries along the logic
of appropriateness. 
EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICIES
TOWARDS THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD:
SOME OUTCOMES
The empirical studies gathered in this special issue have all investigated the link be-
tween solidarity and identity in the East Central European foreign policies. The core
hypothesis used to explain the East Central European solidarity with the Eastern
neighbourhood was that solidarity is defined on the basis of an identity which is
dual, as it is composed of a ‘first order’ political and a ‘second order’ historical self.
While the aim was not to follow exactly the analytical framework proposed above
so as to leave space for an inductive path, the contributions have made the effort
to highlight the relevance of one or several aspects of this framework and thus
greatly participated in generating interesting findings on solidarity in foreign rela-
tions. While looking at solidarity and identity in foreign policy, the analyses high-
lighted not only the importance of the logic of appropriateness, as was expected,
but also the importance of the logic of consequentialism. This special issue thus not
only explores the deeper reasons of the East Central European expression of soli-
darity towards Eastern Europe, but it also complements constructivist approaches
to the foreign policy identities of EU members.
The comparative approach has particularly contributed to deconstructing the
view of the ECE countries as a homogeneous bloc – as this view is often assumed
by the ‘older’ EU members – by highlighting the fact that the East Central European
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countries’ relations towards the Eastern neighbourhood are defined on relatively
different understandings of political and historical identities. Variations (and even
clashes) between the dual aspects of a country’s identity can also be observed, de-
pending on the political parties in power. 
To summarise, one may mention the following outcomes of this exercise:
First and foremost, the promotion of the experience of democratic and eco-
nomic transition, as well as of accession to the EU and NATO, represents the
core priority of the ECE policies in the Eastern neighbourhood. Contrary to
what one would expect, the political self of the ECE foreign policy towards the
Eastern neighbourhood is generally not formulated in terms of a rejection of
Russia as a specific other, but it is rather formulated against a part of a com-
mon historical self, the Soviet or communist past. Here the main idea in defin-
ing a policy of solidarity towards the Eastern neighbourhood is that integration
into Western organisations is an efficient way to modernise and integrate lib-
eral norms and rules, and thus to take distance from the Soviet or communist
past. This is the reason why promoting the experiences of transition and EU en-
largement often represents one of the foreign policy priorities of the ECE coun-
tries. Assistance policy here clearly represents a way to materialise the promo-
tion of EU norms and values, and to integrate the Eastern neighbours into a
‘modern’ community working with EU (and other international) rules. Further-
more, by following the logic of appropriateness through ‘Europeanising’ their
foreign policies, the ECE countries want to show that they have become ‘true
Europeans’ despite their ‘liminal’ position in the EU (Mälksoo, 2009; Kesa, this
issue). They not only want to share this experience with other countries by ex-
pressing solidarity towards them, may it be in periods of change (the Rose and
Orange Revolutions) or in the longer run (assistance, support of EU enlarge-
ment) (logic of appropriateness), but they also want to reduce the socio-eco-
nomic disparities at their own (and the EU’s) Eastern borders (logic of conse-
quentialism).
Second, the longer past still plays a role in the way foreign policy identities are
defined in general and the way priorities are drawn towards the Eastern neigh-
bourhood more specifically. Solidarity is often formulated towards countries or re-
gions which used to belong to the same political space or used to share common
rules. This is the case with Poland’s solidarity towards Ukraine, Lithuania’s solidari-
ty towards Belarus, or Romania’s solidarity towards Moldova. This kind of solidari-
ty largely embraces the logic of appropriateness. Thus the presence (or lack there-
of) of a longer past as a sovereign state seems to be an important factor for the for-
mulation of a consensual foreign policy identity and a policy of solidarity. Countries
which were highly dependent on foreign influences in their longer past started to
define their role in the East only recently; that is, they did so once they were part
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of the EU and correspondingly started to act according to the logic of consequen-
tialism (e.g. Slovakia).
Third, according to the logic of consequentialism, the ECE countries see a poli-
cy towards the Eastern neighbourhood as a way to build an imprint in EU policy, to
switch from their position as ‘policy takers’ to the position of ‘policy shapers’. All
the contributions in this issue highlight the fact that the examined ECE countries
have chosen the Eastern neighbourhood (and/or the Western Balkans) as their pri-
ority region in order to find a ‘niche’ for themselves in EU foreign policy. The East
and the post-communist countries in general thus represent a space where the ECE
countries can ‘make a difference’. In this way, their approach does not differ from
that of the ‘older’ member states, as both groups of countries are more interested
in some parts of the world than in others. The European Neighbourhood Policy and
the sub-regional approaches like the Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy
and the Danube Strategy are clearly seen as a way for the ECE countries to find
their place in the European Union and on the international stage in general. Plus,
for these countries, holding the presidency of the EU Council represents a way for
them to formulate their national preferences and upload them at the EU level.
While expressing solidarity opens the way for assistance and the promotion of na-
tional experiences of transition and accession to the EU (along the logic of appro-
priateness), it also allows the ECE countries to make their place in the EU, assist
neighbour countries and develop ties with them on economic, trade and energy is-
sues (logic of consequentialism). 
Finally, this special issue does not concentrate on collective action and non-
governmental activities, but it is worth mentioning that the expression of solidari-
ty is not limited to single EU member states and the nation-state. The Visegrád
Group (V4), which is mentioned in some of the contributions, exemplifies the
strong common commitment of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (and
Hungary) towards the Eastern neighbourhood. Furthermore, and this should not
be forgotten, EU presidencies and EU-related activities (e.g. the Eastern Partner-
ship, the Black Sea Synergy) also represent good occasions for non-governmen-
tal organisations to promote their own projects. Indeed, non-governmental activ-
ities frequently serve as additional expressions of solidarity which very often com-
plement governmental policies and sometimes influence them, as the Czech case
shows. 
To summarise, the studies gathered here indicate that the ECE countries’ identities
and solidarities have been formulated and evolved throughout the 1990s and
2000s, mainly under the process of EU accession. Although this is a generalisa-
tion, almost all the contributions (the ones by Made, Kesa, Szczepanik, Weiss, Na-
jšlová, and Angelescu) indicate that a discourse on solidarity is present in the cas-
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es of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Roma-
nia, but it is present in these cases mainly for political reasons related to the de-
fense of human rights, democracy, and the promotion of EU norms and as a way
to take distance from the communist past. The articles by Szczepanik (Poland),
Kesa (Lithuania), and Angelescu (Romania) show that the ECE countries’ solidari-
ty towards specific countries of the Eastern neighbourhood is also motivated by
historical reasons, and that it is followed by political declarations, assistance ac-
tivities, and the will to influence EU policy. To contrast, Rácz and Šabič and Bunič
show that Hungary and Slovenia have no strong historical links with the Eastern
neighbourhood (except for the Hungarian minorities in Ukraine) and thus no am-
bition to influence the EU policy towards it. The Slovenian case even reveals that
there is almost no discourse on solidarity towards the Eastern neighbourhood in
Slovenia. 
Finally, even if one considers, in a constructivist perspective, that the ECE coun-
tries’ solidarity was formulated on the basis of a dual identity, one cannot totally ex-
clude more rational reasons for their engagement in the Eastern neighbourhood.
The role of economic ties and energy issues are mentioned in some of the contri-
butions as important factors that influence the East Central European interests in
the region. 
By gathering together specialists on foreign policy and the Eastern neighbour-
hood from East Central European countries, this special issue not only seeks to pro-
vide valuable research on the foreign policies of the East Central European EU
members, but it also opens the way for a field of investigation which remained
rather unexplored until now, at least in its comparative dimension. 
ENDNOTES
1 This special issue is coordinated in the framework of a post-doctoral research project on East Central
European participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (the EFSPS, the ‘European Foreign and
Security Policy Studies’ programme). I would like to thank the Volkswagen Foundation for its gener-
ous support as well as Petr Kratochvíl, Mats Braun, Kai-Olaf-Lang, Vladimír Handl, an anonymous re-
viewer and the authors of the articles of this special issue for their comments during the related work-
shop organised at the Institute of International Relations in Prague on 28 June 2011. 
2 In order to go beyond the debate on the existence of Central Europe and to avoid the term used at
the EU level, ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, which aggregates Central Europe and Eastern Europe, we
prefer to speak of East Central European states. The ECE countries comprise the countries of the Viseg-
rád group – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia; the three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania; and the countries of the Balkans – Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, which acceded the
European Union in 2004 and 2007.
3 For a review of the literature on the ENP, see Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010.
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4 For further definitions on ‘Europeanisation’, see also Radaelli (2000) and Caporaso, Green-Cowles and
Risse (2001).
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Projecting the Re-Discovered:
Czech Policy Towards 
Eastern Europe
TOMÁŠ WEISS
Abstract: The paper analyses the Czech foreign policy towards the countries of the Eastern Partner-
ship from the perspective of identity and solidarity. It provides an overview of the Czech
identity and its impact on the Czech foreign policy priorities prior to and after the EU and
NATO accession. It investigates the expressions of solidarity in the Czech foreign policy and
searches for a link between the practice of policy at various levels and the declared posi-
tion based on identity. It concludes that the practice largely corresponds with the declared
foreign policy identity. It also shows that there is a significant shift of focus from more dis-
tant countries to the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, especially the East European
countries, in the Czech foreign policy.
Keywords: Czech Republic, Eastern Partnership, identity, solidarity, foreign policy
This paper aims to analyse the Czech Republic’s policy towards the countries of the
Eastern Neighbourhood. It follows the approach outlined in the introductory article
to this special issue (Tulmets) and compares the declared foreign policy identity of
the Czech Republic with the actual foreign policy practice. The approach builds on
the constructivist idea that actors’ preferences are influenced by the values and be-
liefs that constitute their identity (Wendt, 1999). These values and beliefs can have
both a historical and a political origin based on the specific narrative about the ac-
tor’s history and ideas about what is right and wrong (Marcussen et al., 1999).
The key attribute of a constructed foreign policy identity is that it is not given. It
can evolve in time with a change in the historical narrative or an adjustment of po-
litical and constitutional norms of behaviour, which may lead to a re-interpretation
of the actor’s role in international relations (Maull, 1990). It can also evolve as a re-
sult of an external pressure. One of the most studied external pressures in recent
years has been the pressure of the European Union (EU) membership. The EU in-
fluences the member states’ identities through both of the above channels (a
change in the historical narrative and a readjustment of norms). Through written as
well as unwritten norms it shapes notions of what should and should not be done.
The embargo on the arms trade with China might serve as an example of a written
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norm, whereas the practice of pre-negotiating positions in the EU-group prior to
meetings of larger multilateral fora represents the EU’s unwritten norms. At the
same time, the conduct of a common foreign policy influences a country’s under-
standing of itself through actions taken in the past in a longer run. Although prob-
ably less visible in foreign policy than in some other policy areas, Europeanisation
does have an impact on foreign policy identities and practices of the member
states (cf. Manners and Whitman, 2000; Tonra, 2001).
The Czech Republic acceded to the European Union in 2004, together with sev-
en other post-communist countries. As a member it started to influence the Euro-
pean policy. But its structures and policies had already been influenced by the EU
during the accession negotiations, and the modifications continued after its entry.
It also adjusted its bilateral foreign policies to the new situation. This paper investi-
gates the foreign policy identity of the Czech Republic and its EU-related change.
The identity is analysed on the basis of two main sources: the discourse of the elites
on ‘who we are’ and ‘what we believe in’, and its translation into foreign policy pri-
orities as defined in the key policy documents with a particular focus on the East-
ern EU neighbourhood.
There is, however, another source that shapes who we are, and it might be dif-
ferent from what we declare ourselves to be – our actual practices. Therefore, the
second part of this paper focuses on the actual policy of the Czech Republic and
asks to what extent the practice supports the image created by the discourse and
foreign policy documents. It focuses on expressions of solidarity with Eastern Eu-
rope which can be traced on three distinct levels: the level of political solidarity
conducted through statements and motions, that of bureaucratic solidarity in the
form of financial and other assistance, and that of civic solidarity carried out by
non-governmental organisations. The last part then compares the declared identi-
ty with the foreign policy practice and concludes the article.
INVESTIGATING THE CZECH FOREIGN POLICY
IDENTITY
A FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY BASED ON EUROPEAN
VALUES
After the 1993 split of Czechoslovakia, the independent Czech Republic and its
elites continued in the discourse established right after the end of the Cold War.
With the exception of the Communist Party and some right-wing extremist parties,
all the mainstream parties identified with Western Europe and the West in general.
If the accession to West European economic, security and political organisations
was considered the primary objective of the Czech foreign policy, it was desirable
not only as an interest-based action, but also as a confirmation of the West Euro-
pean identity of the Czechs.
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The events of the previous five decades were conceptualised as a forced and ar-
tificial separation of the Czech nation from the region where the nation and the
state had always belonged. The future accession would then be a logical result of
the Czech Republic catching up with the luckier nations and ‘returning to Europe’.
This was clearly stated in the memorandum that the Czech government attached
to its EU membership application in 1996. The government emphasised that the
Czech area had been a ‘natural and distinct part of the West European civilisation
area’ for centuries (Government of the Czech Republic, 1996). As a result of this
dominant conceptualisation, European values such as ‘democracy, respect for hu-
man rights, civil society and open market economy’ (Havel, 1994) were taken for
granted by the Czech elites as they saw no need for further debate on them. They
were, after all, considered ‘traditional’ Czech values as well. Thus, the accession
process was considered to be not a transfer of values, but a transfer of institutions
(cf. Topolánek, 2009a). The debate thus focused more on the practical aspects of
the integration (especially the integration into the European Union), such as the
transfer of sovereignty. The discussion on the EU mirrored the argumentation that
existed within the Union at the time, as it focused on the question of the relation-
ship between the EU and the national level, the broadening of the Community
method to other areas, and the level and extent of regulation in various areas (cf.
Marek and Baun, 2010: chapter 2).
The key foreign policy documents have reflected this (re-)internalisation of Eu-
ropean values. In them, the First Republic1 was routinely used as the point of refer-
ence for the values and standards that were abandoned but had to be re-intro-
duced (cf. Zieleniec, 1993). Plus, the Foreign Policy Concept of 1999 clearly stat-
ed that the Czech Republic ‘recognise[d] the heritage and values of the European
civilisation’ (Government of the Czech Republic, 1999). These basic values were
defined as the general international law, rule of law and the principle of the in-
alienability of basic human rights.
From the very beginning the Czechoslovak and Czech foreign policy was shaped
by former dissidents. The most influential among them was President. Václav
 Havel, who had a profound impact on the Czech foreign policy – occasionally he
even overstepped (or almost overstepped) the formal competencies of his office,
like when he signed the letter supporting the military solution to the Iraqi crisis in
2003 without consulting the government (cf. Král and Pachta, 2005). Many former
dissidents also started building careers in diplomacy after the end of the Cold War
– the first Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiří Dienstbier, might be one example,
and the current Minister of Defence Alexandr Vondra (who was also a long-time
official of the Foreign Ministry and a Foreign Minister) might be another. Václav
Havel’s influence and vision have persisted even after he finished his terms, be-
cause his associates from the President’s office, e.g. Vondra or the current Foreign
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Minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, continued to occupy the key positions for foreign
policy-making.
As a result, the Czech foreign policy has elaborated on values in key foreign pol-
icy documents rather than just recognising the European affiliation. In general, hu-
man rights and democracy were the two key values that Czech conceptual docu-
ments identified as ‘principles’ of foreign policy (Government of the Czech Re-
public, 1999; 2003). The general notions have been developed into concrete par-
tial issues by the newly established Specialised Department for Human Rights and
Transition Promotion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which the Czech Republic
should support in target countries. These partial issues were the issues of civil so-
ciety and civil rights defenders, media and access to information, rule of law and
good governance, election processes, and equality and non-discrimination (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Later, the Czech emphasis on human rights has been
reconfirmed by the country’s successful candidacy for a UN Human Rights Coun-
cil membership in 2011.2
Another key issue of the Czech foreign policy identity, which developed only af-
ter the country joined NATO and the EU, was the support for further enlargement
of both organisations. The support for an ‘open Europe’ (Šlosarčík et al., 2011:
90–94) stems from an understanding in which membership in the two organisa-
tions, especially in the EU, is seen as a stabilising factor. There is also a significant
support on the part of the general public for further enlargement. The strong con-
sensual policy is not hampered in its results by the fact that the two biggest politi-
cal parties differ in their understanding of what influence the enlargement might
have on European integration in general. Whereas the Social Democrats simulta-
neously support both the widening and the deepening of the integration process,
the Civic Democrats have often advocated widening but not deepening with the
assumption that the more members there are, the more difficult further political in-
tegration would be.
THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES 
THE FOCUS ON GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
The Czech Republic has always regarded itself as a middle-sized state in the centre
of Europe. The Czech identity has been influenced by the fact that the Czech lands
played a part in many European conflicts. Stability in Europe is therefore ‘the basic
precondition for providing security in the Czech Republic’ (Government of the
Czech Republic, 1999). 
Two Czech foreign policy priority areas of the 1990s result directly from the need
for stability – namely good neighbourly relations and the Euro-Atlantic integration.
The former was at least partly considered as not only a priority in its own terms, but
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as a precondition for achieving the latter. Issues in the Czech Republic’s relations
with its neighbours were largely solved through bilateral negotiations (the Czech-
German Declaration) or internal developments (the end of the Mečiar era in Slo-
vakia). To be sure, some issues of this sort still remained after these developments,
but their impact on foreign policy was limited (e.g. the Temelín power plant issue
with Austria) (cf. Handl, 2009; Šepták, 2009).
Stability in Europe has been primarily associated with the two main organisa-
tions in Western Europe–NATO and the EU. From the very beginning, the Alliance
has been considered the more important of the two in political and security terms.
This stemmed from the historical memories of 1938/1939 and 1968. The NATO
membership (as well as an alliance with the US) has been understood as a guar-
antee that such events would not happen again. The EU, on the other hand, has
been understood more in economic terms than in terms of security. The empha-
sis on NATO was also caused by the existence of the mutual defence clause in the
Washington Treaty, which naturally did not have a counterpart in the Maastricht
Treaty. However, the pro-American stream in Czech foreign policy has prevailed
even after the EU developed its own capabilities and turned into a defence or-
ganisation (Král et al., 2008: 70f).
Despite occasional disagreements about particular (albeit important) issues,
such as the position of the Czech Republic on the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia or
the level of the Czech Republic’s participation in the Iraq War in 2003, the Czech
prioritisation of the accessions to NATO and the EU was based on a broad con-
sensus between the mainstream political parties. The consensus, however, lacked
a proper substance. As soon as the Czech Republic accomplished the declared for-
eign policy objectives in 1999 and 2004 respectively and was surrounded by mili-
tary and political allies for the first time in its history (including its history as a part
of Czechoslovakia), the political elite started losing interest in foreign policy, as the
major problems with foreign policy seemed to be over to some extent. Currently,
only very few people in Czech political parties deal with foreign and security poli-
cy. The political debate focuses on domestic issues, and foreign policy is some-
times even used as a chip in the domestic political fight. The most visible evidence
of the lacking interest has been the process of updating key foreign policy docu-
ments: Both the latest security strategy and a foreign policy concept were adopted
in 2003, with the concept being planned only for the years 2003–2006 (Govern-
ment of the Czech Republic, 2003a, 2003b). But it was only in 2010 that the for-
eign ministry started working on a new foreign policy concept and a new security
strategy (both were adopted in 2011). Consequently, the Czech foreign policy has
been largely conducted by foreign ministry officials, and politicians become inter-
ested in a foreign policy topic only if the topic becomes politicised and has a po-
tential impact on domestic policy (cf. Weiss and Řiháčková, 2010).
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CHANGING PRIORITIES AFTER THE EU/NATO ACCESSIONS
Due to the lack of conceptual documents, the priorities of the Czech foreign poli-
cy after the EU accession have been formulated in less specific terms in various re-
lated documents – in particular in governmental programmes (cf. Government of
the Czech Republic, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009; 2010a). In general, all the
post-accession Czech governments have pledged that the Czech Republic would
be an active member of the European Union and NATO. The programmes put a
strong emphasis on conducting foreign and security policy through these organi-
sations together with the partners. The priorities have remained rather general on
most issues, as the programmes mainly mentioned the ‘usual suspects’, such as
providing security, stability and prosperity, in this respect without specifying the
concrete steps to be taken. However, there are two exceptions to this that are clear-
ly underpinned by the values framing the Czech foreign policy – the promotion of
democracy and human rights and the support to the enlargement of the EU. In
2007 the government even combined the two and stated that human rights and
democracy will be supported in ‘Europe and especially in its closest neighbour-
hood’ (Government of the Czech Republic, 2007). 
Whereas the support for human rights and democracy carried on from the
1990s, the support to the enlargement appeared in the Czech foreign policy, rather
logically, only after the country joined the EU. It soon developed into one of the
key Czech issues in EU foreign policy, though, and even became a chip in the do-
mestic/internal EU debate. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was to a large ex-
tent advocated by the Czech government for the sake of enlargement. When the
then Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek defended the Treaty in the Czech Senate, he
said, ‘The failure of the Lisbon Treaty would mean the ultimate end to our key pri-
ority, which is the further enlargement of the Union’ (Topolánek, 2009b).
Eastern Europe was largely missing from the radar of the Czech foreign policy un-
til the mid-2000s. Being separated from the region by other Central European coun-
tries, namely Slovakia and Poland, the Czech Republic rather focused on its relations
with the neighbours, the accession process and the Balkans, which was considered
the main territorial priority (cf. Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2007). This ignorance is nice-
ly illustrated by the fact that in an overarching review of the Czech foreign policy un-
til 2004 the researchers from the Prague Institute of International Relations focused
on Czech-Russian relations to an overwhelming extent in their chapter on Eastern
Europe. In the same chapter, Ukraine and Belarus were mentioned in passing only,
and the remaining post-Soviet countries did not appear in the text at all (cf. Votápek,
2004). Furthermore, Eastern Europe became a priority area of Czech foreign policy
only in the run-up to the Czech EU Council Presidency (Tulmets, 2008).
The particular focus on the Eastern neighbourhood became one of the Presi-
dency’s priorities – the concrete form of engagement became clearer after the
Perspectives02_11_text2:PERSPECTIVES  16.12.2011  11:11  Page 32    (Black/Black plate)
PROJECTING THE RE-DISCOVERED
33Perspectives      Vol. 19, No. 2      2011
publication of the Polish-Swedish initiative for an ‘Eastern Partnership’, which the
Presidency endorsed. With the establishment of the Eastern Partnership, the Czech
Presidency aimed at three specific objectives. First, the framework was to provide
good working relations with countries which could not be realistically expected to
join the EU any time soon. Second, it was to facilitate the cooperation with those
countries on energy security, which had been very high on the agenda of both the
EU and the Presidency due to the experience with the Russian-Ukrainian disputes.
And third, the Presidency aimed at re-balancing the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy, which had swung towards the South with the launch of the Union for the
Mediterranean in 2008 (Placák, 2010). 
The focus on Eastern Europe combined well with the other major area of Czech
interest – democracy and human rights promotion. During the Presidency prepa-
rations the government clearly stated that the Czech support to democratisation
and transition in post-Soviet republics builds on the country’s ‘own historical ex-
perience with a non-democratic regime and the process of political and econom-
ic transformation’ (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2007: 15). As a result, the
final Presidency programme, which identified the role of the EU in the world as
one of three key priorities, followed the line of the general Czech foreign policy
with an emphasis on the closest neighbourhood, relations with Russia and the US,
and the promotion of human rights, democracy and development (Czech Repub-
lic, 2009).
If an interest in the Eastern neighbourhood was missing during the 1990s, this
has surely not been the case recently. Countries of the Eastern Partnership are list-
ed as priority countries of both the Czech development policy (Moldova and Geor-
gia) and the transition promotion policy (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia).
The focus on this region is comparable only with the emphasis on the Balkans,
where both policies target a number of countries as well (Government of the
Czech Republic, 2010b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Plus, the latest events in
North Africa (the so-called Arab Spring) have naturally deserved the Czech Re-
public’s attention. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has extended transforma-
tion support to the Southern neighbourhood, especially to Egypt. This ad hoc re-
action, however, has not been translated into a mid- and/or long-term re-orienta-
tion from the East to the South (at least for the time being).
To sum up, the Czech foreign policy after the stabilisation of the Central Euro-
pean region during the 1990s and the accession of the country into NATO and the
European Union formulated its foreign policy priorities largely in accord with its
identity. Two main issues have crystallised as pivots of the Czech foreign policy
identity – EU and NATO enlargement and promotion of democracy and human
rights. Both build on the specific Czech historical experience in the 20th century. Es-
pecially in the European Union the Czech Republic has been very active in both
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democracy promotion and defence of human rights as well as in the regions that
have the perspective of EU membership, the Balkans in particular. Eastern Europe
has gained importance in the Czech view only during the 2000s, but it has been
recognised as one of the most important regions for the Czech foreign policy. As
such, it was also prioritised during the Czech EU Council Presidency. Despite the
developments in North Africa, Eastern Europe and the Balkans have remained a pri-
ority for the Czech foreign policy.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CZECH FOREIGN
POLICY IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD
A RECENT SHIFT IN THE EXPRESSION OF POLITICAL
SOLIDARITY
The practical implementation of the Czech policy vis-à-vis the Eastern partners re-
flects the position of the agenda in Czech foreign policy in general. The Czech Re-
public was not particularly interested in the fate of these countries till the mid-
2000s, and as a result it did not show much effort in the mutual relations or express
much solidarity with them. However, a shift in the Czech position can be shown on
various particular cases, such as the introduction of the visa obligation or the
Czech behaviour during the Orange Revolution, the 2008 war in Georgia or the
Czech Republic’s contacts with the Belarusian opposition.
The Czech Republic’s approach to introducing visa requirements for Eastern
countries is a case in point of the Czech neglect of this dimension of foreign rela-
tions during its accession negotiations. The introduction of a visa regime for na-
tionals travelling from post-Soviet Eastern European countries was one of the ac-
cession obligations for all Central European countries. The Schengen membership
requires a common visa regime, and as all candidate states were expected to abol-
ish internal border control in the future, they had to introduce a part of the Schen-
gen acquis already prior to their accession. Unlike Poland or Hungary, the Czech
Republic did not pay much attention to the worries of the Eastern partners and the
complications this step might cause for the mutual relations and trade exchange. It
introduced the visas very early, already in 2000, and it did not show any effort to
limit the burden that the visa obligation imposed on the affected populations. In
contrast, Poland and Hungary introduced the visas as late as possible – in 2003 –
and accompanied the step with mitigation measures such as increasing the num-
ber of consulates and not charging a fee (Kaźmierkiewicz, 2005).
The Czech reaction to the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was also rather limited.
The Czech Foreign Minister, Cyril Svoboda, expressed his dissatisfaction with the
second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections and declared his belief that
the development in Ukraine would have an impact on the EU-Ukrainian relations
(Svoboda, 2004). Otherwise, the Czech Republic kept a low profile, which was lat-
Perspectives02_11_text2:PERSPECTIVES  16.12.2011  11:11  Page 34    (Black/Black plate)
PROJECTING THE RE-DISCOVERED
35Perspectives      Vol. 19, No. 2      2011
er recognised and criticised even within the foreign ministry itself (Vondra, 2006).
This also can be put into contrast with the active behaviour of the Polish or Hun-
garian representatives, and such comparisons led to declarations about a two-
speed Visegrad approach to the East (Zielys, 2009). In the end, the Czech Repub-
lic abolished the visa fees for Ukrainian citizens, but it did so only after Ukraine had
abolished its visa obligation for the whole EU in 2007.
Czech-Ukrainian relations have been marked by a complex set of factors. On
one hand, Ukraine was largely ignored by the Czech foreign policy for a long time
and remained in the shadow of Czech-Russian and Czech-Western relations. On
the other hand, Ukrainians soon became an important immigration community in
the Czech Republic. Lately, they have even become the largest foreign population
in the Czech Republic with over 130.000 residents in 2009 (i.e. about 30 per cent
of the foreign population) (Czech Statistical Office, 2010). The number of illegal
migrants from Ukraine is probably even higher, and Ukrainians have become a
common work force in some segments of Czech industry, especially in construc-
tion. As a result, the Czech approach to Ukraine has always oscillated between the
rather cautious position of the Ministry of Interior (and of the population) and the
approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which initially ignored Ukraine but lat-
er came to support it (cf. Král, 2007; see Tulmets, 2010 for the recent evolution of
this issue). The internal development in Ukraine causes further confusion. A recent
diplomatic controversy between Ukraine and the Czech Republic over an alleged
case of espionage has been interpreted as a result of internal turf wars and/or Rus-
sian pressure and has not led to any open doubts about the Czech support to a Eu-
ropean option for Ukraine (cf. ČTK, 2011). However, it has not helped to clear up
the Czech position any further.
In 2008, the Czech reaction to the war in Georgia was much stronger. The for-
eign ministry declared its ‘deep concerns about the aggravation of the situation
and the outbreak of armed clashes in Georgian South Ossetia’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2008). Prime Minister Topolánek declared in a similar vein that the Czech
Republic supported the territorial integrity of Georgia (Lidové noviny, 2008). The
Czech government also sent humanitarian aid (mainly medical material) soon after
the outbreak of violence and opened a special call for reconstruction projects. The
extraordinary reconstruction and development aid to the value of 20 million Czech
crowns in 2008 and 70 million in 2009 was already approved by the government
in the second half of August 2008 (Government of the Czech Republic, 2008). Ap-
parently, the Czech diplomacy also examined the potential for a peacekeeping en-
gagement of NATO or the EU in Georgia during the conflict (Týden, 2011).
The concrete and quick expression of solidarity by the Czech government dur-
ing the Georgian war was significantly more solid than, for example, its expression
of solidarity in the case of the Orange Revolution. And this holds despite the fact
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that none of the Czech politicians travelled to the country or declared any inten-
tion to do so. The condemnation of Russia was also supported by most of the
Czech media, which did not hesitate to compare the 2008 war to the 1968 inva-
sion in Czechoslovakia, emphasising the disproportion between the two parties
and the abuse of power by Russia as a regional hegemon (cf. Šimůnek, 2008).
However, the Czech foreign policy was not able to maintain a unified voice on
Georgia (as has been the case with many issues in recent years). President Václav
Klaus criticised Georgia for unleashing the conflict soon after the atrocities started
in August 2008 (Klaus, 2008). This unilateral step by the President was criticised
strongly by the Prime Minister on the grounds that the position of the Czech Re-
public was now blurred when viewed from the outside, and it was stressed that the
foreign minister was responsible for the foreign policy of the country (Hospodářské
noviny, 2008).
Belarus has been an object of Czech attention much longer than the other East
European countries. The Czech declarations of solidarity with the Belarusian op-
position or the imprisoned journalists in Belarus were initially limited to the non-
governmental sector (Hospodářské noviny, 2002). The minority Social Democrat-
ic government, although supporting human rights nominally, focused more on
economic issues and attempted (rather unsuccessfully) to re-conquer the lost mar-
kets in the East. Since 2002, however, the critique of President Lukashenka and his
regime became a standard feature of the Czech foreign policy, with the first crisis
occurring in September 2002 when Mr. Lukashenka was not granted a visa to at-
tend the NATO summit in Prague. The decision was justified by the argument that
Belarus did ‘not protect and respect basic human rights and freedoms’ and that the
Czech Republic did not want the Belarusian President to ‘legitimise his position in
Belarus’ (Lidové noviny, 2002).
Ever since then, the Czech Republic has actively supported the Belarusian op-
position through both declarations of solidarity and direct action. The line between
the governmental and the non-governmental sector blurred in the case of Belarus:
Civic Belarus, an NGO focusing on democratic transition in Belarus, was founded
by, among others, former President Václav Havel and the director of the biggest
Czech (and Central European) NGO People in Need, Tomáš Pojar. Pojar later be-
came the First Deputy Foreign Minister and provided for even more coherence be-
tween the official and the NGO position in regard to Belarus. This can be illustrat-
ed by the activities of Czech diplomats during and after the 2006 elections in Be-
larus. During the elections, the Czech Republic financed a translation of a UN re-
port on human rights violations in Belarus into Belarusian and the Czech diplomats
distributed the brochure in the country, which caused a diplomatic fallout (Mladá
fronta Dnes, 2006). After the elections, which were thought to be rigged, the
Czech foreign ministry sharply increased the funds available for transition promo-
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tion in Belarus (Bartovic, 2008: 40f). Furthermore, Belarusian opposition leaders
are regular participants at the yearly Forum 2000 conference founded by President
Václav Havel (Forum 2000, 2011).
The Czech Senate has paid a lot of attention to the situation in Belarus. During the
fifth and sixth term (2004–2008) it maintained a ‘Temporary Commission of the
Senate for identifying persons detained, imprisoned or persecuted in other ways by
the Belarusian regime for political reasons’ and in the following term it maintained
a ‘Permanent Commission of the Senate for Democracy Promotion in the World’.
The latter discussed the situation in Belarus several times and called on the Czech
government, for example, not to invite President Lukashenka for the 2009 Prague
Eastern Partnership Summit unless concrete steps were taken in respect to human
rights protection in Belarus (Senát ČR, 2009). In 2011, the Senate condemned the
crackdown on a demonstration in Minsk after another rigged presidential election
and called for the release of all detained persons (Senát ČR, 2011). Futhermore, the
Czech executive’s support to the Belarusian opposition goes beyond declarations,
as was made evident when the opposition presidential candidate of 2010, Aleś
Michalevič, was granted asylum in the Czech Republic in March 2011 (Právo, 2011).
Besides its bilateral declarations and contacts, the Czech Republic has actively
engaged the Eastern neighbourhood in multilateral formats, notably in the Viseg-
rad Group with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. The V4 address the developments
in Eastern Europe on a regular basis. They have consistently supported the EU
membership aspirations of Ukraine and Moldova. Furthermore, the Czech foreign
priorities, especially the emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion,
have been reflected in the Czech V4 presidency programmes of 2007 and 2011
(Czech Republic, 2007; 2011).
A CONSISTENT ASSISTANCE POLICY
The Czech Republic has been shaping and re-adjusting its foreign assistance poli-
cy for a long time, mostly on the basis of internal reviews and external recommen-
dations from international institutions such as the OECD. The last reform took
place between 2008 and 2010 (Sládková, 2011). At the moment, most of the for-
eign assistance is concentrated under the administration of the foreign ministry.
There are two main channels of the Czech foreign assistance – development assis-
tance and transition promotion. The former represents the standard development
assistance and humanitarian aid that all EU states provide to developing countries.
The latter is a tool of the Czech programmes and activities related to human rights,
democracy promotion and finances that should support human rights and democ-
racy in third countries in transition.
However, the Czech official development assistance was impaired by a lack of
focus. There were twenty priority countries identified in the development assis-
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tance concept of 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002: 7). This high number was
reduced by the later reforms – to eight in 2006 and further down to five in 2011
(Sládková, 2011: 6). The countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood have always been
present among the Czech priorities, although none of them are, strictly speaking,
developing countries. In 2002 it was Ukraine that was prioritised by the Czech de-
velopment assistance, and since 2006 Moldova has remained a target country. For
the period 2011–2017, Georgia has been identified as a ‘project country’, which
means a second order priority country after the priority countries proper (Govern-
ment of the Czech Republic, 2010b).
A focus on countries in the wider neighbourhood has been visible in the Czech
development assistance. Thus, many distant countries such as Angola, Yemen or
Zambia are left out of the current programme even if they are poor. Moreover, the
priorities identified in the documents do not always fully correspond with the prac-
tice. Ukraine has been one of the top ten recipients of the Czech official develop-
ment assistance every single year between 2000 and 2008. Other Eastern Euro-
pean countries occasionally appeared in the list as well – especially Moldova,
Georgia and Belarus (Adamcová, 2006; Rozvojové středisko, 2007; Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, 2009).
In recent years, Eastern Europe has become an ever more important target of the
Czech official development assistance at the expense of other regions. Moreover,
the volume of assistance delivered to Eastern Europe surpassed the aid for the
Balkan countries for the first time in 2009. Also, the aid aimed at the countries of
the Eastern Partnership sharply increased in 2009, which is even more remarkable
when we consider that the total bilateral aid shrank due to the economic crisis (cf.
OECD, 2011).
The transition promotion policy of the Czech Republic was officially estab-
lished in 2005. In 2003–2004 it had been preceded by some assistance pro-
grammes for Iraq that proved useful and consequently, the government decided
to found a permanent tool for transition and democracy promotion on the basis
of NGO lobbying (cf. Bartovic, 2008: 34). The policy has been predominantly fo-
cused on the priority areas of the Czech foreign policy – the Western Balkans
and Eastern Europe – but several other countries were also added to the policy
(Iraq, Cuba, and Burma/Myanmar). Four East European states are considered tar-
get countries for the Czech democratic promotion – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova
and Georgia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Their share of the dedicated re-
sources has been rising in the last years with a clear predominance of Belarus,
which attracts about 20 per cent of the programme’s budget. It should be men-
tioned in this respect that the government has kept or even increased the bud-
get despite the crisis and the austerity measures in all sectors, including the For-
eign Ministry.3
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AN ACTIVE POOL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS
The Czech non-governmental sector is very active in development assistance and
transition promotion alike. There are several platforms for NGOs that coordinate
and provide support for their activities. They also simplify the contacts between the
NGOs and the government. Two major Czech NGO platforms should be men-
tioned in this respect: the Czech Forum for Development Cooperation (FoRS) fo-
cuses on development assistance whereas the Association for Democracy Assis-
tance and Human Rights (DEMAS) mainly deals with transition promotion. The two
platforms’ members are numerous (37 in the case of FoRS and 11 in the case of DE-
MAS) and engage actively in various parts of the world.4 As these NGOs, especially
in the case of democracy promotion, channel a large part of the Czech official bud-
get, their activities follow to some extent the priorities of the Czech foreign policy.
The biggest NGO among them, People in Need, runs special programmes for Be-
larus, Ukraine and Moldova within its human rights section and also conducts de-
velopment projects in a number of East European countries, e.g. Ukraine, Georgia
and Armenia. However, other organisations also greatly deal with Eastern Europe,
providing training for journalists, local administration, or local NGOs (for example,
the Europeum Institute for European Policy or the Association for International Af-
fairs). Prague is also the seat of the Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS)
(and a Czech is a chair of its board of directors), which is a network of NGOs from
Central and Eastern Europe providing a platform for joint projects of Central and
East European organisations.
Other Czech institutions have occasionally taken an active part in expressing sol-
idarity with Eastern European countries as well. An example might be the initiative
of Charles University in Prague which established a special programme for stu-
dents who where persecuted after the 2006 Belarus presidential elections. Under
this initiative, these students could continue their studies in Prague, and the uni-
versity recognised their previous study records and provided them with special
scholarships (cf. iForum, 2006).
CONCLUSIONS
The Czech Republic’s foreign policy identity is based on two basic notions: the sup-
port to human rights and democracy and the support to further enlargement of the
Euro-Atlantic institutions. The former has been present in the Czech discourse since
the beginning of the 1990s. With the accession to the European Union, the empha-
sis on human rights and democratisation did not change, but just included the EU
as another platform for the pursuance of this goal. The latter, however, appeared
quite logically only with the Czech membership in the related organisations. Initial-
ly, it focused only on the rest of Central Europe and the Balkans, but it soon incor-
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porated the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood as well. Since the mid-2000s
the Czech Republic has paid ever more attention to the post-Soviet countries, and
the Czech EU Council Presidency contributed to this trend significantly.
Whereas the human rights and democracy promotion can be considered a pol-
icy largely based on values and the Czech Republic’s narrative of its recent histori-
cal experience, the focus on enlargement and the Eastern Partnership is under-
pinned by a greater mixture of values and interests. On one hand, the enlargement
and assistance to the neighbouring countries is understood as a good thing per se.
The European Union’s main purpose should be the unification and stabilisation of
the continent, which quite naturally implies that the Balkans and Eastern Europe
should be included. On the other hand, the enlargement and especially the East-
ern Partnership have been justified in the Czech Republic by various rational argu-
ments and ideas about the potential profits for the country as well. These justifica-
tions include the potential benefits that the Czech Republic would receive from a
stable neighbourhood and, in recent years, a particular focus on energy coopera-
tion and boosting the energy security of the EU.
The practice of foreign policy and the expressions of solidarity largely correspond
with the declared foreign policy identity of the Czech Republic. Both the political and
the bureaucratic/financial solidarity have been on the rise in regard to the countries
of the Eastern Partnership. There is also strong activity on the part of the non-gov-
ernmental sector. Furthermore, there is a visible shift of the Czech attention to areas
in the neighbourhood at the expense of distant countries such as those in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. This can be interpreted as values slowly giving way to interests, but the
conclusion should not be too conclusive in this respect. Some very distant countries
still remain key priorities of Czech governmental programmes – for example, Cuba,
Burma/Myanmar or Mongolia, and the shift has been rather recent. As a result, the
trend might be reversed quite easily. Much will also depend on the bilateral relations
with the particular countries and their readiness to accept the Czech solidarity. The
recent diplomatic controversy between the Czech Republic and Ukraine might indi-
cate a shift in the Ukrainian position which could influence the Czech policy in the
future, even though this has not been the case so far. Plus, the Czech discourse has
understood the post-Soviet republics as countries with a similar historical experience
as the Czech Republic. It is to be seen to what extent this identification with the East-
ern Partnership countries makes sense and to what extent it is flawed.
To sum up, there is a clear link between the Czech Republic’s foreign policy iden-
tity and its foreign policy practice. The EU membership has not changed the Czech
focus on human rights and democracy, but it has modified the Czech foreign pol-
icy’s understanding of the neighbourhood. Instead of focusing on the relations
with its immediate neighbours, which are all members of the EU, the Czech Re-
public re-focused its attention on good neighbourly relations with the countries
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bordering the EU. The long-term attention paid to the Western Balkans has been
supplemented with a greater focus on the Eastern Partnership countries. The ques-
tion remains, however, whether the Czech Republic is not just projecting its own
re-discovered identity onto countries which will have to discover their own selves
and their own priorities.
ENDNOTES
1 The First Republic is a label used for the Czechoslovakia of 1918–1938, as it was significantly more
democratic and liberal than most of its neighbours during this time.
2 There has been some discussion on to what extent the Czech foreign policy is receding from its pre-
viously unconditional emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion to what may be labelled
as a ‘greater balance’ in recent years (Drulák, 2009: 377). Official documents do not, however, ac-
knowledge such a shift in any respect.
3 In 2011, CZK 50 million are available for transition promotion projects compared to the CZK 45 mil-
lion for the preceding years (Interview with an MFA official).
4 For an overview of their activities see the websites of the two organisations (www.fors.cz;
www.demas.cz) and the websites of their respective members.
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Between a Romantic ‘Mission 
in the East’ and Minimalism:
Polish Policy Towards the 
Eastern Neighbourhood
MELCHIOR SZCZEPANIK
Abstract: This article examines the significance of historical and political identity for the Polish pol-
icy towards the eastern neighbourhood. The historical legacy of the Polish First Republic
– the Commonwealth – includes Poland’s feeling of affinity with the lands and peoples
that once constituted that state (Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine) as well as its belief in a Pol-
ish ‘mission in the East’ as a transmission belt of Western values. It is argued that Polish de-
cision-makers, in Poland’s policy towards the eastern neighbourhood, acted in accordance
with that historical legacy and consistently privileged the so-called romantic approach,
which is focused on promoting democracy and market economy in the eastern neigh-
bourhood and advocating the strengthening of contacts of the EU and NATO with those
countries. The dominance of that approach over so-called minimalism, constituting a break
with certain elements of the historical legacy, can be seen as an illustration of the consid-
erable impact of historical and political identity on the process of the definition of interests.
The analysis of the discourse of Polish decision-makers suggests that the feeling of soli-
darity, stemming from common historical experience (the legacy of the Commonwealth
and the struggle against communism), has been an important factor behind the Polish ef-
forts to draw the eastern neighbours into the European and Transatlantic structures. 
Key words: Poland, Eastern neighbourhood, identity, solidarity 
One of the main challenges for Poland when it succeeded at freeing itself from the
dominance of the Soviet Union in 1989 was to create an independent foreign pol-
icy in an unstable post-Cold War environment. As the Soviet Union collapsed, new
states appeared in Poland’s neighbourhood, and these were built by nations with
which Poland shared a common past as well as some historical animosities. This ar-
ticle examines the influence of the Polish historical and political identity on the cre-
ation of the Polish policy towards the eastern neighbours. In line with the idea be-
hind this special issue, another objective of the article is to ascertain to what extent
the concept of solidarity can help one to fathom the Polish activities in the East. 
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The Polish policy is analysed with reference to two opposing viewpoints that
were most often referred to as romanticism and minimalism in the intellectual de-
bate. The former preached an active support for democracy in the newly indepen-
dent former Soviet republics in the name of a solidarity stemming from the coun-
tries’ common history and the strategic necessity to create a barrier against Rus-
sia’s tendency to re-establish its domination over the territories of the former Sovi-
et Union. Minimalism, in the meantime, argued that a swift democratic transition
and a creation of a Western-style civil society in countries such as Belarus and
Ukraine were highly unlikely. Thus the tendency to challenge the influence of Rus-
sia in these territories in the name of the Polish historical mission in the East would
be counterproductive. An overview of Polish relations with the eastern neighbours
shows that the policies carried out by consecutive Polish governments were usual-
ly much closer to the romantic approach. This article argues that the domination of
the romantic approach may be treated as an illustration of the significant influence
that historical and political identity has had on the choices made by Polish deci-
sion-makers. 
The article consists of three parts. First, the historical context is briefly described
in order to show the main elements of the historical legacy of the Commonwealth.
The second part depicts the debate between the romantics and the minimalists and
discusses the development of the Polish policy towards the Eastern neighbours, fo-
cusing on the period following the NATO and EU accession. Finally, the foreign
policy implementation is analysed in order to verify to what extent actions followed
declarations in Polish foreign policy. Apart from academic work devoted to Polish
history and foreign policy, the analysis in the article is based upon the foreign pol-
icy statements presented each year to the lower chamber of the Polish parliament
by ministers for foreign affairs. 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE POLISH
EASTERN POLICY 
The territories of today’s Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus once constituted a
single political unit – the Commonwealth. It was created as a result of an alliance
between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The first act of
union between the two states was signed in the late 14th century, and its immedi-
ate cause was a common defence against the State of Teutonic Knights. Several
other pacts between them followed before an act of union that united them into a
single state was signed in 1569. As a result of the Union, the nobles of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania ‘polonised’ the new state, meaning that the Polish political sys-
tem, culture and language dominated in it (see Davies, 1981; Zamoyski, 1987). 
Undoubtedly a great power in Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth found a rival
in Russia. The confrontation between them – as a Polish scholar claims – ‘was not
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only about the political dominance over the lands of today’s Belarus and Ukraine,
but also about their religious, cultural and ethnic identity’ (Nowak, 2009: 134). Un-
til the mid-seventeenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian state managed to keep the
ambitions of Moscow at bay, but due to the Commonwealth’s internal difficulties,
the balance of power started to shift. A century later, although still an independent
state, the Commonwealth was already dominated by its ever more powerful neigh-
bour. In 1795, the Commonwealth ceased to exist, as it was partitioned by the
neighbouring powers with the major part of its territory being taken over by Rus-
sia. 
In the second half of the 19th century, on the territories that once belonged to the
Commonwealth, the modern Lithuanian, Belarussian and Ukrainian nations devel-
oped – to a certain extent in opposition to Poles and Polishness (Łossowski, 1991:
6–15). After the First World War, as the Tsarist Empire was collapsing and the na-
tions dominated by it could fight for independence, Poland entered into territorial
disputes with Lithuania, in the north-east, and Ukraine, in the south-east, over lands
that were ethnically mixed. Two cities epitomise these controversies. Vilnius
(Wilno), the historical capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was inhabited by a
large number of Poles and it was an important centre of Polish cultural life. It was
also the birthplace of the most eminent statesman of the newly independent
Poland, Józef Piłsudski. Thus, it was disputed by Poles and Lithuanians. The city of
Lviv (Lwów) was similarly disputed by Poles and Ukrainians. Piłsudski tried to find
a solution to this complex situation by advocating the idea of a federation between
Poland and its eastern neighbours who had just liberated themselves from Russian
dominance. This federative conception would be a recreation of the Common-
wealth, adapted to the circumstances of the beginning of the 20th century. Piłsuds-
ki’s strategy was challenged by that of Roman Dmowski, a leader of the conserva-
tives, who doubted the potential of the new nations in the East. He perceived Rus-
sia as the main partner for Poland in the East. Piłsudski’s approach can be per-
ceived as strongly rooted in the tradition of the Commonwealth, for which the East
was the main direction of expansion and Russia was the main rival. In contrast,
Dmowski’s approach refers to the Middle Ages, when the Polish state was threat-
ened by the German empire. In this approach, Germany is perceived as the main
threat to Poland, while some sort of cooperation with Russia is believed to be pos-
sible on the basis of the two countries’ common Slavic roots. The echoes of both
approaches were manifest in the Polish debates on foreign policy in the East after
1989. 
With nationalist currents on the rise and Russia regaining strength after the Oc-
tober Revolution, Piłsudski’s federative strategy did not succeed. Lithuania man-
aged to create an independent state, but her relations with Poland were cold, as
the majority of the Lithuanian political elites were wary of Polish dominance (Łos-
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sowski, 1991). The Belarussian and Ukrainian struggles for independence failed.
Plus, the relations between the Polish administration and a large Ukrainian minori-
ty living in Poland were complicated. During the Second World War, clashes broke
out in the territories that were ethnically mixed. 
The Polish inhabitants of territories that today belong to Lithuania, Belarus and
Ukraine, which previously belonged to the Commonwealth and then to the Sec-
ond Polish Republic, suffered particularly during the Second World War. They were
subject to brutal repressions by both the Stalinist and the Nazi regime. Those who
survived were forced to leave their homes as the eastern parts of Poland were in-
corporated into the Soviet Union. As a result, the territories lost by Poland after the
war gained a quasi-mythological significance in the Polish perception of history –
that of a paradise lost. 
The heritage of the Commonwealth and the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939)
constitutes an important part of the Polish political and historical identity. In the
times of the Commonwealth, Poland was a transmission belt of Western culture and
civilisation to the East (Najder, 2009: 174; Nowak, 2009: 134). The Polish political
system, based upon a weak central authority and a strong participation of the gen-
try in the decision-making and administration of the country, was often contrasted
with the eastern despotism developing in Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Further-
more, the difference between the Commonwealth and its eastern neighbours was
not only political, but religious as well. As the Commonwealth was the western most
bridgehead of Catholicism, the citizens of the Commonwealth were convinced of
their particular role as defenders of the faith. In the eyes of a significant part of the
Polish elite, Poland and Poles had a mission to fulfil in the East. As Mróz argues, 
in the national identity of citizens of the Polish-Lithuanian state [i.e. the Com-
monwealth] and in [the] Polish mentality, the tradition of great power mis-
sionism – a particular civilising mission in Eastern Europe, not only in the strict-
ly cultural dimension, but political as well – was deeply rooted. [...] it persists
in a modified and modernised form, contributing to shaping our national iden-
tity and [the] group mentality of the Polish people (Mróz, 2009: 16–17). 
All in all, the historical heritage of the relations between Poland and its eastern
neighbours is clearly a complex one. The common past and the heritage of the
unique political undertaking that was the Commonwealth with its democratic, mul-
ticultural and integrationist character provide a good basis for cooperation. How-
ever, while the Commonwealth has certainly been a source of pride for the Poles
(bar perhaps the period of its decline in the 18th century), the eastern neighbours
could have mixed feelings about it, as it could be perceived to incarnate Polish
dominance over the territories that became the independent states Lithuania, Be-
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larus and Ukraine. The aspirations to statehood of the Commonwealth nations of-
ten put them in a situation of conflict with Poland. These conflicts flared up in the
first half of the 20th century, and their upshots were still present at the end of that
century, creating a considerable obstacle to good neighbourly relations. 
EASTERN NEIGHBOURS IN THE POLISH
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY
ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH THE REMODELLED
NEIGHBOURHOOD
When at the beginning of the 1990s the Republics that constituted part of the So-
viet Union declared that they would seek independence, Poland faced the chal-
lenge of adopting a policy towards them. Its reaction was cautious. On the one
hand, further emancipation from Soviet totalitarism could not but enthuse Polish
decision-makers, most of whom were former dissidents; on the other hand, they
were also aware that too vehement a support for Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic
States could bring about complications in the relations with the Soviet
Union/Russia. For Poland, the top priority at that time was to negotiate a calm di-
vorce with the former hegemon and thus dismantle the system of Soviet domina-
tion (the Warsaw Pact, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance – Comecon,
the Soviet military presence in Poland). The collapse of that system could not be
taken for granted, as the unstable situation in the Soviet Union gave Poland reasons
to fear that Moscow could try to re-establish its zone of influence. Given these cir-
cumstances, Poland adopted the ‘double track policy’ (Kuźniar, 2009b: 85–86) – a
strategy that assumed that Poland would establish relations with the Soviet re-
publics that were moving towards independence while maintaining at the same
time friendly relations with the Soviet Union. 
Some reservations provoked by the Polish government’s desire to maintain cor-
rect relations with the Soviet Union notwithstanding, the reaction of Poland to the
emergence of the new states at its eastern border can be described as unam-
biguously positive. Even though each of the new neighbours controlled territories
that were Polish before the Second World War, no territorial claims appeared.
When adopting a strategy towards the new eastern neighbours, Poland followed
the path chartered by Jerzy Giedroyc and Ludwik Mieroszewski – two influential
émigré political thinkers who already in the 1970s argued that the fully indepen-
dent Poland, which would emerge after the inevitable collapse of the Soviet
Union, would have to accept the postwar borders and establish good relations
with the independent Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (Dębski, 2009: 187–188;
Mróz, 2009: 23). This approach, clearly stemming from the precepts of Piłsudski’s
federative strategy, seemed anathema to the majority of the Polish exiles, who
would not accept a Poland without Wilno and Lwów. But in the early 1990s, when
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the predicted shrinkage of the Soviet zone of influence finally happened, it influ-
enced to a significant degree the Polish political elites’ attitude towards the re-
modelled eastern neighbourhood. Poland declared its willingness to establish
friendly relations and encouraged the neighbours to follow the path of political
and economic reforms. 
In the meantime, the situation in the East developed in several different ways.
Lithuania succeeded at its political reforms and quickly adopted a firmly pro-West-
ern course, while Belarus – soon after securing independence – rejected democ-
racy and remained in a state of self-inflicted isolation. Ukraine, because of its strate-
gic importance and the continuing struggle between pro-Western and pro-Russian
forces, constituted the focal point of Polish diplomacy in the East. 
While Poland attached a lot of importance to creating friendly and strong rela-
tions with its neighbours in the East, its top priority was integration with the West-
ern community through membership in the EU and NATO. The ideas of creating
an independent political bloc in Central Europe led by Poland and Ukraine were
quickly discarded (Menkiszak, 2002: 222). The long-term goal of achieving EU and
NATO membership as soon as possible always trumped any other foreign policy
considerations. Poland, for instance, largely ignored the Ukrainian attempt to join
the Visegrad Group in 1991 out of fear that forging overly close ties with the still
unstable Ukraine could make the EU and NATO bid more difficult (Zięba, 2010:
195). However unwilling it was to be overly burdened by close ties with Ukraine,
Poland was nonetheless active in drawing it towards the West and strongly pro-
moted Ukrainian membership in the Council of Europe and the Central European
Initiative (Fedorowicz, 2011: 192). 
In 1993, the representatives of the post-communist left who won the parliamen-
tary election announced a change in the foreign policy towards the East: improv-
ing the relationship with Russia was to become the top priority, while in contacts
with the post-Soviet republics the focus was to shift from politics to economy. But
a return to a more active policy came quicker than expected. Surprisingly for some,
Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a former member of the Communist Party who became
president of Poland in 1995, attached a lot of importance to strengthening the ties
between Poland and Ukraine (Mróz, 2009: 27). He forged a strong personal rela-
tionship with his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kuchma, and they both stressed
the strategic nature of the contacts between the two countries (Fedorowicz, 2011:
191–194). 
ROMANTICS AND MINIMALISTS
The main dilemmas faced by the Polish decision-makers in relation to the Polish
policy in the East are well portrayed in a debate that developed at the beginning of
the 21st century among experts and intellectuals. Two analysts from the Centre for
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Eastern Studies (a Polish think tank) questioned what they perceived as an erro-
neous policy in the East (Sienkiewicz, 2000; Olszański, 2001). While they did not
question the Polish support for independence of Belarus and Ukraine, they judged
the efforts aimed at drawing these states into the Western community as largely
pointless. This conclusion was provoked by a number of observations. Both re-
searchers pointed out that it was unlikely that a political and economic transition
similar to the one that occurred in Central Europe could take place in Belarus and
Ukraine in the near future. Moreover, the majority of the political elites and citizens
in both countries obviously wanted to maintain a close relationship with Russia.
Thus, they stated that Poland should accept the fact that these countries will remain
fundamentally different from the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
in terms of their political and economic regimes. 
Due to the limited resources at its disposal, Poland could not hope to be able
to significantly influence the internal situation of these countries. Any attempts at
creating a political bloc designed to counterbalance the Russian influence were
doomed to fail and could only entail a worsening of the relationship with
Moscow, which was clearly the major player in the region. Both analysts also
claimed that a more pro-Russian position on the part of Ukraine and Belarus
should not be seen as a geopolitical catastrophe for Poland, as the advocates of
the Giedroyc/Mieroszewski approach would have it. The title of one of the two
articles could be translated as ‘National interest comes first’ (Olszański, 2001),
thus suggesting that the policy of drawing Belarus and Ukraine into the Western
camp at all costs represented an approach that was rooted more in history than
in a balanced analysis of the Polish interest at the end of the 20th century. Both au-
thors suggested adopting what they called a ‘minimalist’ approach based upon a
clear definition of Polish interests that would be followed by a choice of realistic
goals that could be achieved by Polish diplomacy instead of objectives that were
closely related to the romantic vision of Polish involvement in the East but were
no more than wishful thinking. These assumptions were to a certain extent a de-
velopment of Dmowski’s convictions that the ‘new nations’ in the East were not
strong and mature enough to be reliable allies and that Russia should be the main
point of reference for any Polish foreign policy strategy.1
The position defended by Sienkiewicz and Olszański has been referred to as
‘minimalist’, ‘pragmatic’, ‘positivist’ and/or ‘passivist’. Their adversaries were de-
scribed as ‘romantics’, ‘idealists’ or ‘activists’. They displayed a strong belief both in
the likelihood of democracy and market economy taking root in Belarus and
Ukraine, and in the capacity of Polish diplomacy to accelerate such changes (Po-
mianowski, 2001). They also emphasised the continuing importance of the central
tenet of the Giedroyc/Mieroszewski approach: a Belarus and a Ukraine that are ful-
ly independent – and closely linked to Poland – are the key to protecting Poland
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against a revival of Russia’s imperialist ambitions. Many arguments were put for-
ward by the scholars and practitioners as they – more or less categorically – ques-
tioned minimalism by looking at it through the prism of questions of history and
identity. Aleksander Smolar2 recalls the words of Jerzy Giedroyc, who claimed that
‘Poland lies in an area that is defined not only by geography, but by history as well’
(Polska Polityka Wschodnia 2001: 4). To this, Smolar himself adds the following:
‘History plays a part in the definition of the future. We have to think about the fu-
ture in strategic terms, but the past inevitably co-defines our policy’ (ibid.).
Zdzisław Najder3 argues that ‘Poland, together with Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine,
created the Commonwealth. We belong to the common European cultural area
because we once constituted a single state [...]. Therefore one of our political ob-
jectives should be to maintain physical contact with peoples and lands that used to
constitute our cultural cradle’ (ibid.: 6–7). Finally, Jerzy Kłoczkowski4 declares that
‘our [i.e. Polish] identity is also the common tradition of the Commonwealth, in
which Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine have a place. These states could not exist
without the heritage of the Commonwealth, and neither could Poland. [...] The
Poles have a moral obligation. If there are people who call themselves Ukrainians,
Belarussians or Lithuanians, [...] they have to have the conviction that we will always
give them a helping hand. We cannot abandon them whatever the circumstances
because they are a part of us, of our common heritage. Their independence is in
our interest’ (ibid.: 21). 
The views quoted above exemplify the romantic approach to the eastern neigh-
bourhood. The romantics do not reject cold realist thinking in terms of national in-
terest – as Pomianowski stressed, Ukraine succumbing to the Russian influence
would be catastrophic for Poland – but their declarations show how strongly their
analysis is framed by Poland’s historical experience and identity. The Polish support
for the sovereignty of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine is not only the outcome of
strategic calculation, but a ‘moral obligation’ as well. The historical experience finds
reflection in the feeling of solidarity towards the inhabitants of these countries,
who – just like the Poles – are descendants of the citizens of the Commonwealth,
experienced a communist dictatorship and had aspirations of regaining full
sovereignty. All those reasons are behind the romantics’ tendency to actively sup-
port the transition in the East. But the element of solidarity is largely absent in the
declarations put forward by minimalists, who tend to emphasise that decades of
Sovietisation have created considerable differences between the societies of the
former Soviet republics and Poland, and – consequently – a swift democratic tran-
sition in the former is highly unlikely. The minimalist and romantic approaches de-
scribed above can be treated as two ideal types between which the consecutive
Polish governments developed their strategy. However, the following part, depict-
ing Polish policy after the country’s NATO and EU accession, demonstrates that
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most of the time the Polish strategy developed according to the romantic ap-
proach.
POLISH POLICY AFTER THE NATO/EU ACCESSION: 
CHAMPIONING THE CAUSE OF THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURS
Poland’s memberships in NATO and the EU have not influenced the perception of
the main goals of Polish diplomacy in relation to the eastern neighbourhood.
Poland continued to encourage partners in the east to follow the path of transition
to democracy and market economy, while at the same time, in its contacts with
Western European countries, Poland persistently stressed that countries such as
Belarus and Ukraine wanted to integrate with the West and were able to imple-
ment the necessary reforms. In his exposé in March 2002, foreign minister Włodz-
imierz Cimoszewicz declared, ‘we will do our best so that after enlargement Eu-
rope is not divided into the better and the worse off, the members of the club and
the excluded. Therefore, we will be advocating the deepening of the relationship
between the EU and our Eastern neighbours’ (Cimoszewicz, 2002). 
Membership in NATO and the EU gave Poland a much stronger position to re-
alise its ambitions in the East (Kuźniar, 2009a: 181). It was not left to its own de-
vices anymore, and it could contribute to shaping the policy of two powerful polit-
ical alliances. An active policy in the East was also perceived by Polish politicians as
a way of strengthening their position within the EU – Giedroyc’s claim that the Pol-
ish position in the West will depend on Poland’s influence in the East clearly had
many followers. Seeking to show its value for the EU and find a niche in the realm
of common foreign policy, Poland focused its efforts on achieving the position of
an expert on the question of the eastern neighbours. The foreign minister of Poland
summarised the country’s ambitions in the following way: ‘it is high time the deci-
sions and actions of the EU – and some member states in particular – in this realm
[relations with the eastern neighbours] were based on solid grounds and rational
knowledge about Russia, Ukraine and other countries of Eastern Europe. We are
ready not only to share our knowledge, but also to participate actively in the adop-
tion of appropriate decisions’ (Meller, 2006). 
While EU membership gave Poland a stronger position, new opportunities
opened up because of the political changes in the East. In November 2003, the
Revolution of Roses in Georgia brought to power political forces which declared a
willingness to strengthen their country’s ties with the Western community. A year
later, similar transformations took place in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution and its
leader Viktor Yushchenko put Ukraine firmly on a pro-Western course. These
changes seemed to have negated the minimalists’ doubts regarding the likelihood
of a quick economic and political transformation in the post-Soviet zone. In Poland,
the Orange Revolution was widely perceived as a turning point in Ukraine’s move
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to the West and the beginning of a wider process of changes in the post-Soviet
area (Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007: 70; Fedorowicz, 2011: 206). Polish Presi-
dent Aleksander Kwaśniewski, when referring to the Orange Revolution, repeated
one of the tenets of the Giedroyc/Mieroszewski line of thinking: ‘Russia without
Ukraine is better than Russia with Ukraine’ (Szeptycki, 2010: 296). It seemed that
the romantics’ dreams were to become reality. 
Polish diplomacy seized that opportunity and vigorously supported the integra-
tionist aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine. When Minister of Foreign Affairs Daniel
Rotfeld presented his priorities to the lower chamber of the Polish parliament, in
the first ministerial exposé after the EU accession, he started with the need to build
a strong Polish position in the EU. After that came his declaration that ‘as a mem-
ber of NATO and the EU, we will be advocating a new opening in the relationship
between the West and Ukraine. [...] In particular, we will call for the EU to upgrade
its relationship with Ukraine to the level of a strategic partnership with prospective
membership, and for NATO to grant Ukraine the Membership Action Plan’ (Rot-
feld, 2005). 
In autumn of 2005, the conservative party Law and Justice won the parliamen-
tary and presidential election. Both the president, Lech Kaczynski, and his brother,
Jarosław Kaczynski, who became prime minister, were advocates of an active pol-
icy in the East and critical of Russia’s role in this area. The determination with which
the Kaczynski brothers advocated the Ukrainian membership in Western organisa-
tions is best demonstrated by the fact that they are sometimes described as
stronger proponents of the integration of Ukraine than the Ukrainians themselves
(Fedorowicz, 2011: 77). After the dispute between Russia and Ukraine about de-
liveries of gas, the issues of the political consequences of control of energy re-
sources took centre stage in the debates about the eastern neighbourhood. In re-
action, President Lech Kaczynski organised two summits with participation of lead-
ers from some EU countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and the eastern neigh-
bours (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan) to discuss the ways of ensuring
stable and secure access to energy sources by creating a Baku–Gdańsk supply line
(Szeptycki, 2010: 304–305). The president and the government led by his brother
vociferously protested against the Nord Stream pipeline project that was to join
Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea. Polish politicians argued that by opening a
possibility of direct transfer of gas to Western Europe, Russia gained an even
stronger position towards Ukraine and Poland – the main transfer countries. Ra-
dosław Sikorski – a defence minister in the Kaczynski government – called the pro-
ject ‘a new Ribbentropp-Molotov Pact’ (Fedorowicz, 2011: 149). 
The following government led by Donald Tusk, which was created after the an-
ticipated election in 2007, was expected to adopt a more pragmatic approach that
would be closer to the minimalist viewpoint. Indeed, the new prime minister adopt-
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ed a more conciliatory policy towards Russia. A few months after taking office, he
visited Moscow (before going to Kiev), and later he revoked the Polish veto that
blocked the negotiations of the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement be-
tween the EU and Russia. The differences between Tusk’s approach and that of the
Law and Justice party were most manifest during the war in Georgia in August of
2008. When hostilities broke out, President Kaczynski (accompanied by the presi-
dents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine) flew to Georgia and, at a rally of
support for Georgian President Miheil Saakashvili, accused Russia of provoking the
conflict.5 Meanwhile, a statement issued by the Polish prime minister’s office was
much more cautious and did not include an unequivocal assessment of the events. 
While the era of the Kaczynski brothers can surely be described as the apex of
romantic thinking, Tusk’s actions – even though they were certainly more prag-
matic and less confrontational – cannot be seen as a definitive move away from the
romantic strategy. Tusk made an effort to improve Poland’s relations with Russia,
but he did not modify the Polish position on two issues that constituted the core of
the divergence: Poland’s readiness to accept parts of the American Missile De-
fence installations on its territory and its unequivocal support for the eastern neigh-
bours’ European and Transatlantic aspirations. Despite considerable opposition
from some member states and the increasingly chaotic political situation in
Ukraine, Minister for Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski was vehemently calling for
a Membership Action Plan – a programme designed to help countries wishing to
join the Alliance – to be granted to Georgia and Ukraine at a NATO Summit in
Bucharest in April 2008. The following statement pronounced by Radosław Sikors-
ki when he was reporting on his activities in the parliament demonstrates the
strength of the romantic element in the Polish foreign policy strategy:
[…] Poland, just as 600 years ago it became a reference point and a model for
our Eastern neighbours, and for our brother, the Ukrainian nation, in particu-
lar. Then, in the Jagiellonian era, the Commonwealth promoted standards of
freedom and tolerance, being the magnet holding together through centuries
the multiethnic mosaic of elites from our region. That is why we believe that
the legacy of the Union of Lublin will be not be fulfilled until our Eastern Eu-
ropean brothers, aspiring to EU membership, realise their ambitions (Sikorski,
2008).6
The more pragmatic approach to the romantic strategy was visible in the efforts of
the Tusk government to gain a more resolute backing of the EU for its activism in
the east. Together with Sweden, Poland prepared a project called the ‘Eastern Part-
nership’ (EaP), which was designed to boost the relations of the EU with the six
countries of the eastern neighbourhood. The proposal gained the status of an EU
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project. The importance ascribed to the EaP by Polish decision-makers shows a cer-
tain evolution of the romantic thinking. While Giedroyc stressed that Poland’s
standing in the West will depend on its position in the East, the Polish authors of
the EaP seemed to be convinced that the mechanism works the other way round
– Poland’s position within the EU enables it to be more effective in the east. 
The overview of Polish policy towards the eastern neighbours in the period fol-
lowing the adhesion to NATO and the EU shows that the consecutive governments
and presidents adhered to the romantic strategy. With their attempts to mobilise a
wider alliance in the eastern neighbourhood, with Poland at the helm (the Geor-
gian war, energy policy), the Kaczynski brothers can be called model romantics.
Meanwhile, the Tusk government, with its attempts to find some sort of modus
vivendi with Russia and its manifest conviction that Poland can do little without the
backing of the EU, made some concessions to minimalism while remaining faithful
to the key romantic principle of a democratic mission in the East. 
POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL IDENTITY AS DRIVING
FORCES OF THE ROMANTIC STRATEGY
The analysis of Poland’s policy towards its eastern neighbours after 1989 shows that
the consecutive Polish governments tended to follow the precepts of the so-called
romantic strategy rather than the minimalist one. The triumph of romanticism –
which is closely related to the historical heritage – over minimalism – trying to break
with certain historical dogmas – suggests that Poland’s political and historical iden-
tity significantly influenced the way in which the majority of the decision-makers
perceived the Polish interest. Some statements made by Polish politicians in charge
of foreign affairs and intellectuals dealing with these matters demonstrate how iden-
tity influenced the definition of political aims in this area. The romantic thinking per-
ceived the situation of modern Poland as very similar to that experienced by the First
and the Second Polish Republic: the eastern neighbours were natural allies, and it
was Poland’s particular mission to draw these countries towards the West and, at the
same time, protect them against Moscow’s imperial ambitions. 
When describing the driving forces behind the Polish policy in the East, next to
the desire to ensure the country’s security, Zdzisław Najder mentions ‘the desire to
ensure the continuity of [the] Polish cultural identity which for at least seven cen-
turies has been tied to the lands that are outside Poland’s borders today’ (Najder,
2009: 173). His analysis emphasises that the calculation of the costs and benefits
of the policy choices made by Polish leaders was strongly influenced by a particu-
lar identity that included a very strong emotional link to the lands that used to be
Polish and the nations with which Poland once shared a state. Polish leaders felt re-
sponsible for helping those nations to follow the political path that, in their view,
was the only right one.
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The impact of the historical identity was highly reinforced by that of the political
identity. It is important to bear in mind that the leaders of the democratic opposi-
tion who shaped the Polish foreign policy after the transition had spent large parts
of their lives fighting for democracy and human rights in Poland. Therefore, pro-
moting similar changes in the neighbourhood, especially in the states that, like
Poland, had to suffer communist regimes, was an obvious choice for them. It is thus
manifest that both the political identity – a strong commitment to the ideals of hu-
man rights and rule of law – and the historical identity – a determination to act in
accordance with the legacy of the Commonwealth – dictated a strong engage-
ment in the name of political independence and democracy in the eastern neigh-
bourhood. 
The concept of solidarity that is the focus of attention for this special issue is use-
ful for the analysis of the Polish case. The romantic conviction that democracy and
market economy can take root in the east and that Poland should actively promote
transition stems from a common sense of belonging to the world of Western civil-
isation. The proponents of the romantic approach are convinced that the legacy of
the Commonwealth left a lasting trace in the societies of Belarus and Ukraine. It is,
in their view, an obligation of Poland to help this element of the Western identity
develop in those countries. The ‘brother nations’ and Poland not only share a com-
mon past but face a common threat as well – that of Russia’s policy to dominate its
neighbours and former satellites. 
In contrast, the minimalist position constituted a break with the tradition of the
Commonwealth. It assumed that due to their strong Sovietisation, the societies of
Belarus and Ukraine were considerably different than that of Poland. The element
of solidarity was largely absent in this view – Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz even argued
that the Polish eastern border would probably become the ‘border between dif-
ferent worlds’ (2001: 12). From this perspective, it was unreasonable to believe that
Poland could significantly influence the situation in these countries. Minimalism
emphasised that Poland did not have the means to pursue a policy of a mission in
the east, and much less so to confront Russia in this area. 
The strategy of promoting democracy, especially in the Eastern neighbourhood,
but also worldwide, offered Poland a chance to express its historical and political
identity and at the same time establish a strong position for itself in international re-
lations. After 1989, Poland, due to its demographic potential and its status of the
largest country among the former Soviet satellites, could harbour ambitions to play
a significant role in European politics. Its military capabilities and economic
strength were modest, however, so Poland decided to use the history of its fight for
freedom as a trump card in international politics. Since its record of its successful
struggle against communism and its transition to democracy and market economy
was its strength, Poland could play an important role as a promoter of democracy,
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highlighting its own example and convincing other countries, in the immediate
neighbourhood and beyond, to follow this path.7 ‘Our centuries-long tradition of
struggling for freedom and independence and – in particular – our experience of
successful transformation constitute a rich political know-how, giving us the right
to focus on the issue of human rights and the rights to democracy and free mar-
ket’, argued Foreign Minister Stefan Meller (Meller, 2006). ‘Human rights protec-
tion and the promotion of the rule of law and democracy have become a passion
of ours’, declared his successor, Radosław Sikorski (Sikorski, 2008: 12). 
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Analysts and practitioners give a mixed assessment of the implementation of the
Polish policy towards the eastern neighbours. While Polish politicians were usually
eager to stress the importance of the bilateral relations, the real cooperation rarely
matched their ambitious declarations. Dariusz Rosati, minister for foreign affairs
between 1995 and 1997, declared that ‘a good opening [of relations] was not fol-
lowed by more far-reaching undertakings. In fact, our policy barely went beyond
declarations’ (Polska Polityka Wschodnia, 2001: 13). Scholars present similar views,
even referring to the term of office of Aleksander Kwasniewski, who often empha-
sised the ‘strategic relationship’ between Poland and Ukraine, as a case that sup-
ports such views. A case in point is the problem of energy supply. In 1993, Poland
signed a deal with Russia to build the Yamal pipeline, which would transport gas to
Western Europe through Belarus and Poland (Fedorowicz, 2011: 196–197). That
deal weakened the position of Ukraine as a transit country. Later, Poland discussed
closer cooperation with Ukraine in the area of energy. The projected Odessa-
Brody-Gdańsk pipeline was a project that was supposed to strengthen the position
of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia by enabling it to import energy from other countries. At
the same time it would open the way to exports of energy from the Caspian area
without the involvement of Russia. However, the Polish part of the pipeline was
never constructed. 
The progress of the economic cooperation was slow, with bilateral trade and in-
vestments being very moderate in comparison to the declarations. Fedorowicz
claims that the limited attention paid to developing an economic cooperation with
Belarus when opportunities for it arose was a particular mistake considering the
fact that Belarus’s deepening economic problems were an important factor for the
rise of Lukashenko and, in due course, that country’s move away from its western
orientation (Fedorowicz, 2011: 289). 
Poland’s visa regime is often evoked in the literature as an example of a policy
implementation that did not match the corresponding declarations. The more de-
manding standards for issuing of visas and border control, which were related to
the Polish adhesion to the Schengen area in 2008, provoked chaos in the Polish
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consulates in Ukraine and at the crossings (Fedorowicz, 2011: 208). The govern-
ment was also criticised for not trying to apply for the transitional periods that were
provided for in the Schengen regime and taking a long time to conclude the Agree-
ment on Local Border Traffic that allowed visa-free travel for people living close to
the border (ibid: 2009; Szeptycki, 2010: 308). The Agreement entered into force
only in July of 2009, while Hungary and Slovakia concluded their agreements with
Ukraine much earlier. 
Sometimes the good intentions declared by the highest authorities were not en-
tirely shared by those at lower levels. The city council of Lviv for a long time ob-
structed renovation works at the Cemetery of Eaglets, which commemorates
young Polish volunteers who fought with the Ukrainians for the control of Lviv in
1918. In 1999, when an official opening of the cemetery was planned with partici-
pation of the presidents of both countries, a diplomatic scandal was just barely
avoided. The inscription on the tomb of the Polish soldiers was changed at the last
minute to one whose content was unacceptable for Poland. After that event the au-
thorities of Lviv resisted the pressure of the Ukrainian ministry for foreign affairs
and consistently opposed the opening of the cemetery. Ukrainians, for their part,
often called for a strong condemnation of Operation Vistula, during which, in
1947, around 140 thousand Ukrainians were forcefully resettled. The fact that the
reconciliation promoted by the governments and presidents took some time to
take root in the Polish society is exemplified by the results of public opinion polls
that showed a negative image of Ukrainians in the Polish society (Copsey, 2009: 9).
Only the Orange Revolution brought changes in this respect. The rallies of support
for Ukrainian democrats that were organised in Poland left a visible trace in the
growing sympathy for the neighbour in public opinion polls (Longhurst and
Zaborowski, 2007: 66–67). The Orange Revolution also helped to surmount the
obstacles of history. The Eaglets Cemetery was opened in 2005 by Presidents
Kaczynski and Yushchenko. One year later, both presidents unveiled a monument
in Poland dedicated to the Ukrainians killed by Polish paramilitary groups in 1945. 
Despite the shortcomings of the Polish strategy and the problems described
above, it should be emphasised that on many occasions the Polish diplomacy
proved that its support for the independence and democracy of the eastern neigh-
bours did not stop at declarations. As mentioned in the previous parts of this arti-
cle, Poland supported Ukraine’s candidacy to such organisations as the Council of
Europe and the Central European Initiative. Once these first aims were accom-
plished, Poland attempted to anchor its neighbour more firmly in the West by
stressing its eligibility for NATO and EU membership. In 1997, at a Madrid Summit
that confirmed the first NATO enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe,
Poland was instrumental for the conclusion of the Declaration of Partnership be-
tween NATO and Ukraine that opened the way to closer relations between the Al-
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liance and Poland’s neighbour. Later, Poland consistently lobbied in favour of grant-
ing Ukraine and Georgia MAP. Its efforts were not fully successful, but it gained an
important declaration of the Alliance that Georgia and Ukraine ‘will become NA-
TO members’ (NATO, 2008: point 23). 
Similarly, even before its formal accession, Poland had been calling for the
strengthening of relations between the EU and the countries that were to become
its new eastern neighbours after the 2004 enlargement. Over the years Poland per-
sistently emphasised that the differences between the southern and the eastern
neighbourhood made it necessary to conceive two separate approaches instead of
a single one. One of the most fundamental differences, according to the Polish
point of view, lay in the possible future membership of the Eastern neighbours.
‘East of our borders we are dealing with European neighbours, while on the south-
ern flank – in North Africa and the Near East – we are dealing with the neighbours
of Europe. It is a fundamental differentiation’, argued the Polish foreign minister
(Sikorski, 2008, emphasis in the original). Poland called for the inclusion of Belarus
in the neighbourhood policy, and in the case of Ukraine it argued that the prospect
of membership needed to be clearly stated (Fedorowicz, 2011: 72–79; Natorski,
2007). 
A SYMBOLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ORANGE REVOLUTION 
The most poignant demonstration of the Polish commitment to the objective of
maintaining Ukraine on its pro-Western course was the support lent to the Orange
Revolution. In November 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, a candidate advocating closer
cooperation with Russia, won the Ukrainian presidential election. However, inter-
national observers and a large number of Ukrainian citizens denounced the elec-
tion on the grounds that it supposedly involved serious electoral frauds. It seemed
likely that the real winner was Viktor Yushchenko, who was considered a pro-West-
ern candidate. Poland acted to bring about a strong reaction from the EU and
called upon Ukrainian authorities to repeat the rigged second round. Both the for-
mer Polish president Lech Walesa and the then acting president Aleksander Kwas-
niewski went to Kiev and tried to mediate between the opposing camps. Kwas-
niewski also played an important part in convincing Javier Solana, the EU High
Representative for the CFSP, to come to Kiev. The good relationship between
Kwasniewski and Leonid Kuchma, the then president of Ukraine, – both of whom
were former members of their countries’ communist parties – was particularly
mentioned as an important factor in convincing the Ukrainian president to support
the re-run of the second round (Kuźniar, 2009b: 346). 
The success of Viktor Yushchenko and – above all – the strong wave of popular
democratic protests that preceded it provided ammunition for the Polish diplomacy
in its quest to convince its EU partners that Ukraine could be democratic and that
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the majority of Ukrainians wanted their country to join the EU. As the then Polish
foreign minister argued, ‘the myth of our eastern neighbours not being able to live
up to western standards of democracy and human rights was shattered’ (Rotfeld,
2005). In January 2005, riding on the wave of the pro-Ukrainian enthusiasm, the Eu-
ropean Parliament adopted a resolution stating that Ukraine may become a mem-
ber of the EU.8 The lobbying effort of Polish MEPs is generally considered one of the
reasons for the inclusion of such a strong statement (Szczepanik, 2009: 97–98).
THE LAUNCH OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP
With its growing membership experience, Poland has increasingly focused on try-
ing to shape the EU policy so that it would reflect the Polish calls for greater ac-
tivism in the east. Those efforts found reflection in the Eastern Partnership project
– the most ambitious attempt to upload Polish strategy to the EU level. The project
was presented by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in April 2008 and endorsed
by the European Council in June of that year. The EaP was a Polish-Swedish initia-
tive designed to enhance the EU’s relations with the Eastern neighbours (Azerbai-
jan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) at a time when France put
forward a plan for upgrading relations with the Mediterranean. It was a compre-
hensive programme designed to strengthen economic cooperation, open the door
to people-to-people contacts by liberalising the visa regime, and dynamise civil so-
ciety in the partner countries. It also included provisions aimed at boosting multi-
lateral cooperation between the EaP countries. The project was to lead to the sig-
nature of association agreements between the partner countries and the EU. 
The eastern neighbourhood received considerable attention in the programme
of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU. ‘Europe Benefiting from Open-
ness’ is the name of one of the three priority areas (Polish Presidency, 2011: 10),
and the authors of the programme declare that ‘the aim should be to extend the
area of European values and regulations through further enlargement’ (ibidem).
The EaP is mentioned in this regard as one of the projects that contribute to such
an extension. Two important events – the Eastern Partnership Summit and the Civ-
il Society Forum – took place during the second half of 2011. The aim of upgrad-
ing the relations with the Eastern neighbours is also manifest when other aspects
of the Presidency Programme are studied. Within the area of the CSDP, for in-
stance, Poland declares its ambition to develop military cooperation between the
EU and the EaP partner countries. 
A MODEST BUT RESOLUTELY EAST-ORIENTED ASSISTANCE
POLICY
The attention paid to the eastern neighbourhood has also translated into material
help. As Poland’s economic condition improved, it could gradually devote more
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significant sums to development assistance to other countries. In 2009, Poland de-
voted nearly 375 million USD to development aid (Polska Pomoc, 2009). Most of
this sum (75%) was spent in contributions to international organisations that offer
development aid, above all the EU, while the remaining part was devoted to bilat-
eral assistance and administered mostly by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The re-
sources devoted to assistance are still relatively modest, especially considering
Poland’s aspirations to be an important player on the international scene. Yet, how-
ever small the resources, a look at the list of the priority recipients proves the im-
portance of the eastern neighbours for Poland. The priority recipients are
Afghanistan, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Palestinian Autonomy and
Angola. In 2009, the MFA carried out 75 projects in Ukraine, 45 in Afghanistan, 40
in Belarus and 32 in Georgia (ibidem). 
Ukraine is the main recipient of Polish aid. In 2010, apart from the aid projects
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, various projects toward Ukraine were organised
by institutions which are part of the central administration such as the police,
courts and even firefighters. In addition, the ministry financially supported some
projects toward Ukraine that were prepared by NGOs and local authorities. The
projects organised by the former included supporting independent media, pro-
moting energy efficiency, strengthening knowledge about the Transatlantic coop-
eration, and exchanging experiences on the subject of control of illegal migration
(Polska Pomoc, 2010a). The funds devoted to these projects in 2010 amounted to
11.9 million zlotys (ca. 3 million euros). In the same year, projects carried out in
Georgia received 7.5 million zlotys (ca. 1.6 million euros). The projects carried out
in Georgia included assistance for the victims of social exclusion, support for re-
gional development, and promotion of knowledge of human rights-related issues
(Polska Pomoc, 2010b). 
In sum, the analysis of policy implementation shows a general, but not always
complete, consistency between discourse and actions. In relations with the West-
ern European partners, Poland consistently supported the European aspirations of
its eastern neighbours. In contrast, though, in bilateral relations, Poland’s actions
sometimes did not match its declarations emphasising the strategic nature of the
relationship. 
CONCLUSION
This article discussed the development of the Polish policy towards the eastern
neighbourhood after 1989. The point of reference for the present analysis was a
debate between two divergent approaches to the eastern neighbourhood: ro-
manticism and minimalism. Advocates of the former believe that Poland should
actively support the political and economic transition in the eastern neighbour-
hood and, if necessary, challenge Russia in that area. In contrast, partisans of min-
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imalism doubted the likelihood of a quick Westernisation of the eastern neigh-
bours and, consequently, perceived an active involvement of Poland to this end as
largely futile and potentially pernicious for Poland’s relations with Russia. The anal-
ysis of the policy carried out by consecutive Polish governments shows a general
dominance of the romantic strategy, even though the political forces in power
since 2007 have obviously embraced some of the arguments put forward by the
minimalists. 
The romantic thinking is strongly related to the historical legacy of the Com-
monwealth: it emphasises the bond that exists between Poles and the nations that
once made up the Commonwealth, expresses the conviction that Poland has a mis-
sion to be a transmission belt of Western values to the East, and includes a deter-
mination to oppose Russia’s imperialist tendencies. Minimalism, on the other hand,
challenges the dogmas of the historical legacy by stating that the Commonwealth
nations (apart from Lithuania) are closer to Russia than to Western Europe. It also
questions the assumption that an alliance of Poland with Ukraine is the only way to
stop Russia from returning to imperialism. The dominance of the romantic ap-
proach can thus be seen as an illustration of the significant influence of both the
historical and the political identity on how the Polish interest was interpreted and
how Poland’s main goals were defined. 
The historical identity, which was built around the legacy of the Common-
wealth, and the political identity, consisting of strong support for democracy, hu-
man rights and the rule of law, found expression in Poland’s strong feeling of sol-
idarity with the eastern neighbours. The declarations of Polish decision-makers
demonstrate the widespread conviction that there exists a specific bond between
Poland and its eastern neighbours stemming above all from their common histo-
ry, but also from the shared desire to reject Soviet domination and build a demo-
cratic political regime. That feeling of solidarity constituted an important motiva-
tion for Poland to support the democratic transition in the eastern neighbourhood
and act as a representative of the neighbours’ interests in its contacts with West-
ern European countries. 
The analysis of Poland’s policy implementation shows a focus on high politics.
Polish leaders were eager to stress the strategic nature of their contacts with
Ukraine or Georgia, but there was often little substance behind these declarations
in terms of economic or social relations. Poland consistently called for greater in-
volvement of NATO and the EU in the East and emphasised the aspirations of its
neighbours to integrate with the transatlantic community – sometimes more de-
terminedly than the neighbours themselves. But the Polish actions in the East suf-
fered from a lack of resources and of a carefully designed long-term strategy – the
decision-makers were apparently convinced that meetings at the highest level cou-
pled with highlighting the Polish experience would be enough to cement democ-
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racy in the East. However, Poland’s recent actions, such as the Eastern Partnership
project, demonstrate its growing consciousness that it can succeed in its romantic
mission in the East only with the support of the EU. 
ENDNOTES
1 Even though echoes of the Dmowski/Pilsudski debate were manifest in the controversy between min-
imalists and romantics, the latter cannot be perceived as a simple revival of the former. 
2 Academic, advisor to the Polish Prime Minister in 1989–1990 and 1992–1993. 
3 Intellectual, dissident, former director of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe. 
4 Professor of history, senator between 1989 and 1991. 
5 In his speech, President Kaczynski claimed that Russia thinks ‘that the nations around it should be sub-
jected to it’. He also denounced Russia’s imperialist tendencies and its tendency to dominate its neigh-
bourhood, declaring that ‘it is Georgia today, Ukraine tomorrow, later the Baltic States, and one day
perhaps my own country Poland’ (Obserwator, 2008: 9–10). 
6 The Jagiellonian dynasty came to the throne of Poland as a result of the first union between the King-
dom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and ruled for nearly two centuries between 1386
and 1572. It was the last of the Jagiellonian kings who oversaw the conclusion of the Union of Lublin
that created the Commonwealth. 
7 Even though Poland does not participate in the military intervention in Libya, the contacts it developed
recently with Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate that it does not want to limit its role of promoter of
democracy to the Eastern neighbourhood. 
8 The Parliament called ‘the Council, the Commission and the Member States to consider, besides the
measures of the Action Plan within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, other forms
of association with Ukraine, giving clear European perspective for the country and responding to the
demonstrated aspirations of the vast majority of the Ukrainian people, possibly leading ultimately to
the country’s accession to the EU’ (EP, 2005: point 14).
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Shining in Brussels?
The Eastern Partnership
in Estonia’s Foreign Policy
VAHUR MADE
Abstract: The article maintains that there exist two competing discourses in explaining Estonia’s for-
eign policy motivation and priorities in terms of the Eastern Partnership. The article also ar-
gues that in the view of Estonia, the EU-centric view is becoming more important than the
Russia-centric view, which conceives Estonian foreign policy only in terms of Estonia’s re-
lations to Russia. Estonian foreign policy interests and motives are thus gradually becom-
ing more varied and multi-layered, making a departure from the traditional ‘Russia only’
approach. For Estonia, the Eastern Partnership serves the aim of making the country visi-
ble and noticed in Brussels rather than serving the aim of being a containment strategy vis-
à-vis Moscow. Thus, membership of the European Union is becoming increasingly
important in Estonian foreign policy. The need to be more visible within the EU policy-
making process forces Estonia to search for policy areas where it can claim to have an ex-
pert knowledge. One such area is the Eastern Partnership. Estonia has identified the Eastern
Partnership as one of its foreign policy priorities and directs half of its development assis-
tance to the Eastern Partnership partner countries. 
Key words: Estonia, Eastern Partnership, Russia, identity 
For Estonia, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP) have proved to be increasingly important elements of the country’s
post-enlargement (post-2004) EU policies. Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have
been priority countries of Estonia’s development assistance since 2003 (Estonian
MFA, 2005).1 Since 2011 Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan have also been added
to this list (ibid.; Estonian MFA, 2010). Estonia maintains its strong support to the
EU-aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and supports a rapid conclu-
sion of the association, free trade, visa facilitation and energy cooperation agree-
ments with those countries, and an extension of all these cooperation modes to
the rest of the EaP partners. Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Paet (in
office since 2005) has made the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and particularly
the Eastern Partnership the key issue of Estonia’s foreign policy. In 2010 Paet has
stated that ‘the six Eastern Partnership countries are now closer to the EU than
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never before’.2 Paet also advocates the view that the Eastern Partnership has to
be a powerful ‘reform-facilitator’ in the six eastern neighbours of the EU.3
Why is Estonia an active supporter of the Eastern Partnership? The answer may
include justifications based on geography, or even geopolitics. But the actual Esto-
nian motives are more complex than that. Not only is Estonia’s motivation to sup-
port the Eastern Partnership based on geography, geopolitics, and perhaps history,
but it also reflects the competition Estonia faces within the EU’s policy-making pro-
cess. For Estonia, the Eastern Partnership is rather significantly about intra-EU visi-
bility and positioning vis-à-vis other EU member states.
Against this background the present chapter observes developments within the
process of forming the Estonian foreign policy identity during the past decade. EU-
centric motivators have clearly emerged to challenge the more traditional Russia-
centric ones in the Estonian foreign policy identity. This may indicate that in Esto-
nian foreign policy a more traditional constructivist approach to foreign policy –
based on historical memory and small state threat-perceptions – is gradually giving
ground to the rational arguments stressing Estonia’s need to be successful in the
EU policy processes, as its success in this respect could lead to it being a visible and
appreciated EU member state. In other words, visibility and activism are associat-
ed with greater intra-EU prestige, which as an end goal may provide Estonia with
increasing access to political and financial support from the EU. 
It is more difficult to define Estonia’s solidarity towards the partners of the Eastern
Partnership. If foreign policy could be based on non-rational – even purely emotion-
al – arguments, then historical experience would be decisive in this respect. Accord-
ingly, Estonia could be expected to support other states who resist Russia’s foreign
policy interests and ambitions, perceiving their resistance as a security guarantee. 
On the other hand one can also observe that Estonia’s solidarity with the six coun-
tries belonging to the EU’s eastern neighbourhood is currently pretty much under
construction. Estonia’s solidarity towards the ‘East’ could be seen as a process that
has only started a decade ago and still has a long way to go before it can develop in-
to a fully legitimate foreign policy ‘brand’. For instance, Estonia’s wide-scale political
and societal support towards Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of the
Southern Caucasus was largely missing during the 1990s. However, during the 2000s
this support has been consistently built up by the Estonian foreign policy elite through
the media, civil society organisations and development cooperation projects. 
DEFINING ESTONIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
IDENTITY
IS RUSSIA THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN?
Placing the Baltic states into an East-West or a Russia-Europe dichotomy is the most
common way to approach the foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania af-
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ter the Cold War. Even the accession of these states into the EU and NATO in 2004
has changed very little, if anything, in the conceptualisations of their foreign and
defence policies in mainstream academic writing.4 In addition some of the litera-
ture on EU-Russia relations views Estonia and other Baltic states as potential ele-
ments of conflict between Brussels and Moscow, or at least as the EU member
states who, along with Poland, are the most critically minded towards Russia’s for-
eign policy aims and interests in Europe. As Vadim Kononenko puts it, ‘the Baltic-
Russian relations are likely to remain prone to friction as long as the wider EU-Rus-
sia relationship continues to be problematic’ (Kononenko, 2006: 71). Maria Mälk-
soo summarises this reasoning in terms of security thinking: ‘in the EU the so-called
“new Europeans” arguably represent the “old security thinking”, especially when it
comes to Russia’ (Mälksoo, 2008: 33).
Countless accounts of a similar kind name a number of standard issues as ar-
guably being the keys to understanding the Estonian foreign policies. It is said that
Estonia is pushing towards ever increasing integration and identification with Eu-
rope/the West in order to distance itself from Russia. Estonia is seen as seeking in
its Western partners and European institutions a counterbalance to the continu-
ously strong pressure from Russia on its domestic, foreign and security policies. On
the extreme edge it may even be argued that everything Estonia does in its foreign
policy is because of Russia or in context with Russia, and that Estonian foreign pol-
icy can only be properly understood and analysed if it is placed into the wider spec-
trum of Russian foreign political interests, particularly those in Northern Europe
and the Baltic Sea region.
Therefore it is not surprising that Estonia’s approaches towards the European
Neighbourhood Policy, and towards the Eastern Partnership in particular, are simi-
larly seen as one element within this traditional Europe-Russia division within Esto-
nian foreign policy. Again, analysing Estonian policies within the Eastern Partner-
ship, one may come forward with the rather robust argument that Tallinn manifests
its support towards the six Eastern Partnership countries only because it wants to
do something that would challenge the traditional Russian dominance within the
former Soviet space. 
Such an argumentation is, for instance, very much present in the 2009 Eastern
Partnership Briefing Paper prepared by the International Center of Defence Stud-
ies under the Estonian Ministry of Defence. Written by Kaarel Kaas and Merle Mai-
gre the paper states that the ‘Eastern Partnership lessens and balances Russia’s in-
fluence in the region by promoting European values. /…/ For Estonia it is important
to have a strong and unified EU foreign policy. It is not in Estonia’s interest to set-
tle the important decisions of EU-Russian relations in a bilateral format’ (Kaas and
Maigre, 2009). This citation illustrates also the following wishes within Estonia’s for-
eign policy establishment: that the launch of the Eastern Partnership would help to
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bring into existence a more coherent EU policy towards Russia and that further bi-
lateral deals à la Nord Stream would be avoided. In a similar vein, although more
emotionally, Mart Laar (former Estonian Prime Minister and the personal policy ad-
viser of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in 2006–2008) has stated that Es-
tonia has to support Georgia because this country has chosen the ‘Western path’
and therefore it faces ‘a serious controversy’ with Russia (Laar, 2006).
Finally, there are some elements in the official Estonian foreign policy which in-
dicate the linkage between the country’s support to the Eastern Partnership and its
relations with Russia. Estonia sees the development cooperation – the main tool
used by Tallinn to support the Eastern Partnership – as a part of the country’s se-
curity policy. The 2010 Estonian Security Policy Concept identifies the develop-
ment cooperation as a part of Estonia’s activities aimed at strengthening ‘security
and stability /…/ and assisting the aid recipient countries in their political, social
and economic buildup’.5 Furthermore, Estonia has strongly supported Moldova
and Georgia in their frozen regional conflicts with Russia while agreeing with all
pro-western developments in the partner countries of the Eastern Partnership. 
Still, while the arguments of there being an ‘EU-Russia dichotomy’ definitely
bear a great deal of substance in explaining Estonian foreign policy, they never-
theless do not seem to be fully explanative. Firstly, this argumentation is largely
based on the state of affairs in EU-Russian relations before the 2008 Georgian-
Russian war. The impacts of the war, together with the generally complex EU-Rus-
sian relationship (no renewal of the EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement, no visa-free travel, no agreement on energy cooperation, etc.) and
Europe’s overall disappointment in Russia’s real intention to carry out democrati-
sation and modernisation processes, have resulted in increasing distance between
the EU and Russia. The trend of the EU’s ‘Russia fatigue’ is increasingly reflected
in the academic and policy writing of recent years. We can name just a few ex-
amples: In an essay dealing with the situation in 2008, Piret Ehin questions very
bluntly the rationale of offering the EU’s financial assistance to Russia (Ehin,
2009). In a 2010 essay, Sinikukka Saari directly points out the gradually increasing
level of distrust in EU-Russian relations (Saari, 2010). Finally, while commenting
the results of the June 2011 EU-Russia Nizhniy-Novgorod Summit, Arkady Mosh-
es states that the EU has come to the point where it lacks both the motivation and
the resources to cooperate with Russia: ‘From Moscow nothing is expected – nei-
ther bad nor good’ (Moshes, 2011). While Russia continues to be a difficult case
for the EU’s foreign policy, it has ceased to be the foreign political priority. As a
success indicator for assessing the EU’s foreign policy performance, the Eastern
Partnership seems to outweigh the EU-Russian relations. It is obvious that trends
like these in the EU’s foreign relations can not leave Estonia’s foreign policy unaf-
fected. 
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Secondly, the traditional way of explaining post-2004 Estonian foreign policies
very often fails to take into consideration the change in the status of small states,
including Estonia, when they become members of the EU and NATO. For Estonia,
success in its performance within the EU decision-making processes is increasing-
ly gaining existential importance. In this light, not all the foreign and security poli-
cy steps of Estonia can be explained through the EU-Russia division. This applies al-
so to Estonia’s actvisim within the context of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership.
Presenting these EU policies as Estonia’s ‘specialisms’ is a foreign policy motivator
that should be studied in the light of Estonia’s EU membership rather than in the
context of the Estonia-Russia-Europe triangle.6
FROM AN ‘AUTHORITARIAN BORDERLAND’ TO
‘PROSPECTIVE FUTURE EU MEMBER STATES’
Estonia has not always prioritised its relations to the current six partner countries of
the Eastern Partnership (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Aser-
baijan). The difference between the democratic governance and the Western ori-
entation of the Baltic states and the continuously authoritarian regimes of the
‘Newly Independent States’ of the former Soviet space was clearly stressed in the
foreign political reasoning of Tallinn during the 1990s. This was understandable be-
cause Estonia was in need of an image that would be different from that of the So-
viet past, as well as from that of the increasingly unstable post-1991 Russia. The
countries in the ‘east’, routinely labelled in Europe as the ‘former Soviet republics’,
evidently lacked any serious perspectives of closer EU approximation in the con-
text of the 1990s. 
In the 1990s Estonian perspectives, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, as well as the
three South Caucasus states, seemed hopeless in their internal instability. These
countries were associated with the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the civil wars in
Moldova and Georgia, non-democratic regimes and corrupt political culture, as
well as Russo-centric economic models and Moscow-friendly foreign policy sym-
pathies. While the Baltic states continued their journey to the realm of the demo-
cratic West, the rest of the former Soviet Union was well on its way to concentrat-
ing around its authoritarian heritage and drifiting further away from freedom, pros-
perity, stability, rule of law and policy ethics.
The situation changed fundamentally in the early 2000s. The EU’s eastern en-
largement generated the ‘new neighbourhood’ proposal from the United Kingdom
to the EU in 2002 and subsequently led to the launch of the ENP in 2003–2004.
Simultaneously there occurred the 2003 Revolution of Roses in Georgia and the
2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. 
In Estonia these developments were perceived with large-scale enthusiasm
among both the policy elites and the civil society organisations.7 Particularly the
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Ukrainian Orange Revolution was perceived as a starting point of the collapse of
the authoritarian rule in the very heart of the former Soviet Union with a great po-
tential to eventually lead to democratic changes in Russia. The post-Soviet coun-
tries in the east, which were previously seen as destined to continue in an endless
authoritarian darkness, suddenly emerged as a promising extra space of democra-
cy in Europe (the EU) which contained a vast amount of possibilities for Estonian
foreign policy. This kind of drastic U-turn definitely deserves closer examination. 
A traditional approach would probably use the ‘EU-Russia’ dichotomy or the
prism of great power politics when looking for an explanation for it. Such an ap-
proach would most likely consider the launch of the ENP as an initiative of the UK
and Germany – the two large EU member states most interested in the Post-Sovi-
et space in terms of geopolitics – backed by the USA. A journalistic conspiracy the-
ory may state that it was primarily the USA that was behind the Georgian and
Ukrainian events of 2003–2004. Logically, in such a context Estonia only had to fol-
low an inroad made by the most influential powers in the EU and the global lead-
er of the time – the USA.
But is this enough to explain the Baltic states’ ENP/EaP activism in the following
years? 
TOWARDS A CONSISTENT FOREIGN POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION?
FROM A DEMOCRACY PROMOTER TO A MODEL REFORMER:
THE RISE OF THE ESTONIAN MESSIANIC FOREIGN POLICY
The understanding that Estonia has a special experience that it can share with the
partner countries of the Eastern Partnership is deeply connected to the current Es-
tonian foreign policy. The common Soviet heritage is rather extensively stressed in
this context. It is widely argued that since both Estonia and the partner countries of
the Eastern Partnership ‘come from similar Soviet backgrounds’, the experience Es-
tonia can offer is much more relevant than any experience offered by the EU mem-
ber states beyond the former Soviet borders. 
Democracy promotion was very much in the center of Estonia’s policies towards
the future Eastern Partnership partner countries in 2003–2008 and 2010. The 2003
events in Georgia and particularly the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine boost-
ed the Estonian view that a genuine democratic change is also possible in those
parts of the former Soviet Union that, unlike the Baltic states, lacked the historical
experience of democratic statehood. The events in Tbilisi and Kiev were seen in
Tallinn as landmarks introducing completely new political developments as well as
opportunities to the space of the former Soviet Union.
The Estonian ambassador to the USA Jüri Luik said it particularly bluntly in his
analysis of the 2003 Georgian Revolution of Roses: ‘What happened in Georgia
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has a capacity to change the whole nature of the CIS (Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States – VM). Georgia has a similar status of a torch-bearer as the Baltic
states had in the former Soviet Union /.../ We in Estonia should seriously consider
how we can assist the new democratic government of Georgia’ (Luik, 2003). 
Another high-ranking Estonian diplomat, Kaupo Känd, who worked in
2004–2005 as an expert in the EUJUST THEMIS program in Tbilisi under the EU
Special Representative in the Southern Caucasus Heikki Talvitie, clearly stressed
the need for Estonian assistance to Georgia. According to Känd the Georgian gov-
ernment had the ‘short-term goal’ to join NATO while the EU-membership was put
in a ‘longer perspective’. For this reason Georgia needed to both learn from the Es-
tonian reform experience and get help from Estonian experts working on the basis
of bilateral projects as well as in the international organisations assisting Georgia
(Känd, 2005a, 2005b: 58). 
Analysing the outcomes of the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Estonian pol-
icy analyst Aili Ribulis stated that a ‘new Ukraine’ had been born from the events
in Kiev of November 2004: ‘Ukraine now urgently needs the EU’s assistance. On-
ly this can prevent Ukraine from backsliding into Russia’s sphere of influence’
(Ribulis, 2005). 
Against this mental background Estonia enthusiastically entered the anticipated
democratisation processes in its immediate neighbourhood. These processes
promised to open for Estonia a new wide opportunity for aquiring both new like-
minded allies from among other countries and a sphere of influence. In addition,
Estonia could see itself as a legitimate partner in the European/Western democra-
cy promotion effort (Made, 2007/2008). The Estonian government strategies in re-
gard to EU policies started to stress the importance of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy from 2004. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were indicated as priority
countries. Estonia’s political relations to Belarus remained very limited until 2009,
when an Estonian embassy was opened in Minsk and the first high-level visits be-
tween the two countries took place. Estonia has always observed the develop-
ments in Armenia and Azerbaijan, but due to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict it has
preferred to exercise a low profile in the political cooperation with these countries.
The strategy for 2004–2006 particularly stressed democratic development and
stability/security as the keywords of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.8 Then the
2007–2011 strategy already paid more attention to economic development and
deeper EU-integration while stressing continuously the need for democratisation.9
A number of events and processes in 2008–2010 shifted Estonia’s attention from
democracy promotion to promoting itself as a model country in terms of its eco-
nomic and societal reforms. The Georgian-Russian war in 2008, the global financial
crisis of 2008–2009, and the Ukrainian presidential elections in 2010 made the Es-
tonian policy focus shift more towards non-political issues.10 A return of authoritar-
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ianism was anticipated, and concentrating on economic, social and administrative
reforms was considered safer than democracy promotion.
For reform promotion the launch of the Eastern Partnership in 2009 presented
further opportunities. Being promoted by Poland and Sweden the Eastern Partner-
ship emerged as a project with a heart and mind in Estonia’s home region. 
Estonia maintained that the experience they had acquired from the transition, re-
form and EU integration during the past decade could be exactly the kind of ex-
perience that could help to boost the reform processes in the Eastern Partnership
partner countries. For example, Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Paet has
stressed that Estonia has a lot of transition experience to offer to the Eastern Part-
nership countries and that within the last decades hundreds of officials from the
Eastern Partnership countries have been trained in Estonia.11 Shortly afterwards, the
official Estonian position vis-ą-vis the Eastern Partnership started to stress the im-
portance of ‘practical solutions’.12 This stress on practical solutions embraces a
wide scope of different areas – from democratic institutions and elections to vari-
ous different sectors of socio-economic reform. Estonian models of e-governance,
taxation, social security, health care, public administration build-up, domestic co-
ordination of EU-related decision-making, transport and logistic systems, and man-
agement of EU assistance and structural support are all areas that were closely
linked to the EU-integration process of Estonia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In
these areas, one may see a promising tool for building up Estonia’s image of a re-
form-related knowledge-provider in the former Soviet space.
On the other hand, applying for the status of an ENP-EaP specialist is the least
stressing approach for Estonia’s participation within the EU decision-making. The
ENP and EaP are quite harmless policy areas demanding little domestic, including
financial, input from Estonia but offering at the same time rather wide and risk-free
opportunities to increase the image profile of the small EU member state. 
ESTONIAN ASSISTANCE POLICY AND NGO ENGAGEMENT
Development cooperation is Estonia’s key tool in implementing its policies towards
the partner countries of the Eastern Partnership. The Development Cooperation
and Humanitarian Assistance Department in the Estonian MFA manages the Esto-
nian development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (DC/HA) budget
since 2006. Then the budget was 11.5 million Euros. In 2010 the Estonian DC/HA
budget amounted to 14 million Euros.13 The budget is being spent either through
the UN agencies (UNDP, etc.) and other international organisations of humanitar-
ian assistance (the EU through EuropeAid, OECD, IBRD, EBRD and other develop-
ment banks) or through the projects implemented by the Estonian NGOs.
Among the Baltic States Estonia spends slightly more on development cooperation
than Latvia (12 million Euros in 2010) but considerably less than Lithuania (28 million
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Euros in 2010). From among the EU member states only Latvia and Malta (7 million
Euros in 2010) spend less on development cooperation than Estonia.14 The Develop-
ment Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance Development Plan for 2011–2015
envisages an increase of the Estonian DC/HA budget to 22 million Euros by 2012.15
The EU suggests that the member states should spend at least 0.33 percent of their
GDP on DC/HA. Estonia plans to bring this figure to 0.17 percent by 2015.16
Afghanistan is by far the largest individual recipient of Estonia’s development co-
operation assistance. However, the partner countries of the Eastern Partnership
combined capture almost half of the DC budget (45 percent in 2009).17
From among the Estonian DC projects carried out for the Eastern Partnership
partner countries, the educational and training projects occupy the largest part. Al-
so, the institutions with an educational/training/research focus are the most active
project implementators (the Estonian e-Governance Academy, the Estonian School
of Diplomacy, EuroCollege of the University of Tartu, the University of Tallinn, the
Open Estonia Foundation, the Arcimedes Foundation, the Estonian NATO Associ-
ation, and various vocational training associations as well as municipalities and re-
gional cooperation organisations).18
There is also an umbrella organisation – the Estonian Round-Table for Develop-
ment Cooperation (ERDC)19 – that unites some but not all Estonian NGOs active in
the field of DC/HA. The ERDC is also the main provider of criticism towards the
MFA-directed DC/HA policies, as it maintains that Estonia spends too little money
on DC/HA and pays too little attention to poverty reduction (the UN’s millennium
goals).20
In short, while Estonia continues to invest strong political support into the East-
ern Partnership and sees this as one of its key ‘niches’ within the EU, the actual im-
plementation of this policy goal is very much in its beginning phase. It is very ob-
vious that in the matter of the Eastern Partnership, Estonia needs to both present
policy initiatives and cooperate with the EU member states, the EU institutions and
the ‘group of friends’ of the Eastern Partnership (the USA, Canada, Norway, Ice-
land, Japan, Turkey, etc.).
CONCLUSION: TWO COMPETING DISCOURSES
FOR EXPLAINING ESTONIA’S NATIONAL
INTERESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN
PARTNERSHIP 
This article has indicated the emergence of two competing discourses in explain-
ing Estonia’s national interests in the context of the Eastern Partnership. On the one
hand there exists the traditional discourse based on geopolitical reasoning and
stressing Estonia’s rather problematic positioning between Russia and the EU. On
the other hand it is possible to present a discourse which directs attention from the
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Estonian-Russian relationship to the Estonian EU membership. In this light, the East-
ern Partnership can not only be seen as a part of Estonia’s geopolitical struggle for
survival with its large eastern neighbour but also as a part of Estonia’s emerging
self-identification within the EU. 
The discourse change does not necessarily mean that the position of Russia as a
geopolitical player in Europe, as well as in Europe’s North and the countries of the
Eastern Partnership, is being neglected. There is rather an indication that the ‘EU-
Russian dichotomy’ is not the ‘only game in town’ when an attempt is made to anal-
yse the current Estonian foreign policies.
Judging by the European Commission’s May 2011 review of the state and per-
spectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy, we can look rather optimistical-
ly to the future of the Eastern Partnership. In the EC communication’s preamble,
Moldova and Ukraine are pointed out as the success stories of the ENP process.
From the beginning of 2011, the anti-enlargement rhetoric has gradually disap-
peared from the official EU communications on the Eastern Partnership. Finally,
new versions of the key elements of the EaP – Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreements (DCFTA) and visa facilitation agreements – are now being pro-
posed for the EU’s southern neighbours.21
Therefore Estonia may have made the right choice when it selected the Eastern
Partnership as its ‘specialism’ within the EU. After all, the EU’s success in the East-
ern Partnership may become a bridge to more flexible and cooperation-minded
EU-Russian relations.
ENDNOTES
1 The principles of Estonian development cooperation were laid down by the decrees of the Parliament
in 1998 and 2003. However, the first project with Ukraine was carried out in 2000. In 2005 the Esto-
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted the first development cooperation and humanitarian assis-
tance strategy for 2006–2010, which pointed out Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova as Estonia’s priority
countries of development assistance. See Estonian MFA (2005). 
2 Urmas Paet’s statement at the meeting of the EU/EaP foreign ministers in Sopot, Poland in May 2010.
Estonian MFA press release 24. 05. 2010. On-line: www.vm.ee/?q=node/9504. 
3 Estonian MFA press release 08. 12. 2009. On-line: www.vm.ee/?q=node/8763. 
4 For the most recent argumentation see the collection of articles from fifteen authors in the Baltic De-
fence Review No. 11 (Baltic Defence College, 2004); Ehin and Kasekamp (2005); Kononenko (2006);
Ehin (2006); Nielsen (2007); and Mouritzen (2009). 
5 ‘Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused [Foundations of Estonian Security Policy]’, Estonian Parliament decree
12. 05. 2010. See online: www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/JPA_2010.pdf. See also the special develop-
ment cooperation-focused issue of Riigikaitse (the state defence supplement of the daily Eesti Päe-
valeht), 01. 09. 2011.
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6 The discussion about Estonia’s ‘specialisms’ within the EU’s common policies emerged gradually along
with the country’s adaptation to the Union’s decision-making process. The discussion is related to Es-
tonia’s limited human and financial resources, which do not allow the country to be an active initiator
in all EU policy areas. As a part of this discussion, the Estonian MFA has strongly advocated the idea of
the Eastern Partnership being a particular Estonian ‘specialism’ within the EU since 2009. With this aim,
the Estonian Center of Eastern Partnership was established in 2011 in Tallinn (online: www.eceap.eu).
See Made (2009/2010). 
7 The main Estonian newspapers Postimees and Eesti Päevaleht were daily publishing a vast amount of ‘pro-
Orange’ news, comments, and analyses of Ukrainian events. Marko Mihkelson, then the Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Estonian Parliament, and the Member of Parliament Silver Meikar
emerged as the spokesmen of the Estonian lobby supporting the anticipated Ukrainian democratic
change. Among the Estonian civil society organisations, particularly the Open Estonia Foundation and the
Estonian European Movement emerged as active supporters of the ‘Orange’ Ukraine. See the Ukraine is-
sues of the monthly Diplomaatia from October 2004 and January 2005 and also Meikar (2006). 
8 Valitsuse Euroopa Liidu poliitika 2004–2006. Vabariigi Valitsus, 22. 04. 2004. See online: valit-
sus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/riigikantselei/euroopa/eesti-eesmargid-euroopa-liidus/eesti-euroopa-li-
idu-poliitika-2007/Valitsuse_Euroopa_Liidu_poliitika_2004_2006.pdf. 
9 Eesti Euroopa Liidu poliitika 2007–2011. Vabariigi Valitsus, 25. 10. 2007. See online: www.riigikantselei.
ee/failid/ELPOL_2007_2011.pdf. 
10 See Merle Maigre’s (2009) account of the ‘Ukraine-fatigue’ that started to emerge in Western capitals in
2008–2010 because of the general feeling of disappointment with the results of the Orange Revolution. 
11 For Urmas Paet’s speech during the opening ceremony of the Estonian Center of Eastern Partnership
in Tallinn on 26 January 2011, see online: www.valitsus.ee/et/riigikantselei/euroopa-liit/euroopa-
liidu-uudised/23432/valisminister-paet-avas-eesti-euroopa-liidu-idapartnerluse-keskuse. For Urmas Paet’s
speech on Estonia’s foreign policy priorities at the Estonian Parliament on 11 February 2010, see on-
line: www.vm.ee/?q=node9000. 
12 See the Estonian Government Goals in the EU during the EU presidencies of 2009–2011. Online: 
valitsus.ee/et/riigikantselei/euroopa-liit/eesti-eesmargid-ja-poliitika/valitsuse-eesmargid-euroopa-
liidus-eesistumisperioodiks. 
13 2011 AidWatch report of the CONCORD network, 19. 05. 2011. On-line: aidwatch.concordeurope.org/. 
14 2011 AidWatch report (ibidem).
15 See online: www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/Rakendusplaan_2011-2015.pdf, p. 4.
16 See online: www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/arengukoostoo-humanitaarabi_arengukava_2011-2015.pdf,
p. 27.
17 See online: www.vm.ee/?q=et/node/8630#projpartner, p. 2.
18 For an exhaustive list of the 2006–2010 Estonian DC/HA projects, project amounts and implemen-
tating organisations, see online: www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/abi-aruanne-2007-08.pdf. The 2011
Estonian DC and HA projects can be seen online: www.vm.ee/?q=node/11327 and www.vm.ee/
?q=node/11675. 
19 See online: www.terveilm.net. 
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20 See ‘Raport: Keegi ei tea, milline on Eesti arenguabi mõju’ [‘Report: Nobody Knows the Actual Impact
of the Estonian Development Cooperation’]. Online: www.terveilm.net/?id=1&archive=true
&blog=655.
21 In its May 2011 communication on the progress and perspectives of the European Neighbourhood
Policy the European Commission stresses ‘the encouraging progress made by /…/ the Republic of
Moldova in its reform efforts, [and] Ukraine in the negotiations of the Association Agreement’. See
European Commission / High Representative (2011: 1).
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Latvian and Lithuanian 
Policy in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood: Between 
Solidarity and Self Promotion
KATERINA KESA
Abstract: This paper studies how Latvia and Lithuania support the countries of the Eastern Ne-
ighborhood in their process of coming closer to Western Institutions. Based on the post-
structural constructivist approach of international relations, the analysis focuses on the
way these two Baltic States view their place in the world (geopolitically and as small sta-
tes), how they perceive their surrounding ‘Other’ (in both positive and negative terms)
and how they build their own identities (‘Self’) in relation to this ‘Other’. It argues that
there are multiple ‘circles of affiliation’ (‘external’ and ‘internal’) to which Lithuania and
Latvia belong and which have an impact on the definition of their political identities.
This highlights some differences in the countries’ approaches to their assistance policy.
On one hand, their policy towards the East reflects the design of their new foreign po-
licy priorities after 2004. On the other hand, it reflects the continuation of their previous
politics, albeit in a different form. This corresponds to Latvia and Lithuania’s desire to be
considered as ‘true’ Europeans. However, the two countries are ambivalent between a
strong political-ideological standpoint and their politicians’ solidarity towards the Eastern
neighbours on one side and the rather modest and pragmatic implementation of their
assistance policy on the other. 
Key words: Latvian and Lithuanian Foreign Policy, Assistance Policy, circles of affiliation, political and
historical identity, solidarity, Eastern Neighborhood, Russia
INTRODUCTION 
When the 15 Soviet Republics regained their independence in 1991, one of their
first challenges was to redefine their identity, rebuild their economy and reestab-
lish their statehood on new bases. The newly independent states, with the excep-
tion of the Baltic States, soon established a Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). The Balts instead chose to follow a different route and look towards the West
by preparing for their membership in the European Union (EU) and the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Joining these organizations in 2004 was con-
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sidered by the Baltic States as a unique and concrete way to guarantee their secu-
rity and their image as ‘true’ Europeans.1
Since they regained independence, the three Baltic States tried to rid themselves
of the ‘post-Soviet’ or ‘Eastern European’ label while increasing their contacts with
Western Europe and trying to reorient their trade exchange from the other post-So-
viet countries’ markets to those of countries like Germany, Sweden, Finland and
Denmark. All their efforts were then dedicated to creating new ties with Western
states and to adopting ‘European’ and Western norms. Once they had become
members of the EU and NATO, their foreign policy had reached a situation of ‘ze-
ro gravity’.2 It therefore became necessary for the Baltic States to redefine their for-
eign policy priorities and to participate in European foreign policies as new mem-
bers of these organizations. 
As we will further discuss, the Baltic States’ ‘rapprochement’ with several ex-So-
viet countries (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus) and the involvement of the
Baltic States (starting in 2003–2004) in assisting in the development of these coun-
tries and promoting their membership in the EU and NATO can be considered, on
the one hand, as part of the logic of redefining the foreign policy priorities of the
Baltic States and, on the other hand, as the continuation of their desire to become
‘true’ Europeans. Indeed, we argue that the Latvian and Lithuanian foreign policy
identities consist of both a ‘first order identity’, a political identity (based on domi-
nant political priorities, the ‘political self’), and a ‘second order identity’, the histor-
ical identity (based on memory and narratives of common history) (cf. Tulmets, this
special issue).
While there is no doubt that this new policy towards the ‘new’ Eastern Euro-
pean countries has become a real priority in Lithuanian and Latvian foreign pol-
icy, this article tries to analyse the consistency/coherence between Lithuania
and Latvia’s expression of political solidarity with the Eastern Neighbourhood
based on the countries’ shared history, their attitude towards their common
neighbour, Russia, and Latvia and Lithuania’s real desire to help the post-Soviet
countries to adopt the European values of democracy, rule of law and market
economy. In order to draw a comparison between the official motivations of
Latvia and Lithuania’s foreign policy and what is done in practice within the
framework of their policy, this study proceeds as follows: Firstly, it analyses the
way Lithuania and Latvia have redefined their foreign policy since their acces-
sion to the EU and NATO and tries to understand what caused these states to
become active promoters of Western norms in the ‘new’ Neighborhood of the
EU. Secondly, through the study of Latvian and Lithuanian official discourses, it
attempts to highlight how solidarity towards this Eastern neighborhood is ex-
pressed by the political elites and what kind of message this support carries.
And finally, leaving behind the theory and discourse, the article gives a de-
Perspectives02_11_text5:PERSPECTIVES  16.12.2011  11:07  Page 82    (Black/Black plate)
BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND SELF PROMOTION
83Perspectives      Vol. 19, No. 2      2011
scriptive overview of how the assistance policies are implemented by Lithuania
and Latvia.3
LATVIA AND LITHUANIA AS ACTIVE
PROMOTERS OF THE EASTERN
NEIGHBORHOOD
Almost immediately after Latvia and Lithuania4 joined the EU and NATO, and the
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was announced, they sought to renew their
relations with several post-Soviet states and started to proclaim that an active and
successful ENP should be their foreign policy priority. The decision of Latvia and
Lithuania to take an active part in this new policy is based on a range of complex
political and identity related calculations.
THE EXPRESSION OF A BALTIC FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY 
The present study is based on the post-structural constructivist approach of interna-
tional relations. This approach argues that the conceptualization of identity is dis-
cursive, political, relational, and social, and thus it implies that ‘foreign policy dis-
course always articulates a Self and a series of Others’ (cf. Tulmets, this special issue).
The study of Lithuania and Latvia’s foreign policies towards the Eastern Neighbor-
hood is based above all on the way these two Baltic States view their place in the
world (geopolitically and as small states), how they perceive their surrounding ‘Oth-
er’ (including both positive and negative views) and how they build their own iden-
tities (their ‘Self’) in relation to this ‘Other’. In the case of Lithuania and Latvia’s self-
identity construction, it is important to take into account the multiple different iden-
tity circles or spheres to which they belong and which, in one way or another, have
an impact on defining the political identity of these countries. We can distinguish
here between ‘external circles of affiliation’, i.e. the different alliances to which they
belong or have belonged before, and ‘internal circles of affiliation’, which refer to
their cultural and historical identity – or how they identify themselves. 
Their accession to the EU and NATO in 2004 officially made Latvia and Lithua-
nia a part of the Western international community. However, because they were a
part of the Soviet Union for fifty years and because they have common borders
with Russia and Belarus (the latter is a direct neighbor of Lithuania), Latvia and
Lithuania continue, in a way, to feel that they are still considered a part of the post-
Soviet region by the outside world. It is this feeling that gives them an inferiority
complex and consequently the need to prove to others that they are just as Euro-
pean as any Western European country. Maria Mälksoo has characterized the
Baltic States as ‘liminal entities whose belonging to the community is contested
and ambiguous’ as they are ‘Europe but not quite Europe’, being positioned on the
‘borderline between Russia and the West’ (Mälksoo, 2009). 
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Culturally and geographically, both of these countries are Baltic because of their
languages – Latvian and Lithuanian belong to the Balto-Slavic branch of the Indo-
European language family – and also because of their geographical position by the
Baltic Sea. Notwithstanding this similarity, a fundamental difference between the
self-identifications of Latvians and Lithuanians should be mentioned. As Latvians
are attached to their Baltic image, and Latvia has a geographic position between
Estonia and Lithuania, Latvians are the only Baltic people who continue to empha-
size the common past and future of the Baltic States and the need to preserve the
Baltic unity. As Latvia is stuck between two political identity orientations that cor-
respond to the North and the South respectively – Estonians are keen to assert their
Nordic identity, and Lithuanians their Central European identity – Latvians do not
have any other choice than to prefer the trilateral cooperation (Yurkynas, 2005).
Whereas Latvia has no problem with identifying itself as a Baltic country, Lithuania,
due to its more important historical heritage as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithua-
nia in the 14th Century and its closeness to Poland (largely because of the Com-
monwealth of Lithuania and Poland in the 18th Century), constantly prefers to refer
to itself as a Central European country, or at least to show its plural affiliation. In his
annual report to the Seimas, the Parliament of Lithuania, on the 18th of February
1997, Algirdas Brazauskas, the then president of Lithuania, declared the following: 
In spite of our differences, the unity between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as
well as the cooperation between our countries should survive and constitute
one of our priorities. At the same time, this cooperation should not in any case
be a closed space in which Lithuania locks itself. […] we belong simultaneously
to many regions: to the space around the Baltic Sea, to Central Europe and to
the Baltic States. The development of our relations with Central Europeans
consolidates the historical place of Lithuania in Central Europe.5
On the basis of the theory in which the ‘Other’ in international relations is usually
a neighbor and in which there can be both negative and positive ‘Others’, we can
say that for a long time, and especially before Lithuania and Latvia’s NATO and EU
accessions, one of their ‘Others’ was the post-Soviet world dominated by Russia.
This ‘Other’, from which they wanted to move away, was perceived at that time as
a source of instability and even a potential threat to its ‘near abroad’6. Europe and
the Western community in general were and are still perceived by Latvian and
Lithuanian elites as a source of security, stability and modernity, and as an opposi-
tion to this negative ‘other’. Thus Latvia and Lithuania desire to get closer to the
West. Today after their accession to the EU and NATO, although Russia is no longer
perceived as a direct threat to the two countries’ independence7, it continues to
have an indirect influence on Lithuanian and Latvian relations with the EU and the
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EU Eastern Neighborhood countries, and by having this influence, it also has an im-
pact on the definition of the new Latvian and Lithuanian foreign policy identities.
The Latvian and Lithuanian foreign policies were in a situation of ‘zero point’ or
‘zero gravity’ after having reached their most desired goals in 2004. It thus became
necessary to define new strategies. The EU’s new external policy instrument, the
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), proved to be exceptionally well suited for
defining the new foreign policy objectives of Latvia and Lithuania (Yakniunaite,
2009). It is fair to say that the first incentive to engage in this kind of assistance pol-
icy came from the Nordic countries, who had been actively assisting the Baltic
States in their transition and ‘Europeanization’ process and to whom the Baltic
States owe much for their success. Therefore, this new policy corresponds to a cer-
tain sense of duty and ethics which could be summarized as ‘we have received a lot
of help; it is now our turn to do the same’. Another incentive came from the Unit-
ed States, which, at the time when the ENP was not yet created, were seen as an
active actor interested in ‘extending the stability and security in this region’. The in-
volvement of the Baltic States in the East even seemed to some of the Baltic elites
as a kind of guarantee that the United States would support them in case of threats
against their own security.8
THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD AS A MEANS TO FIND A
PLACE IN THE EU
This new policy appears to be a response to the need for recognition by others:
Latvia and Lithuania’s membership in EU and NATO officially made the two coun-
tries part of European/Western society and it was felt as a response to their secu-
rity dilemma/concern: 
The goal of Latvia’s foreign policy in the past decade was to ensure perma-
nence for Latvia’s statehood. This goal has been attained. Now, in the early
years of the 21st century, Latvia finds itself in a fundamentally new and differ-
ent situation. For the first time in history Latvia is living without the shadow of
a threat from abroad and this opens up opportunities for accelerated devel-
opment.9
In the view of these countries, the membership in the EU and NATO appears as a
sign that they have reached the same level as other Europeans and that they should
now be considered as having an equal position and equal rights inside the inter-
national community. This willingness to be considered as equal to others is con-
stant in Latvian and Lithuanian official declarations: ‘The broader significance of this
day both in our history and now is Latvia’s acceptance in the international commu-
nity of states as an equal partner with all concomitant rights and duties’.10 Howev-
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er, despite this new status, due to the two countries’ historical past, their geo-
graphical position of being in between two worlds – the Western and the Eastern
world – and their existence as ‘small states’ (Galbreath–Lamoreaux, 2008), Latvia
and Lithuania seem to continue to see themselves as vulnerable and inferior parts
of Europe: ‘Baltic States are Europeans yet not fully. This perception makes the
Baltic States to constantly confirm their Europeanism and to seek confirmation of
their aspiration from Western Europe’ (Jakniunaite, 2009: 119). Therefore, the def-
inition of the new Latvian and Lithuanian foreign policies, in particular the policy of
assistance towards the Eastern neighborhood, has to be understood as a sign of the
willingness of the two countries to identify themselves as more European and de-
fine anew their relations with Europe, Russia and the post-Soviet zone. 
For both Lithuania and Latvia, their active participation in the neighborhood pol-
icy is supposed to make them better heard and give them the possibility to find
their place within the EU. Since 2004, Lithuanian and Latvian politicians tend to
perceive the fact that their respective countries are ‘liminal’ countries (Mälksoo,
2009) as an advantage rather than as a weakness. Indeed, this situation of ‘liminal-
ity’, when added to the two countries’ recent experience of transition from the sta-
tus of post-Soviet countries to that of countries that have adopted the so-called ‘Eu-
ropean model’, is considered as offering the Baltic States an opportunity to play the
role of a ‘bridge’ (Galbreath and Lamoreaux, 2007) between Western and Eastern
Europe in the matter of ‘exporting’ the values of western democracy and market
economy to Eastern Europe (Kasekamp and Pääbo, 2006). Lithuania, which, of the
three Baltic States, is probably the most ambitious in promoting the ENP (Jakniu-
naite, 2009), declared its wish to become ‘the regional leader’ in this policy imme-
diately after gaining EU membership: 
Our geographical location and experience of living at a crossroads of regions
and civilizations opens up most probably the first opportunity in history to
bridge the East and the West and make Lithuania a center of gravity in a geo-
graphically and culturally diverse region.11
Through this, Lithuania portrays itself as ‘an active country, visible in the world and
influential in the region’, and tries to distinguish itself not only from the other Baltic
States but also from its bigger south-eastern neighbor, Poland. The latter consti-
tutes an additional important ‘Other’ in Lithuania’s identity construction for histor-
ical reasons. Indeed, Poland and Lithuania have shared a common past: in 1569,
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been established in Lublin, Poland, re-
placing the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Therefore, the
Lithuanian identity is closely connected with the Polish identity. However, Lithua-
nia tends to perceive itself today as competing with Poland in the Eastern neigh-
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borhood (Jakniunaite, 2009) even if Lithuanian leaders construct their discourse to-
wards the neighbourhood around the promotion of Western values:
[Lithuania should become] a dynamic and attractive center of interregional
co-operation which would spread the Euro-Atlantic values and the spirit of tol-
erance and co-operation across the borders and unite cultures and civiliza-
tions.12
Latvia also declared itself a ‘responsible member of international society’. It has
been keen, since gaining membership in the EU, to encourage and assist other
states in the process of ‘Europeanization’, and in doing so, it hopes to find a place
in the EU. Hence, for Latvia, this policy does not seem to be founded on an ambi-
tious logic of ‘leadership’ or competition with neighboring states, as it is for Lithua-
nia. Unlike its southern neighbor, Latvia cannot boast about its history, and being
stuck between two Baltic States, it has fewer opportunities and less leeway. We ar-
gue that in the case of Latvia, the factor of being small is probably more prevalent
and that her active participation in some European policies, like the ENP, is sup-
posed to give her an opportunity to overcome the negative self perception related
to her small size. Indeed, as Thorhallson (2006) argues, small states are not always
limited in their action: in spite of their size, their membership in international orga-
nizations ‘increases their capacity of influence inside and outside of these organi-
zations’ (Lamoreaux and Galbreath, 2008). 
While some differences in the ways Latvian and Lithuanian political elites con-
sider their role towards the Eastern neighborhood countries can be noted, we can
say that both of these countries try to make their development and assistance pol-
icy their key specificity or ‘niche’. Politicians from both countries believe that their
country’s historical experience of being a Soviet Republic and its recent transition
experience of ‘desovietization’, ‘marketization’ and ‘Europeanization’ put them in
a better position to understand the challenges that the other post-Soviet republics
are facing today. Latvia or Lithuania is consequently supposed to offer them more
adequate solutions than what some Western European states like France or Ger-
many, for instance, could offer. According to some political leaders from Lithuania
and Latvia, Georgians, Moldavians, Ukrainians and Belorussians accept pieces of
advice and ‘lessons’ more easily when they come from people that have known a
similar history. In their opinion, this assistance from the Baltic States to Eastern Eu-
rope is viewed more like a ‘partner to partner’ relation than a ‘teacher to student’
relation.13
On the whole, we can say that Lithuania, through its ‘normative’ discourse, and,
probably to a lesser extent, Latvia have both sought to change the geopolitical in-
fluences in this region by engaging in the development of the Eastern Neighbor-
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hood and by diminishing the Russian and strengthening the European (Western) in-
fluence. To this, one can add that the relatively difficult and strained relations be-
tween the Baltic States and Russia (Fofanova and Morozov, 2009) have most likely
contributed to strengthening the Baltic solidarity towards other post-Soviet states.
Thus one now needs to examine the rationale behind the solidarity expressed by
these two countries towards the Eastern neighborhood.
LATVIAN AND LITHUANIAN SOLIDARITY
TOWARDS THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD
Both Lithuania and Latvia have expressed their desire to extend the EU and NATO
borders to other post-Soviet countries since 2003–2004. Their political declara-
tions of support towards the ‘Color Revolutions’, and their participation in pro-
western alliances and organizations where they could speak in the name of Geor-
gia, Ukraine or Moldova clearly demonstrate their willingness to influence the pro-
cess of ‘Europeanization’ (adoption of European norms and values) and to help the
Eastern states get closer to the EU and NATO. However, it is interesting to exam-
ine what their declarations of support reflect in reality: is this solidarity based only
on values or also on a common history, identity and geopolitics? 
A NEW SOLIDARITY WITH ORIGINS IN THE PAST
In order to understand the rationale that lies behind Latvia and Lithuania’s solidar-
ity towards the Eastern neighborhood, a solidarity which can be analysed through
the political discourses of Latvian and Lithuanian political leaders after 2004, one
should bear in mind that this solidarity is to be understood rather as a continuation
and a ‘reactivation’ of a solidarity that takes its origins in the past. Since the 19th
century, there were demographic movements between the Latvian, Lithuanian, and
Estonian populations on one side and the Georgian and Armenian populations on
the other. During the 20th Century, some collaboration and solidarity between
Baltic and South Caucasus anti-communist activists developed abroad (Plasseraud,
2006). In the late 1980s, there was an attempt to ‘export’ the ‘Singing Revolutions’
and the model of the Baltic Popular Fronts from the three Baltic states to other So-
viet Republics.14 According to the Latvian researcher Nils Muiznieks, these late
1980s movements had an ‘indirect influence on the progression of independent
movements in other Soviet Republics’ (Muiznieks, 1995). These are just some ex-
amples that show that some kinds of solidarity between the Baltic States and some
of the other post-Soviet countries already existed over the course of the last two
centuries. The ‘new’ solidarity which was established 15 years after the collapse of
the USSR is thus part of Latvia and Lithuania’s ‘historical identity’ (a long term iden-
tity) as well as their ‘political identity’ (a short term identity). As a political solidari-
ty, it reflects their willingness to share European norms and values with the Eastern
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neighbourhood. However, being at the same time a historical solidarity that is
based on the two groups of countries having a common history and common rep-
resentatives, the solidarity of Latvia and Lithuania tends to be ideological rather
than neutral, and it expresses the two countries’ own geopolitical vision.
THE ‘COLOURED REVOLUTIONS’: A PUSH TO LATVIAN AND
LITHUANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD
The ‘Coloured Revolutions’ which took place in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine
(2004) can be considered as having provided a new starting point which renewed
the relations between Lithuania and Latvia and the other post-Soviet states. For
Lithuanian and Latvian politicians, these events appeared as a sign that important
changes could take place in the region, which had since 1991 been dominated by
Russia and the CIS. Political leaders became aware of the opportunity to influence
future developments in this region that was given to them. For example, after Vik-
tor Yushchenko’s official election, the Latvian president made the following
promise to him: ‘In the name of the people and government of Latvia, I assure you
of our full support, I assure you of our sympathy for your aspirations and values, I as-
sure you of our readiness to assist your nation in every possible way’.15 The official
declarations made during that period clearly show that the Baltic States identify the
revolutionary movements which took place in Georgia and Ukraine with the
‘Singing Revolutions’ that had developed in the Baltic States at the end of the
1980s. Or more specifically, in the view of the Baltic States, the Coloured Revolu-
tions represent a logical continuation of the peaceful revolutions of the 1980s: 
This Orange Revolution of Ukraine now takes its historic place alongside the
Singing Revolution of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (…) All these movements,
as powerful manifestations of the will of the people, have been peaceful revo-
lutions that have radically changed the fate of their nations, that have trans-
formed the political landscape of our whole continent.16
Lithuania and Latvia recognize that the assistance and support that came from
some western countries17 for their transition and ‘Europeanization’ process had
strongly contributed to their success. Thus, in their view, it is now their duty to help
the countries that had not undergone a similar evolution. Declarations by Baltic po-
litical leaders to Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus indicate that the leaders
are keen to encourage these countries in their efforts to pass reforms and adopt
democratic values. The leaders even promise that they will be ready to help them
in this process: ‘Latvia is eager to see Moldova develop as a prosperous and demo-
cratic nation. We will stand by you and are also ready to assist you in your efforts to
establish closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community (…)’.18
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However, it is important to take into account that the declarations of support of-
ten carry a message that goes beyond neutrality and a willingness to help these
countries become more democratic.
THE NEED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO ALLIANCES
In their statements and actions, Lithuanian and Latvian politicians not only demon-
strate their desire to assist the Eastern Neighborhood countries in their democrat-
ic developments, but very often they tend to take a clear position in systematically
opposing two main actors, or ‘Others’, who are interested in this region – Eu-
rope/the United States and Russia. The first ‘Other’, Europe and the Western world,
appears as a symbol of a stable, modern and pacific space by its opposition to the
second ‘Other’, the post-Soviet space or CIS, which is perceived as an unstable and
unpredictable space that is subject to a negative influence from Russia. Latvia and
Lithuania today see the Eastern neighborhood as being in the same situation as
they used to be in in the beginning of the 1990s, when they had to make a choice
between the East and the West – the neighborhood could either link itself with the
CIS and Russia or strive to enter Western institutions. The Baltic States, as we know,
have refused to become part of the CIS from the very beginning. It is on the basis
of this political identity that they ask the post-Soviet countries to make the choice
between the two ‘others’ today. Indeed, according to them, it is impossible to be a
part of two ‘contradictory’ organizations – the CIS and the EU/NATO – at the same
time: ‘I don’t see any real possibility for these Eastern countries to be coherent with
Russian politics if they want to enter the EU at the same time. Either they move to-
wards the West or they move towards the East’.19 From this political standpoint, it
seems easier to understand the positive reaction by some political leaders in
Lithuania and Latvia in September 2009 to Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS after
the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008. During his visit to Tbilissi in 2009,
the former President of Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis congratulated Georgia on
this important step, declaring that ‘Georgia has formed into a truly independent
state after it left the CIS. This was achieved through a lot of hard experiences and
sacrifice from the side of the Georgian people’.20
THE SUPPORT OF FURTHER EU AND NATO ACCESSIONS
Lithuanian and Latvian politicians are conscious that for these ‘new’ Eastern Euro-
pean countries, it will not be possible to withdraw politically and economically from
the post-Soviet alliances if they are not offered further inclusion or membership in
the EU and NATO:
The EU’s strict withdrawal from further enlargement would encourage Russia
to pursue an aggressive policy in relation to these countries by seeking to keep
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them inside its sphere of influence. (…) Therefore, the Baltic States and other
Eastern EU Members States constantly stress the necessity to keep the doors
open for the Eastern direction countries and that the ENP should become the
initial stage of the enlargement process rather than its substitute.21
In this respect, it should be mentioned that the earlier conception of the ENP that
sought to ‘reinforce relations with neighboring countries to the East and to the South
in order to promote prosperity, stability and security at its borders’ was felt as a great
disappointment by Lithuania and Latvia because it did not allow for a special EU
policy towards the Eastern neighbors. These Baltic countries, especially Lithuania
(together with Poland), thought that a special neighborhood policy aimed towards
the Eastern European neighbors should have the EU enlargement to the East as its
final objective (Raik and Gromadzki, 2006). Therefore, Lithuania was one of the ini-
tiators of a special policy for the EU’s Eastern neighborhood, and it prepared draft
papers for what became the ‘Eastern Partnership’ in 2009. Currently the Eastern
Partnership includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
In order to show their support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and ‘euro-
peanization’ of these Eastern Neighborhood countries, Latvia and Lithuania partic-
ipate in various pro-western alliances in the region (Tulmets and Kesa, forthcom-
ing), like the Baltic Sea-Black Sea Axis, which was launched by Mikheil Saakachvili
and Viktor Yushchenko in 2005 to support the membership of Georgia and
Ukraine in the EU and NATO while at the same time diminishing the influence of
the CIS in the region. They are also members of the Community for Democratic
Choice, an intergovernmental ‘politico-declarative’ organization that was created
in 2005 and which aims to promote democracy and security in the region, and of
the non-official structure called the New Friends of Georgia group of countries. In
parallel to these interstate alliances, they support some Non-Governmental Orga-
nizations (NGOs), like the Baltic to Black Sea Alliance (BBSA), which is composed
of journalists, researchers, smaller NGOs, and Latvian, Georgian and Ukrainian
politicians. This NGO was created in October 2008 in reaction to the Russian-
Georgian War of August 2008. According to one of its initiators, Martin Murnieks,
this alliance was made to ‘answer to Georgian needs in allies and in support’.22 The
activities of this NGO consist essentially in organizing conferences and public de-
bates with the objective to ‘defend Georgian interests’. Indeed, for many Lithuani-
an and Latvian political leaders, the Russian-Georgian war served as a warning of
what could happen to a country situated next to Russia, as they refer to Russia as
a threatening and unpredictable country. 
In their official declarations, Latvian and Lithuanian leaders did not hesitate to
take a clear position on this war, as they systematically condemned Russia for its
aggression and did not really question the Georgian actions in it: 
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Using the above mentioned pretext for launching military action, the Russian
Federation has violated the sovereign rights of another state and is endanger-
ing the territorial integrity of Georgia. Such actions are deplorable. It seems to
me that it is clear to everyone that we are talking about warfare by the Russian
Federation within the territory of Georgia, not in the territory of the Russian
Federation.23
On the 13th of August, 2008, immediately after the start of this war, Latvian and
Lithuanian political leaders together with three other Eastern European political
leaders made a joint declaration stating that ‘Georgia should be put on the path to
NATO membership to prevent future attacks by Russia’. In this declaration, Valdas
Adamkus, then President of Lithuania, said that ‘the only option to prevent similar
acts of aggression and occupation of Georgia in the future is to give (it the) NATO
Membership Action Plan’.24
We can see from all these political declarations and standpoints that Latvian and
Lithuanian political leaders clearly tend to express their desire to help the eastern
neighborhood countries to swing from the Russian influence to the West-
ern/European influence. More globally, this standpoint seems to represent the
Baltic countries’ own vision of the two ‘others’ – the Russian/post-Soviet space and
the European/western space – that surround this region. This solidarity expressed
vis-ą-vis Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, which is based on political as well
as historical considerations, as we have seen earlier, should be taken as part of the
construction of Lithuania and Latvia’s own self-identification in relation to these
‘others’. In this respect, we can note that the Baltic States’ policy-makers are heav-
ily influenced by the structure of the geopolitics in the post-Soviet region, where
the Russian Federation remains an important actor. At the same time, these policy-
makers are equally influenced by their own personal experiences and historical
legacies. Through these prisms, the Baltic foreign policy-makers reinterpret and
project their own vision of regional politics through their standpoints and declara-
tions addressed to the evolution of the Eastern Neighborhood (Galbreath, Lass and
Lamoreaux, 2008: 10). Therefore this solidarity is based not only on values but al-
so, to a larger extent, on the countries’ common history, identity and geopolitics.
A MODEST BUT ACTIVE ASSISTANCE POLICY
If there is no doubt about the willingness of the Latvian and Lithuanian political es-
tablishment to assist the Eastern Neighborhood countries in becoming more ‘Euro-
pean’ and help them get closer to the Euro-Atlantic organizations, this solidarity
most frequently remains at the level of politico-declarative dialogue and coopera-
tion. To measure the extent to which this policy has had an impact on the develop-
ment of the Eastern neighbourhood countries, it becomes necessary to study what
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was done in practice, i. e. the concrete steps – on both a bilateral and a multilateral
level – that Latvia and Lithuania have taken to implement this assistance policy. 
Since 2003–2004, development assistance towards several post-Soviet states
has become one of Lithuania and Latvia’s foreign policy priorities. This policy,
which is part of their European development and cooperation aid policy, is done
on both the multilateral and the bilateral level. The shares of Latvian and Lithuani-
an financial allocations to the assistance policy are as follows: in 2009, Latvia’s of-
ficial development assistance (ODA) amounted to 15 million Euros, representing
0,08% of the GNI. 90% of Latvia’s ODA has been disbursed through multilateral
channels (the EC, UN agencies, the International Development Association, IDA,
etc.), while the rest of the ODA has been implemented bilaterally through various
different technical assistance projects.25 Lithuania’s official assistance in 2009
amounted to 0,11% (30 million Euros) of its GNP. It consists of 0,30% of the com-
mon EU assignment for development cooperation, contribution to multilateral or-
ganizations, humanitarian aid and bilateral development cooperation projects
funded by Lithuanian Institutions.26
THE MULTILATERAL LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE: TECHNICAL
AID AND LOBBYING
Already during 1998–1999, when the negotiations about the EU membership were
opened, the Baltic States had started to manifest through official declarations their
undivided support for the candidacy of several ex-Soviet states, such as Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldova, to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, it was not until the
Baltic States themselves became members of these organizations in 2004 that they
really got involved in promoting the candidacy and the ‘Europeanization’ of these
states (Tulmets and Kesa, forthcoming). During the period when the EU was prepar-
ing a new strategy and policy towards the ‘new’ neighborhood – Wider Europe,
which later become the ENP – the Baltic States, in spite of their little financial means,
were actively participating in the definition of this new EU external policy. For ex-
ample, Lithuania supported Poland in its willingness to define a special policy to-
wards the Eastern neighbors, prepared several political propositions addressed to
the European Council in 2003 and did some important lobbying in order to stop the
EU’s isolationist policy towards Belarus (Tulmets and Kesa, forthcoming). 
The three Baltic States as member states make good use of the possibility to par-
ticipate in the round tables or negotiations and speak on behalf of further inclusion
of the Eastern Neighborhood. Indeed, after the ENP was already launched, the
Baltic politicians did some important lobbying in order to include the Southern
Caucasus countries in the policy. In the same manner as that in which the Nordic
countries had supported the Baltic States’ candidacy during the informal and for-
mal meetings within the EU, these new members support the Eastern neighbors in
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their efforts to come closer to the EU. In practice, they organize informal meetings
before the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) together
with the Baltic-Nordic group of countries, the Visegrad group or some representa-
tives from the Eastern Partnership countries. Lithuania and other ‘new’ member
states have initiated informal meetings before the GAERC with some ‘old’ member
states of the EU that are interested in the Eastern neighbourhood countries. The
two Baltic countries have also had opportunities to play their desired role of ‘bridg-
ing the East and the West’ when representing some ‘older’ EU states in Eastern
Neighbourhood countries, as was the case in 2006 when Latvia represented Aus-
tria, during its EU presidency, in Belarus (Raik and Gromadzki, 2006). In parallel to
this lobbying, the Baltic States also participate in the EU’s assistance policy and mis-
sions, in particular in the management of border control and in the training of the
civil servants of the partner countries. In this context, one may give the example of
the work of Lithuanian (and Estonian) experts in implementing the EUJUST Themis
mission in Georgia (2004–2005), which consisted in assisting and advising the
Georgian government during its carrying out of important criminal justice reforms.
Experts from Lithuania and Latvia have also participated in the EU border assis-
tance mission (EUBAM) in the control and management of Ukrainian and Molda-
vian borders (Tulmets and Kesa, forthcoming). The two Baltic States are also very
active in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, which was launched in
May 2009 (a multilateral co-operation between Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine in
the fields of transport, energy and visa facilitation; a cross-border cooperation pro-
gram between Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus, etc.).
TRANSFER OF LATVIAN AND LITHUANIAN SKILLS AND
EXPERIENCE AT THE BILATERAL LEVEL
On the bilateral level, an important part of Lithuania and Latvia’s assistance policy
consists of ‘transferring’ their model of transition and reforms. Lithuanian and Latvian
civil servants and experts are conscious of how little their countries’ financial contri-
butions are compared to those of the Nordic countries, for instance. Therefore, they
put emphasis on the ‘added value’ of their skills and non-material assistance, their re-
cent experience of reforms and the process of moving towards the Euro-Atlantic in-
stitutions, or, again, their comprehension of the challenges that the post-Soviet states
face. In Latvia, a special division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called ‘De-
velopment Cooperation’ is responsible for the management of the projects, while in
the Lithuanian MFA, the corresponding department is called ‘Development Cooper-
ation and Democracy Promotion’. The MFAs cooperate and finance the assistance
projects with other ministries, NGOs, universities, study centers or independent ad-
visers. Several public institutions and NGOs from partner countries participate in the
implementation of the projects. The main fields of the assistance policy concern the
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following: the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance; the
strengthening of administrative capacities; economic development; education; and
preparing the partner states for moving closer to European structures.
Despite the fact that the projects that Lithuania and Latvia develop in the frame-
work of their own bilateral assistance policies are rather similar in their nature and
that the priority partner countries are nearly the same, it should be mentioned that
there is very little, if any, coordination of the two Baltic countries’ assistance pro-
grammes. However, some coordination between the two countries informally ex-
ists within the group of Baltic-Nordic countries and also within the group of Baltic-
Visegrad countries.
Latvia’s priority countries in the Eastern neighbourhood are Moldova, Georgia,
Ukraine and Belarus. Latvia has developed a ‘Development Cooperation Plan’ with
each of these countries. Out of these four priority countries, the ones that Latvia is
most keen to develop projects with are Georgia and Moldova. Because of Latvia’s
small size, Latvian officials often tend to compare their own country with Moldova.
The projects towards Moldova range from Latvian assistance to the Border Guard
Service of the Republic of Moldova to development of local government in Moldo-
va, support for the enhancement of the Moldovan judicial system, and improving
the penitentiary and prisoners’ rehabilitation systems.27
In addition to these four countries – Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus –
Lithuania’s assistance partners from the Eastern Neighborhood countries also in-
clude Azerbaijan as well as some other countries not included in the ENP like
Afghanistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan . As a direct neighbor of Belarus28, Lithuania
has always been the most ardent promoter of stability and democracy in this coun-
try. In 2008 the majority of Lithuanian projects vis-à-vis Belarus were those of
democracy and human rights promotion (86% of all the projects). A number of
projects assisting Belarusian society in the field of democracy and open society
have been developed by Lithuania. From these projects, we can mention the
strengthening of grassroots organizations in Belarus by the Eastern Europe Studies
Center (EESC) in Vilnius or the creation of an independent cable television channel
(TV BELSAT) in Belarus by the Polish Information Center in Vilnius. At the same
time, Lithuania has been eager to stabilize its neighbor because this Baltic country
wants to have the same economic rules as Belarus in order to facilitate trade and
the movement of people between itself and its neighbor.29
In the framework of the assistance policy towards the East, more and more gov-
ernmental and non-governmental actors insist that it is important that the ‘demand’
for help come from the partner country and that assistance should not be imposed
on the partner country. We also observe that Lithuania and Latvia exert almost no
pressure on the partner countries and impose almost no constraints on them as
conditions for assisting them. 
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A closer look at the assistance policies of Lithuania and Latvia, however, shows
that there is an important difference in the two countries’ attitudes towards the as-
sistance provided to the Eastern Neighborhood: while the Latvian assistance and
its Eastern policy seem to be more pragmatic, as the proclaimed foreign policy ob-
jectives focus primarily on the need to ‘strengthen economic ties and cross-road
cooperation’, the Lithuanian assistance (with the exception of some projects relat-
ed to Belarus, which are more pragmatic) seems to carry a more normative and val-
ue discourse oriented line. This observation seems to confirm the impression that
Lithuania has an ambition to have a leadership position in its direct neighborhood.
It also confirms, in a way, this country’s need for self-confirmation in front of oth-
ers. This, in turn, raises the question of whether the self-declared ‘partner to part-
ner’ relationship that we saw before is rather not actually more like a ‘teacher to
student’ relationship in the case of Lithuania. 
On the whole, the study of how this assistance policy is implemented by Lithua-
nia and Latvia shows that compared to their expressions of strong political solidar-
ity with the countries they are assisting, their development assistance is rather
more pragmatic, reasoned and modest. Indeed, except for maybe the action of lob-
bying that Lithuanian and Latvian representatives perform within the EU and NATO
to further the inclusion of the Eastern Neighbourhood in these institutions, the
method of assistance used by these two Baltic States is rather flexible and not con-
straining. The projects aimed at introducing economic reforms, good governance,
and media freedom and regulating border controls are all concrete steps and in-
struments that support more democracy and freedom in the post-Soviet states. 
CONCLUSION
Since obtaining their membership in the EU and NATO, Lithuania and Latvia have
made their development assistance towards several of the post-Soviet states one of
their main foreign policy activities. Their assistance policy allows them to fill a gap
which appeared in their foreign policy strategies after they had achieved all of their
original desired goals by becoming members of the two organizations in 2004. At
the same time, this policy is part of the endless desire of these countries to be seen
as ‘true’ Europeans and distinguished from ‘Eastern Europeans’, a term that has al-
ways had a pejorative meaning in the view of the Baltic States. On the one hand,
the official status of being an EU/NATO member can be considered as a real
change for Lithuania and Latvia, as it certainly gives these states the possibility to
play a bigger role within the international community, and with it, they can ambi-
tiously attempt to obtain the prestigious role of a ‘bridge’ or link between Europe
and its Eastern neighborhood. On the other hand, this need for recognition, even
after 2004, shows that there are still signs, albeit in a different form, that reflect a
continuation of their previous foreign policies.
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The question of the consistency between the two Baltic countries’ expression of
solidarity with the post-Soviet countries in their foreign policy and the Baltic coun-
tries’ actions on the ground is ambivalent. The type of solidarity expressed by Lat-
vian and Lithuanian leaders shows their willingness to have Western/European in-
fluences and values spread to the post-Soviet region. The messages they send
clearly reflect their own vision of the post-Soviet space. Their assistance projects
and actions aim to ‘export’ the European model to the states of the Eastern neigh-
borhood and, in doing so, move these countries closer to Europe. Nevertheless, we
note that compared to their strong political-ideological standpoint and solidarity,
the implementation of their assistance policy (which consists primarily of advising
and training their partners) is in reality much more modest, pragmatic and flexible.
Although this policy helps Latvia and Lithuania to better define themselves as Eu-
ropeans and modern states, it has its limits. Being too ‘one-way’ oriented and not
completely neutral (the two Baltic countries often criticize Russia but avoid criti-
cizing the pro-western heads of state of this region), today this foreign policy seems
to serve the interests of the Baltic States rather than the interests of the other post-
Soviet states. Finally, without a perspective of membership, the latter do not have
enough motivation to implement the necessary reforms. They cannot define a
more clear-cut relation towards the EU and its member states as easily as the Baltic
States did. 
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Slovakia in the East: 
Pragmatic Follower, 
Occasional Leader 
LUCIA NAJŠLOVA
Abstract: This article argues that Slovakia’s efforts to shape the EU’s Eastern policy have been a
blend of solidarity and pragmatism, a permanent renegotiation between ‘the logic of
appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of consequentialism’ (March and Olsen, 1989 and 1998).
The  solidarity dimension of this relation has drawn on Slovakia’s transition experience
and a certain similarity between Slovakia’s historical experience and that of the EU’s Eas-
tern neighbors. The pragmatic dimension has been motivated by a national interest that
prefers a democratic and better governed neighborhood, and, at the same time, by Slo-
vakia’s need to be respected and recognised as a relevant international player. At the
same time, Slovakia as a small state has been using the EU arena to promote its foreign
policy priorities and has selected the Eastern neighborhood as one of its contributions
to the EU policy. 
Key words: EU, Slovakia, Eastern neighborhood, solidarity, pragmatism
In a recent interview Milan Ježovica, the state secretary at the Slovak Ministry of For-
eign Affairs (MFA), declared, ‘Development assistance has several goals. The first one
is that it is a means to stick the Slovak flag in the world and spread the good name of
this country and its inhabitants’ (Balazova, 2011). Ježovica’s prioritisation of the ‘Slo-
vak flag’ is a fitting illustration of the factors underlying the Slovak engagement in the
EU’s Eastern neighborhood. While there is an undeniable dose of solidarity and a sin-
cere effort to assist Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus to become better governed in the
Slovak Eastern policy, the Slovak Eastern policy is also motivated by Slovakia’s desire
for self-promotion and its desire to reestablish its self-confidence and (re)gain the re-
spect of other international players. This article argues that Slovakia’s efforts to shape
the EU’s Eastern policy have been a blend of solidarity and pragmatism, a permanent
renegotiation between the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of consequen-
tialism’ (March and Olsen, 1989 and 1998). Ever since the beginning of the Slovak in-
volvement in the Eastern neighborhood, the majority of the Slovak governing elite
and intellectuals have been repeatedly highlighting that Slovakia’s experience of
democratic transition and Euro-Atlantic integration is an asset in understanding and
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helping the Eastern neighbors. At the same time, they frequently argued that Slo-
vakia’s membership in the EU and NATO has placed new responsibilities on the
country, and sharing its transition experience is one way to respond to the challenge
of becoming a mature international player. The rationale of solidarity in the Slovak
policy ran as follows: ‘we will help you because you are like us – you experienced a
similar past, and, moreover, we were also helped by the others’. At the same time,
there has been a two-fold pragmatic push in the background. On one hand the Slo-
vak discourse reflects the reasoning that a democratic and free neighborhood with
good governance corresponds more to the Slovak national interest than one which
is poor, unstable and conflict-ridden. But on the other hand, and more importantly,
Slovakia’s pragmatism can be felt in another realm as well – by its prioritisation of the
East and its highlighting of the relevance of its transition experience, Slovakia has
been looking for a way to establish itself in the international arena in general and in
the EU in particular. This is the pragmatic element – ‘we will help you because by do-
ing so, we can find a relevant place for ourselves on the international scene and gain
the recognition of key international players’. This pragmatism is part of Slovakia’s ef-
fort to reclaim its self-confidence by making the ‘others’ see ‘us’ as equal, mature and
relevant. Minding what others think and might think about ‘us’ and trying to shape
these perceptions is an important element of creating one’s identity (Diez, 2004).
Being small in terms of size, economy and international influence, Slovakia has
been looking for a niche where it could make a specialised and visible imprint on
the EU policies. It has chosen the ‘transition experience’ as a major realm of this
sort, and in this realm it has centered its contribution to the EU and its foreign pol-
icy. In addition to that, it should be emphasised that the EU membership remains
at the backdrop of Slovakia’s Eastern policies – i.e. Slovakia understands its policy
towards the East as a contribution to the EU Eastern policy. At the same time, for-
eign policy has been a major area for Slovakia, and Slovakia has so far prided itself
on its contribution to the Union. 
Identity (including foreign policy identity) in this article is understood as ‘imag-
ined’ (Anderson, 1991) and as renegotiated or ‘debated’ (Calhoun, 2002). More-
over, it is a ‘category of practice’ as opposed to a ‘category of analysis’ (Brubaker,
1998; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Brubaker, 2002). In other words, the statements
and policies of Slovakia and its representatives about what Slovakia is (or who Slo-
vaks are) and why it acts in a certain way are not taken as the only evidence of how
the Slovak foreign policy identity is constructed. As highlighted in the introduction
to this special issue of Perspectives, there are other factors that need to be taken in-
to account in an effort to understand the present rhetoric and action towards the
East. These include Slovakia’s self-perception and its understanding of its past. The
current debate on how identities of states or larger abstract entities are created
draws largely on the social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner and the
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conceptualisation of social representations developed by Moscovici (Moscovici,
1990; 1994). In the creation of a foreign policy identity of a country or a larger ab-
stract entity (such as Europe), self-perception is an important factor, and for self-
identification, the ‘other’ is an important reference frame (Neumann, 1999; Lu-
carelli, 2007; Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2009). 
But is this ‘other’ spatial or temporal? While the obvious spatial Other would be
Russia, and, indeed, this idea was occasionally floated in off-the-record interviews,
based on the analysis of discourse and policies employed by Slovakia towards the
Eastern neighborhood, this paper emphasises the temporal dimension of the Oth-
er. Thus, in the temporal view, the Other is the past, the authoritarian, communist,
unprosperous past in which Slovakia did not ‘belong’ and did not matter – it was
invisible or ignored. This past is contrasted with Slovakia’s present, in which it is
seen as a successful country whose ‘story is an inspiration’ for Eastern countries
(supposedly) struggling with similar challenges (Ježovica in Balazova, 2011). 
FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY AND ITS LINKS TO
THE EU
The first part of this article explores the reasoning and interests (as well as the his-
torical factors) that underlay Slovakia’s emergence as a promoter of the EU’s en-
gagement in the East. It briefly covers the reasoning behind Slovakia’s joining of
the European Union and the subsequent formulation of its priorities inside the EU.
The implementation of Slovakia’s Eastern policy is then discussed in the second
part of this paper. 
RETURN TO EUROPE: A VOCATION OF PRAGMATISM,
VALUES AND THE NEED TO BELONG
Slovakia’s EU vocation began even before the country existed. The so-called Euro-
agreement (Eurodohoda), or the Association Agreement between the European
Community and Czechoslovakia, was signed in 1991 yet it never entered into
force. The demise of the communist regime opened plenty of new questions for
the Czechoslovak elite: how to deal with the proponents of the old regime; how to
modernise; how to achieve the standards of the West. The path of modernisation
via accession to the European community soon became a major alternative that
was considered in the debate of pro-democratic forces, especially since the EU ac-
cession process was seen as a tool that could help Slovakia do away with the au-
thoritarian tendencies of Vladimir Mečiar and the circles around him. As Haughton
(2007) has pointed out, the key driving force was Slovakia’s desire ‘to be a normal
European country’ – and the EU process was seen as a way to achieve this goal.
Although Slovakia’s joining of the EU tends to be treated as if this goal were re-
ally stated and embraced already at the onset of Slovakia’s democratisation pro-
Perspectives02_11_text6:PERSPECTIVES  16.12.2011  11:08  Page 103    (Black/Black plate)
LUCIA NAJŠLOVA
104 Perspectives      Vol. 19, No. 2      2011
cess, the fact remains that at the beginning of the process, neither the democrats
in Czechoslovakia nor the EC representatives knew how the newly free countries
in Central Europe should be dealt with and what the final goal of the EU policy to-
wards them should be (Gower, 1999: 3). 
What was clear to some intellectuals and members of the elite, though, was that
the country needed to become integrated with the West or ‘return to Europe’
(Henderson, 1999). Such streams of thought followed the idea of Central Europe
being the ‘kidnapped West’, as described by Kundera (1984): Central Europe had
always belonged to the West (culturally), yet it was stolen from it by an oppressive
regime. However, the need to belong to the West, as we will show later, was not
motivated only by cultural considerations (‘we are like you’), but also by pragmat-
ic considerations (‘we want to be where the decisions are being made’). In the end,
the ‘West’ is a contested concept – geographically and culturally – and in the prag-
matic understanding, there was more of a desire to belong to ‘Western institutions’
than to whatever values they may embrace. As Probyn (1996) has noted, belong-
ing is not merely about be-ing, but also about longing (Probyn in Bell, 1999). Thus,
Slovakia’s gradual drive towards the membership in the EC was motivated by vi-
sions of better standards (economic standards, human rights standards), but more
importantly, and this is an aspect which often tends to get overlooked in the litera-
ture, an important consideration in this process was Slovakia’s struggle to be ‘tak-
en seriously’. The practical interplay between the logics of appropriateness and
consequentialism suggests that they do not have to be exclusive (Risse, 2000), and,
in practice, even rationally inspired behavior might bring about solidarity as a con-
sequence, as we will see later in the paper. 
While a large part of the public debate in the early post-communist years con-
centrated on resolving the relations within the Czechoslovak federation, it is on-
ly from 1993 onwards – after Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and
the Slovak Republic – that we are speaking about Slovak foreign policy. Yet, the
emergence of the independent Slovak state still did not mean a clear consensus
on Slovakia’s ‘European future’. Quite the contrary – soon after gaining inde-
pendence, Slovakia slid into a period of illiberalism, the so-called era of
Mečiarism, which lasted from 1994–1998. This period was characterised by a
number of breaches of civil and political rights (Szomolanyi, 1999; Kollar et al.,
2000; Lesna, 2011). While the governing elite was inward looking and frequent-
ly employed nationalist rhetoric, the opposition and a large part of the society
would have welcomed a fast-track adoption of the EU norms. During this period
the Slovak pro-EU elite experienced how the mechanism of external pressure
works, as in this period the European Union was issuing frequent démarches to
Slovakia, and these were sometimes based on information received from the Slo-
vak opposition (EC, 2000).1
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The EC-Slovakia Association Agreement was signed on October 4, 1993 and en-
tered into force in February 1995, well into the era of Mečiar’s reign. Although
Mečiar’s government did declare that Slovakia’s EU membership is a strategic pri-
ority to be achieved by 2000 (Government of the SR, 1994), the European Com-
mission did not recommend the opening of negotiations with Slovakia until it start-
ed fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. Thus, although Slovakia filed its application
for EC membership at the Cannes summit in 1995, the Luxembourg summit in 1997
recommended opening negotiations only with the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hun-
gary, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. Slovakia, rejected for its failure to meet the
Copenhagen political criteria, was left as the only member of the Visegrad Four
(V4) outside of the EU door. Given the fact that one of the main reasons for the es-
tablishment of the V4 was cooperation towards Euro-Atlantic integration (Visegrad
Group, 1991), the international isolation into which Slovakia descended was re-
markable, and it even strengthened the push among the democratic opposition for
Slovakia to ‘belong’ to a ‘respected club’. The 1997 rejection only strengthened the
conviction of the anti-Mečiar opposition that the EU process could help to defeat
illiberalism in Slovak politics. 
The 1998 elections were another restart for Slovakia – the coalition under the
leadership of Mikulas Dzurinda and the SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition), which
emerged victorious, campaigned not only on domestic issues, but also on the Eu-
ro-Atlantic future of Slovakia, which resonated in the campaign. After the 1998
elections, Slovakia emerged out of a ‘black hole’ (as Madeleine Albright called the
period of Mečiarism) and undertook fast reforms. The 1999 Helsinki summit rec-
ommended the beginning of Slovakia’s accession negotiations with the EU. Given
the fact that painful reforms were undertaken in the public sector, though, the for-
eign policy remained one of the few issues with which the post-1998 government
could pride itself (Strazay, 2000). 
Radaelli and Pasquier describe what was happening during the accession peri-
od as a process of ‘Europeanisation’ – ‘the institutionalization of norms, beliefs, for-
mal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing
things” that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy processes and then
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, politi-
cal structures and public policies’ (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 35). While there
have been actors who saw the EU process as a way to assure the exercise of hu-
man rights and rule of law, there have also been those who understood the adop-
tion of these principles only as a ticket that needed to be bought before the coun-
try could enter the ‘power club’. 
The Slovak transition experience is thus two-fold: On one hand it is the experi-
ence of doing away with the communist regime and adopting the EU standards,
and of establishing rule of law, free market economy and respect for human rights.
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On the other, it is the experience of doing away with the post-communist authori-
tarian regime of Vladimir Mečiar and catching up with the Central European neigh-
bors. It is the experience of an outsider who has twice emerged as an insider. Yet,
still, while the political rhetoric of Slovakia’s leaders argues that this experience is
the source of Slovakia’s solidarity with and efforts to assist the Eastern neighbors,
one should not omit pragmatism as another reason for this policy. Similarly, Slo-
vakia’s ‘return to Europe’ was, on one hand, a value-based policy (as expressed in
numerous declarations and statements) and, on the other, a pragmatic policy – be-
longing to the EC was understood as belonging to a ‘club that matters’ and im-
proving the economic situation. It would then be wrong to imagine that the prag-
matic part of the policy suddenly evaporated after accession. 
As we will see in the second part of this article, doing ‘the right thing’ and trying
to pursue one’s interests do not necessarily have to be in contradiction, and inter-
est-motivated (logic of consequentialism) behavior can in the end produce similar
benefits as behavior motivated by solidarity or altruism. Thus, the approaches of
constructivists and rationalists do not necessarily have to be at odds in all cases
(Checkel, 2001).
As suggested in the introduction, one of the driving forces of Slovakia’s own
transition (and, later, a driving force of its Eastern policy) has been its desire to
distance itself from ‘the other’. It is common to assume that this ‘other’ is geo-
graphical and spatial, and that it is Russia. In the case of Slovakia, though, the
threat perception of Russia is not that high.2 Thus, although there have been po-
litical splits over how to approach Russia, and the governments of Vladimir
Mečiar (1994–1998) and Robert Fico (2006–2010) would occasionally use dif-
ferent vocabulary and suggest different policies than the governments of Miku-
las Dzurinda (1998–2006) and Iveta Radicova (2010–) in this respect, in the Slo-
vak debate one might actually observe more reflection on the past as the (tem-
poral) other than on Russia as the (spatial) other.3 This is also the realm where Slo-
vakia mirrors (rhetorically) the East European others – in the sense that they have
similar experiences. Yet this mirror might already be distorted, as there are in-
creasingly more voices in both the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe that sug-
gest that these two regions underwent considerable change in recent years and
that it is thus analytically wrong to see them as the Western Balkans and Eastern
Europe of 1989.4
POST-2004 PRIORITIES
In 2004 Slovakia became a member of the European Union. However, earlier, in
2002, it had joined the OECD and as a member of this organisation, it had to start
thinking of contributing to development assistance. In parallel, as the goal of EU
membership was reached, it was natural for the Slovak elite to start thinking in
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terms of contributions, and not only in terms of gains. But despite these changes,
it would still be wrong to interpret Slovakia’s efforts to support the EU’s Eastern
neighbors merely as a sign of altruism and solidarity. 
Slovakia suddenly found itself as a would-be member in a community (the think-
ing on the Eastern involvement started well before Slovakia’s actual EU member-
ship) where every other member was active in specific foreign policy areas (e.g.
Spain in Latin America; France in North Africa). Thus, it was natural that Slovakia
looked for a domain where it could come up with a specific contribution, and the
EU’s aspirants – in the Balkans and the East – proved to be an apt domain of this
sort since they were previously quite forgotten in EU policies. The East in particu-
lar represented a specific niche where Slovakia, together with other new member
states, could make a difference. 
Again, the effort to make a contribution and a difference was not motivated mere-
ly by goodwill, but also by Slovakia’s internal need to belong and be treated as an
equal member, as it could not be treated as a learner and a follower forever. This need
was not always declared explicitly in Slovakia’s political rhetoric (speeches and doc-
uments), yet it was always tangibly present. This also explains why Slovakia has be-
come a staunch supporter of democratic reforms in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. 
Around 2002, the think-tanks in various Visegrad countries, including Slovakia, be-
gan to initiate a debate on the post-2004 priorities. In Slovakia the prominent pro-
moter of this issue had been the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. As a key foreign
policy think-tank, it has organised several conferences and hearings with representa-
tives of Slovak ministries, including international events that involved joint brain-
storming by think-tankers. These debates provided opportunities for brainstorming in
regard to the prioritisation of geographical regions of operation as well as their the-
matic focus. 
In the first phase the Slovak policy-makers prioritised those countries that had sim-
ilar experiences as Slovakia and also countries in its geographic vicinity – hence, they
prioritised the Western Balkans and, later, Eastern Europe. The focus on these coun-
tries came as a consequence of various other factors as well, such as the strategic in-
terests of the Slovak Republic and the capacity of the countries in question to digest
Slovak assistance. Before Slovakia’s EU membership, the majority of the discourse on
its foreign policy priorities had been concentrated on working jointly with these two
regions, since here Slovakia could combine its niche (‘here we can provide our
unique expertise’) and its perceptions of similarity between itself and the other coun-
tries (‘they are struggling with similar phenomena as we have struggled with in the
past’). Likewise, the long-term activities of Slovak non-governmental organisations
have generally been focused on the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. 
At the same time, it should be noted that although the post-2004 consensus on
priorities was created and mostly upheld no matter which parties were in govern-
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ment, there were differences in the parties’ accents. The foreign policy in the peri-
ods 1998–2002 (SDKU, KDH, SMK, SOP) and 2002–2006 (SDKU, KDH, SMK,
ANO), that is, in the period when Slovakia joined the EU, and in 2010 – the pre-
sent (SDKU, KDH, MOST-Hid, SAS) has been rhetorically different from the foreign
policy in 2006–2010, when the country was ruled by the coalition of SMER [Di-
rection]-Social Democracy, HZDS (the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia,
Mečiar’s party) and SNS (the Slovak national [and nationalist] party) under the
leadership of Prime Minister Robert Fico (SMER). The shift to be detected in this
coalition was in its accentuation of priorities.
In relation to this matter, two particular instances deserve our attention: that of
PM Fico’s statements during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and that of his state-
ments during the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2009. In the first case, PM Fico
stated that the war was provoked by Georgia (Aktualne.sk, 2008; Hospodárske
noviny, 2010), which ran not only counter to what the rest of the EU leaders were
saying, but also counter to the thinking in the Slovak MFA (Economist, 2010). Yet
even during Fico’s tenure in office, the first ‘Slovakaid’ projects for Georgia were
approved and started to be implemented, and Georgia received a similar percent-
age of the Slovak ODA for 2009 as Moldova or Belarus (Slovakaid, 2009). In fact,
in 2009 Georgia appeared on the list of priorities of the Slovak ODA for the first
time. Thus, despite Fico’s rhetoric, Slovakia did provide assistance to Georgia.
In the second case, Fico argued that not Russia, but Ukraine was to blame for the
dispute, and since the dispute ended in a considerable economic loss for Slovakia,
Fico called for a reevaluation of Slovakia’s support for the Eurointegration ambi-
tions of Ukraine. In the end, the Slovak-Ukrainian relations were cold until the new
Ukrainian government took office in 2010 (Duleba, 2011). 
To sum up, the post-1989 and post-2004 priorities of the Slovak diplomacy and for-
eign assistance came to be defined as a blend of pragmatism and solidarity. That said,
while the speeches and declarations of the Slovak leaders do tend to stipulate the no-
tion of solidarity and moral duty, as noted in the introduction of this article, the refer-
ences to solidarity should not be understood as analytical categories but as categories
of practice (for an explanation of this term, which was introduced by Bourdieu, see
Brubaker and Cooper, 2002). The rhetorical usage of ‘solidarity’ fits into the discourse
on values – and Slovakia’s EU presence as a value-oriented issue. Yet, while one might
use the notion of solidarity in statements, it is not possible to prove whether this usage
is sincere or merely a public relations strategy – a statement or reference produced for
the country to look good in the eyes of the international community. 
The current Slovak foreign policy thinking is well grasped in the following ex-
cerpt from a recent speech by Mikulas Dzurinda, the former Prime Minister and
current Minister of Foreign Affairs. Of particular relevance are two principles that
he highlights: first, the Slovak assistance to the East is framed within the Euroatlantic
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integration, and secondly, Slovakia sees itself (and the V4) as an example to follow.
The first principle clearly puts the Slovak Eastern policy in the EU-ropean context
and stipulates Slovakia’s ambition to influence the EU policy:
I want to reconfirm that the Slovak priority is to have a meaningful and visible
EU policy in the Eastern neighbourhood through the Eastern Partnership. Our
key goal is to have a stable, democratic and prosperous neighbourhood. ... 20
years ago the V4 countries decided to join forces in their efforts to integrate
into the European and Transatlantic community. Today, we are joining our ef-
forts in promoting our European values further to the East (Dzurinda, 2011).
The emphasis on EU policy as opposed to Slovak policy can be explained by the
size of the country as well. As Malova and Haughton (2011) have pointed out,
since Slovakia is not a big country, it understands that ‘acting through EU channels
it may have more influence’. In the other principle outlined by Dzurinda one can
observe an identification with the V4’s common past and a view of the past as a
joint other (for the V4 and the East): 
The added value of the V4 in the Eastern Partnership is our unique transfor-
mation experience. Our countries underwent the whole process of transfor-
mation and made deep and painful structural reforms. Our countries estab-
lished a precedent worth following – we provide an example of successful en-
largement, a tangible success of European ideas and values (Dzurinda, 2011).
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS
LINKS TO THE EU
This part analyses the political and civil society efforts towards Slovakia’s Eastern
neighbors in the post-2004 period. Scrutinising the documents, the rhetoric of the
leaders, and the activities of the political representation and civil society, it argues
that even though the Eastern policy is not only motivated by a logic of appropri-
ateness (doing what is right and what brings benefits to others), but also by a log-
ic of consequentialism (doing what brings benefits to Slovakia), the result can be
considered to be beneficial to the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. 
POLITICAL EFFORT ON THE BILATERAL AND THE
MULTILATERAL LEVEL
Slovakia’s political engagement with Eastern Europe ran largely in the framework
of supporting its integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the bilateral level a
number of meetings have taken place, especially with Ukrainian leaders, the Be-
larussian opposition and, recently (after 2010), Moldovan leaders. The exchange
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with the Southern Caucasus remains limited, though. On the multilateral level, Slo-
vakia has supported all the major EU initiatives towards the Eastern neighborhood
(the European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy).
Although it has taken part in their creation, it has not been a leader for most of the
time, although the year 2011 was special for it, as during this year Slovakia hosted
a V4 summit on the Eastern Patnership in Bratislava and initiated EU-level sanctions
against the Lukashenka regime. Out of all the Eastern countries, Ukraine received
the most visible long-term attention from Slovakia – after the Orange Revolution,
the Slovak Prime Minister presented the Ukrainian Prime Minister Jurij Jekhanurov
with a Plan of Slovak Assistance to Ukraine to Fulfill the Goals of the EU-Ukraine Ac-
tion Plan, which was largely prepared by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (RC
SFPA 2005). The SFPA, as an independent NGO, has played a key role in the pri-
oritisation of the East in the Slovak foreign policy.
The attention to the East (including the support for its Euro-Atlantic integration)
has also been articulated in multilateral fora. In 2006–2007, Slovakia held a non-per-
manent membership of the UN Security Council. Although the Council agenda did
not prioritise the EU’s Eastern neighborhood given its global scope and a number of
more pressing issues in international politics, two particular issues that required the
Council’s attention did appear in this respect – the secessionist conflicts related to
Georgia and Moldova. In its positions on the conflicts, Slovakia emphasised its sup-
port for the Euro-Atlantic integration of both countries (MFA SR, 2005). At the same
time (in 2006–2007), Slovakia held the V4 presidency during the important period
of the introduction of new EU tools towards the Eastern neighborhood. However,
the Slovak V4 presidency in the period July 1, 2010–June 30, 2011 was probably
more visible. Although the core of the priorities was centered on intra-Visegrad is-
sues, the Eastern partners did receive the attention of the presidency, explicitly as
part of the solidarity principle (MFA SR, 2010a). Specifically, the Slovak priorities re-
lated to the Eastern partners include sharing transition experience, support for the
reform processes in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and facilitation of the
visa regime. At the same time, the program acknowledges the need for joint efforts
at the EU level and the inclusion of the V4 effort and experience into the EU strate-
gic documents, notably the ‘inclusion of the experience from implementation of
sector policies as a part of the dialogue with countries of the Western Balkans and
the Eastern partnership’ (ibid.). The most important part, however, was the ‘mini-
summit’ that took place in Bratislava in March 2011, which was attended by Angela
Merkel and adopted an important joint declaration on the Eastern Partnership. 
Regarding the issue of Belarus, after the December 2010 presidential elections
and Lukashenka’s crack-down on his opponents, Slovakia led the effort at the EU
level to adopt sanctions against the Belarussian regime. Although Slovakia also sup-
ports the Belarussian opposition bilaterally (by expressions of solidarity, issuing in-
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vitations to conferences, and raising the issue at EU fora), Slovakia’s EU level activ-
ities in this matter have gained the Slovak diplomacy acknowledgement but also
shadows of a doubt as to whether such a mission really is bound to succeed – as
the Economist comments, ‘Slovakia is punching above its weight’ (the Economist,
2011). Yet, it seems that it indeed is bound to succeed – the June External Relations
Council in Luxembourg saw the adoption of sanctions ‘that concern a concrete
person connected with the regime and specific companies that cooperate with the
establishment’ (MFA SR, 2011b). The Slovak Foreign Ministry seems to be con-
vinced that these measures adopted by the EU (in combination with the deterio-
rating economy of Belarus, which has recently seen a multifold inflation) might
bring about the last days of the regime. We will yet have to see how the Slovak ini-
tiated policy towards Belarus will work, but it might be one of the most successful
and efficient products of Slovakia’s solidarity and pragmatism. 
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE POLICY
As already noted, the main priority for the Slovak assistance has been the Western
Balkans – the respective amounts of resources invested so far in the Balkans and
the East are incomparable. For example, in 2009 Serbia alone received 39% of the
Slovak Official Development Assistance (ODA), while all the eligible Eastern part-
ners combined received 10%. Yet, some activities have been taking place between
Slovakia and the Eastern neighbors in recent years. The Slovak ODA has prioritised
Ukraine, Belarus and, recently (2010), Moldova. Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine all received assistance from Slovakia. Each of the first three countries re-
ceived it in the amount of 2% of the total Slovak ODA for 2010, while Ukraine re-
ceived 4% (191.430,49 EUR) (Slovakaid, 2009). There have been no significant
links with the countries of the South Caucasus, although in 2009 the first three pro-
jects for Georgia were approved, and this was followed by the approval of three
more projects for Georgia in 2010. 
Since its establishment, the Slovak ODA has undergone several reforms. The re-
view of basic ODA documents reveals how the assistance has been communicat-
ed and confirms the thesis that the Slovak cooperation with the EU’s neighbors in-
deed is a pragmatic endeavor. The first Slovak ODA strategy for the years
2003–2008 does not include any of the six EaP countries as a priority. The main
priorities are Serbia and Montenegro, and the other priorities are countries in the
Balkans, Central Asia and Subsaharan Africa. It is, however, interesting to look at
the reasoning behind the ODA (why Slovakia needs ODA), and this reasoning is
purely pragmatic. The first ODA strategy argues that it is essential to provide ODA
for the following reasons: 1) Slovakia should join the OECD and needs to har-
monise its policy with the donor community; 2) Slovakia needs to fulfill its interna-
tional commitments; 3) Slovakia has an interest in solving global questions and
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helping the developing world. The altruistic ‘helping’ is mentioned only as the last
subreason of the third reason, and particular attention should be dedicated to the
reasoning in point 2 (emphasis added):
The second important incentive for providing development assistance is the
fulfilment of obligations (mostly of a moral nature) and promises resulting
from Slovakia’s membership in international organisations and from the ac-
cession to international documents. Even though these are mostly recom-
mendations and moral obligations, the international community carefully ob-
serves how they are respected (MFA SR, 2003). 
The strategy could just as well say, ‘We would not have to do it, but they are watch-
ing us, and we want to look good’. This excerpt from the ODA strategy is a fitting
illustration of the need for international recognition as an important motivation of
Slovakia’s engagement abroad in general and in the East in particular. As noted in
the first part of this article, this ‘need to belong’ has important roots in Slovakia’s
perception of its own past, as in the past, it felt oppressed and ignored by other
countries.
Even more telling are the goals of the Slovak ODA, which consist of the follow-
ing: 1) transfer of Slovak experience and know-how; 2) engagement of Slovak ex-
perts in international development projects; 3) expansion of economic coopera-
tion with developing countries; 4) support of Slovak minorities abroad (MFA SR,
2003: 8). Note the emphasis on the Slovak interest – this can, on one hand, be ex-
plained by the concern to communicate the ODA to the Slovak public. On the oth-
er, it can be interpreted in line with the arguments introduced in the first part of this
chapter. In this interpretation, Slovakia understood its EU membership and the du-
ties stemming from it as a way to become a part of the ‘in-group’, a part of the cir-
cle that decides. 
The second Slovak ODA strategy for the years 2009–2013 (adopted during Fi-
co’s government) offers a slightly altered set of justifications for the Slovak ODA:
1) shared responsibility for global development; 2) interest in being an active sub-
ject of international politics and an active member of the donor community; 3) the
moral duty and commitments that are related to membership in international or-
ganisations, especially the EU. This strategy, which is more detailed than the previ-
ous one, already includes the Eastern neighbors – Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine. They are, however, left in the second tier (as ‘project countries’), while the
more important ‘program countries’ are Afghanistan, Kenya and Serbia. 
Based in this strategy, the National Program for Slovak ODA of 2010 specifies
the following priorities for EaP countries: 1) support for projects aimed at legal ap-
proximation to EU law; 2) support of ‘integration ambitions and building of admin-
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istrative capacities’. In the case of Georgia two more priorities are added: ‘strength-
ening of regional security and stability’ and support for internally displaced persons
– IDPs (Slovakaid, 2010).
The year 2011 brought further changes to Slovak development assistance – the
list of countries eligible for bilateral development assistance has been cut, and out
of the Eastern partners, only Moldova remained. At the same time, a new program
called ‘technical assistance’ was created. Under this program the countries of the
Western Balkans and those grouped under the Eastern Partnership (with the excep-
tion of Armenia and Azerbaijan) are eligible to receive support with the goal of sup-
porting reforms and European integration. Apart from calls that are to be published
by the Slovak Agency of International Development Cooperation (which is respon-
sible for distribution of Slovak Aid), a new program is currently being formed in the
MFA. This program is called CETIR – the Centre for Sharing Experiences of Transi-
tion and Integration. The goal of this program is to ‘deepen the contacts of Slovak
experts with representatives of state and civil society in the countries of the West-
ern Balkans and EU’s Eastern Partnership. The emphasis will be laid on consultations
on specific questions related to their reform and integration processes. CETIR will try
to respond promptly to partner country demand’ (SlovakAid, 2011: 7). 
DIPLOMACY AND NGOS WORKING HAND IN HAND: THE
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS
A particularly interesting case of Slovakia’s assistance to the EU’s Eastern neighbors
is the one of the ‘National Convention on the EU’. The project, which emerged in
Slovakia shortly before its accession to the EU, has come to be implemented in Ser-
bia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova as a joint effort of the Slovak diplomacy
and a non-governmental organisation – the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. At
the moment the National Convention is Slovakia’s flagship initiative in the priority
countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. 
The project is based on the philosophy that all major stakeholders in the country
should take part in a structured debate on its future. This means that representatives
of state, regional and local governments, businesses, academia, civil society and the
media should all have the opportunity to take part in the formulation of national po-
sitions in key areas of importance. The National Convention, which has a plenary as-
sembly and thematic working groups, provides for exactly this kind of forum.
In Slovakia, this project emerged shortly before the EU accession and its main
goal was to facilitate Slovakia’s European integration. It, however, continued (al-
though with a break) even after Slovakia joined the Union, and its renewed version
was focused on facilitating the priorities of Slovakia’s role inside the European
Union. This ‘export’ of the National Conventions abroad is evidence of a fusion of
solidarity and pragmatism in the Slovak Eastern policy (and Slovakia’s foreign poli-
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cy in general). The projects do respond to the needs of the countries in which they
are implemented. Their initial phases have been funded by SlovakAid. At the same
time, they serve as a powerful tool of the country’s public diplomacy, since the
Conventions are visible and attended by senior representatives of state, and thus
they contribute to Slovakia’s image in other countries as well.
In Moldova, the National Convention on the EU was launched on November 9,
2009 (National Convention in Moldova, 2011). The project is implemented by the
Slovak think-tank SFPA, the Moldovan Institute for Development and Social Initia-
tives (Viitorul), the Foreign Policy Association and the analytical centre Expert
Grup. For now, three working groups have been established: 1) Visas, Borders and
Transnistria; 2) Agriculture and Regional Development; 3) Trade, Services and
Competition. The National Convention on the EU in Ukraine was launched in Fall
2010, and it follows a similar pattern like the ones in Slovakia and Moldova – it is a
joint state-civil society initiative aimed at facilitating the harmonisation of legisla-
tion with the EU standards, and it produces recommendations for the government.
It has four working groups: 1) Relations with the EU and the European Integration
Strategy for Ukraine; 2) Free Trade Agreement and Regulatory Approximation with
EU Acquis; 3) Justice, Freedom and Security and 4) the Regional Dimension of
Ukraine’s European Integration Strategy: Regional Development and Interregional
Cooperation (National Convention in Ukraine, 2011). The project is implemented
jointly by the SFPA and the Ukrainian partners – the National Institute for Strategic
Studies and the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. 
That said, Slovakia is sharing its own experience upon the request of the neigh-
borhood governments. At the same time, the National Convention on the EU is
still, in a revamped form, running in Slovakia as a dialogue between the govern-
ment, businesses and civil society. To illustrate the scope and depth of the debates,
its recent (May 2011) session in Banska Bystrica was focused specifically on the
Eastern Partnership, and the recommendations, addressed to the Slovak govern-
ment, have been very detailed and very technical in nature. That said, they did not
include much reasoning for why Slovakia should be involved in the East – that is al-
ready taken as a matter of course. The focus was on how Slovakia could best be
engaged. The recommendations specifically outline that by far the most important
country is Ukraine, and not for the reasons of solidarity, but for pragmatic reasons
related to the state and economic interests of the Slovak Republic. The geograph-
ic proximity (Ukraine is a direct neighbor) is indeed a strong factor that influences
Slovakia’s interest in the cooperation. Plus, supporting Ukraine is a way to reduce
Slovakia’s liminal position in the EU:
In case of the European integration of Ukraine, or at least in case of the sign-
ing of an Association Agreement, such as the free trade agreement which the
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EU offers to Ukraine via the Eastern partnership, it is justified to argue that the
trade balance between the SR and Ukraine might increase several times and,
at the same time, that a free trade zone between the EU and Ukraine will have
an extraordinarily positive impact on the economic development of Eastern
Slovakia... which belongs to the most backward Slovak regions (National Con-
vention, 2011).
Besides the clear prioritisation of Ukraine, the Convention recommendations stip-
ulate that it is essential that the EaP partners get a voice (e.g. via observer status)
in EU working groups targeting specific sectoral policies, that the Slovak Republic
reevaluate the visa regime, and that the specific experience of the SR might help
Ukraine fulfill the Action Plan. 
Apart from the Convention on the EU, there are many other activities that are
carried out by the Slovak NGOs operating in the Eastern neighborhood. They
mostly work with the support of the Slovak government funds designated for this
purpose and also the international grant schemes, including the International
Visegrad Fund, an intergovernmental fund created by the V4 states which has spe-
cial funding schemes for cooperation with the East. The ‘European future’ for the
East stands at the backdrop of their efforts. The NGOs operate either domestical-
ly, by raising awareness about the situation in the EaP countries (e.g. the MEMO 98
project slovenskoukrajina.sk), at the EU level (e.g. the advocacy activities by Pontis
or SFPA), or directly in the EaP countries. Many of them have been active in issues
related to the EaP countries even before Slovakia’s EU accession. Regarding their
domestic involvement, one should not overlook the NGOs’ agenda-setting func-
tion and efforts to shape the policy. The important annual conferences, such as the
GLOBSEC (organised by the Slovak Atlantic Commission) or the Annual Confer-
ence on Evaluation of the Foreign Policy (SFPA and MFA) always dedicate separate
panels to Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the two foreign policy priorities. Similar-
ly, the relevant Slovak publications (e.g. International Issues, Zahraničná politika)
dedicate considerable attention to these two regions. 
Given the broad area of priorities outlined in Slovak development assistance
strategies, the activities in the East have gained a variety of ranges and scopes. To
illustrate the dispersion of the resources, we could use the case of Georgia – a
country that has not received significant attention from the Slovak diplomacy and
development assistance until 2008 and 2009, when Slovakia, following the rest of
the donor community, decided to contribute to Georgia’s reconstruction and mod-
ernisation. The divergence of the implemented projects, however, shows that the
assistance to Georgia was not well premeditated. Presently there are six Slovak pro-
jects running in Georgia (contracted in 2009 and 2010), spanning from support for
enhancing of water quality monitoring to provision of assistance to internally dis-
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placed persons.5 Although there are not many reasons to doubt the usefulness of
all the above activities, it is questionable whether such a small donor as Slovakia
should have such a diversified portfolio of support activities. However, as in the
case of other countries, despite the lack of coherence of the policy, the imple-
mented efforts are a clear reflection of the solidarity to Georgia. 
Finally, at the EU level, apart from their advocacy, the Slovak NGOs strive to take
part in pan-European civil society networks. A case in point would be the Eastern
Partnership Civil Society Forum (CSF). Yet, although a representative of SFPA took
part in the CSF’s preparatory steering committee, no representatives of Slovak
NGOs took part in the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 steering committees, and SFPA
and the Pontis Foundation participated only in the first (2009) EaP CSF6 (EEAS,
2010). 
Again, just like the activities of the state towards the East should be understood
as a blend of pragmatism and solidarity, the activities of Slovak non-governmental
organisations cannot be conceived merely as expressions of altruism. SlovakAid
has proved an important source of funding for the Slovak NGO sector, and al-
though their activities cannot be considered as mainly donor-driven (the state con-
sults the ODA with the civil society), they as well are competing for funding.
That said, it would be imprecise to understand government and NGO activities
as separate or unrelated in this case. In the end, the NGOs do try to shape the gov-
ernment agenda in the East, either as think-tanks or as potential recipients and im-
plementing agencies. The NGOs and the government thus frequently engage in
consultations on the Eastern policy and the structure of funding. On the other
hand, the NGOs do depend on government money to survive. There are several
reasons for this – the SlovakAid resources are, for example, more accessible than
EuropeAid, which has more complicated application materials and more demands
on the capacities of the implementing organisation. At the same time, although it
is often suggested that civil society plays a vital role in international relations, and
indeed, cooperation with civil society is essential if a country wants to have ‘soft
power’ (Nye, 2008), the relevance of its large-scale activities remains rather un-
derstudied (Gotz, 2008). 
CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that the Slovak policy towards the EU’s Eastern neighbors
should be understood as a blend of altruism and pragmatism, following both the
logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentialism (March and Olsen,
1989, 1998). The very fact of Slovakia’s engagement – on the governmental and
the NGO level – points to a genuine goodwill to help the less reformed coun-
tries, especially since Slovakia itself has experience of democratic transition and
Euroatlantic integration. On the other hand, however, prioritising the East has a
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strong pragmatic element. Ukraine, which is Slovakia’s direct neighbor, is its on-
ly non-EUropean neighbor. Thus, Slovakia, in terms of security and economy,
would prefer if this neighbor were integrated in the Euro-Atlantic space. One of
the most important elements in this relation is energy security – as Russian oil
and gas are transferred to Slovakia via Ukraine. Besides Ukraine, Moldova and
Belarus have received attention from the Slovak foreign policy as well, while the
Southern Caucasus has remained marginal so far. There is, however, one more
pragmatic consideration, and that is Slovakia’s own role in international relations
and in the European Union. The East is considered as a specific niche where Slo-
vakia can make a contribution to European politics and thus increase its visibili-
ty. 
While the path towards the European Union was frequently communicated by
the Slovak leaders as a path towards democracy, human rights and ‘shared values’,
at the same time it was a move towards becoming respected, towards regaining re-
spect. In this sense, regaining respect means that one does not remain a recipient
of policy and assistance, a passive actor, but instead becomes an active one – the
one who participates in decision-making and shaping policy. At the same time, the
European Union already operates in such a way that some countries or small
groups of countries are more strongly involved in some areas than in others. For
example, Spain has particularly strong relations with Latin America, while the Unit-
ed Kingdom and France have been active in the Middle East and North Africa. Fi-
nally, Slovakia, like the other post-communist EU members, has chosen the post-
communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans as the countries
that it wants to be involved with on the grounds that they have experienced a sim-
ilar past – and could consider the Slovak story inspiring when shaping their future.
The past then is the major other in Slovakia’s identity formation and in determining
its policy preferences for the future. 
ENDNOTES
1 Haughton (2007) cites the key demarches of 24 November 2007 and 25 October 1995. Apart from
these, however, the representatives of the EU and its member states kept regular contact with the op-
position.
2 Interestingly, despite the recentness of the Soviet past and the distance of the Austro-Hungarian past,
the Hungarian is a much more significant ‘other’ than the Russian in Slovak discourse.
3 If there is a spatial other, then it is Hungary – a frequent target of complaint of Slovak nationalist cir-
cles. This is so despite the fact that the ‘Austro-Hungarian’ past and the period of ‘Hungarisation’ are
much less recent than the period of Soviet influence and oppression. 
4 I owe thanks to Olga Shumylo-Tapiola (Carnegie Europe) and Dejan Jovic (University of Zagreb) for
drawing my interest to this subject.
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5 1) ‘Support for improvement of quality management in water quality monitoring and information sys-
tems, as a tool for the decision-making process in water protection policy in Georgia’ (worth 116.774
EUR); 2) ‘Management of public finance on the local administration level in Georgia’ (190.612 EUR);
3) integration of resettled communities in Kobi (150.165,02 EUR); 4) ‘Assistance for Georgia in post-
war reconstruction and prevention of local conflicts’ (139.700 EUR); 5) support for marginalised IDPs
(149.723 EUR); 6) support for IDP Youth Clubs (140.692 EUR). SlovakAid, 2011b; Najslova, 2011
(forthcoming).
6 This can be explained by many factors, including the fact that Slovak NGOs have limited travel funds,
the fact that they are understaffed and cannot attend every event (even if the event is highly relevant),
and, finally, the possibility that they are so well networked with the Eastern partners that they do not
necessarily see the EAP CSF as an added value.
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New Eastern Perspectives?
A Critical Analysis of 
Romania’s Relations with 
Moldova, Ukraine and the 
Black Sea Region
IRINA ANGELESCU1
Abstract: Romania’s relations with its Eastern neighborhood reflect a form of solidarity founded on
the country’s political and historical identity, as illustrated in case studies of Romania’s
relations with Ukraine and Moldova. After assessing Romania’s foreign policy identity of
the past two centuries, the article concludes that the country has only recently been in
search of its ‘Eastern vocation’. In this sense, Romania’s integration in the Euro-Atlantic
institutions (the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe) has helped consolidate
the country’s democratic path. Subsequently, after gaining its membership in NATO and
the EU, Romania has been re-assessing its foreign policy priorities. The article also iden-
tifies two foreign policy priorities that Romania would like to elevate on the European and
international political agendas: the democratic future of Moldova and that of the Black
Sea region. 
Key words: Romanian foreign policy, foreign policy identity, Moldova, Ukraine, the Black Sea region
There has been a notable absence of Romania in public debates about the Eastern
neighborhood despite the fact that the country is the second largest new European
Union (EU) member state and geographically located in the strategic Black Sea re-
gion. Unlike the Eastern foreign policy actions of Poland, which even before its EU
accession was a strong supporter of what was to become the Eastern Partnership
(EaP), Romania’s Eastern foreign policy actions have not been very prominent. Its ef-
forts were rather focused on relations with Moldova and the Black Sea region,
where Romania put forward a rather modest proposal for an informal regional con-
sultative process called the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF).
What could explain this situation? Does Romania have an ‘Eastern vocation’ in its
foreign policy, and how is it manifested? How has Romania’s foreign policy been af-
fected by its membership in the EU and other transatlantic organizations, like the
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Council of Europe (CoE)? Fol-
lowing the approach of this special issue of this journal, the present article will anal-
yse Romania’s current foreign policy towards Eastern Europe through the lens of the
country’s (foreign policy) identity. Of course, foreign policy decisions are based on
a variety of factors, and any separation of ‘identity’ from other geopolitical, eco-
nomic and social considerations is somewhat artificial. However, in line with the
identitarian discourse, the article argues that Romania’s foreign policy positions and
actions towards its Eastern neighbors – including those cases where Romania did
not take a clear position or action – have until recently been guided by the coun-
try’s denial of its geopolitical location. During its history as a modern state, Roma-
nia has generally not identified with the Central and Eastern parts of the continent.
It is only after the fall of communism – and particularly after its accession to the EU
and NATO – that Romania has started looking for its ‘Eastern vocation’. In the in-
troduction to this issue, Elsa Tulmets talks about ‘solidarity’ in foreign policy, which
is driven by a sense of shared identity. According to this understanding, Romania ex-
presses a form of solidarity with most of its neighbors on the basis of a political iden-
tity that it shares with them. As will be shown, Romania’s path of accession to Euro-
Atlantic institutions has consolidated this liberal-democratic form of its political iden-
tity and had beneficial consequences for the country’s relations with its neighbors.
The exception to this pattern is Moldova, as historical identity lies at the basis of the
Moldovan-Romanian relations. 
The article follows Ruxandra Ivan’s (2009) distinction of three periods in Roma-
nia’s foreign policy after 1989: the first is the period of confusion immediately af-
ter the Romanian revolution, and the second is the period of general consensus
and support for Romania’s membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The third
phase began after Romania’s accession to NATO and the EU, and it still continues
at present. In this phase, the country is reformulating its foreign policy goals and
role. This article argues that only during this last phase has Romania started to re-
conceptualize its role in the East and that the county’s memberships in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have provid-
ed a ‘psychological comfort’ and a new impetus for defining these relations.
In terms of its methodology, the article presents Romania’s position towards its
Eastern neighborhood by analysing discourses and public statements of Romanian
foreign policy makers. This approach permits one to find out whether the public
declarations on the foreign policy towards the East are followed by symbolic and
material actions. The article begins by offering a brief presentation of Romania’s
foreign policy before and after 1989. It argues that the country’s decision to join
the Euro-Atlantic institutions has deeply affected not only the country’s domestic
policy, but also its relations with its neighborhood. In this sense, as a consequence
of its accession bid, Romania had to engage its neighbors to consolidate peaceful
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and friendly relations with them. The article then looks specifically at the bilateral
relations between Romania and its two direct neighbors among the EaP states,
Moldova and Ukraine. These two cases have the advantage of illustrating the two
forms of Romanian foreign identity and the resulting solidarity. A section on the
Black Sea region is also included as this region is an area of concern and priority in
Romanian foreign policy and an issue which Romania is hoping to insert into the
EU foreign policy agenda. It is an area which reflects not only a form of historical
and political identity, but also more rational economic and energetic interests.
INVESTIGATING ROMANIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
IDENTITY
ON ROMANIA’S POLITICS OF IDENTITY
Throughout its history, Romania has never been a great power, but it has always
gravitated towards great powers (Ivan, 2009: 18). In modern times, the country lay
at the crossroads of several big empires (i.e. the Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg and
Austro-Hungarian empires). In the twentieth century Romania was part of the land
area that Germany and Russia struggled over, ‘a “buffer zone” characterized by po-
litical instability, economic disarray and “security vacuum”’ (Baleanu, 2000: 2). Giv-
en Romania’s location among these great powers, many of the country’s transfor-
mations in modern history have been due to events that took place outside its bor-
ders and that were beyond its direct control. As Baleanu points out, it was Ger-
many’s defeat in World War I that made possible the creation of the ‘Greater Ro-
mania’ in 1918 while the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact led to the seizure of the
Romanian regions of Bukovina and Bessarabia and the latter’s incorporation in the
Soviet Union as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova (Baleanu, 2000: 2). The
end of WWII led to the installment of communism in Romania, although this polit-
ical movement had very few local supporters. Even in more recent times some
scholars argued that Romania’s accession to NATO and the EU was not so much a
result of the country’s own efforts as a result of international events and the threat
of instability in the region (Gallagher, 2005). 
In general, we can identify a shift in the country’s identity and self-perception
that occurred during the past two centuries. Starting with the Middle Ages, when
religion was the preeminent form of identification, Romanians orbited towards the
East, given their Orthodox faith. Thus, when Romania identified itself as an Ortho-
dox country, it was ‘at ease’ and ‘at home’ as part of Eastern Europe and the values
associated with it (Boia, 2002: 66). However, starting with the nineteenth century,
when ethnic identity became the norm for national identification, Romanian elites
re-discovered the nation’s ‘Latin roots’ and wanted a geopolitical shift westwards
towards Rome, Paris, Vienna and Berlin (Mureseanu, 2010: 49). Romanians began
to look at Bucharest as ‘the Paris of the East’. When in the nineteenth century, the
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Romanian political and intellectual elite adopted a discourse of Romania as a ‘Latin
island in the middle of the Slavic sea’, they looked at their Slavic and Hungarian
neighbors with suspicion. Far from engendering solidarity and cooperation with
neighbors, this view lead to competition. Thus, from then on, one can talk of a
‘quasi-permanent hostile’ national position towards Russians and Hungarians on
the part of Romanians (Hurezeanu, 2010: 39). 
It is worth stopping here to look at the role of Russia in the formation of Roma-
nia’s foreign policy identity. As mentioned above, in the past Romania’s Orthodox
faith brought it closer to its big neighbor, the Russian empire. Romanians used the
Slavonic language in church and the Cyrillic alphabet in public life (the Latin one was
only officially adopted in 1860). However, after the modern Romanian state was
formed and gained its independence in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the
political elite began to look at Russia with increased suspicion. As pointed out
above, Romania’s ‘new’ identity as ‘a Latin island in a Slavic sea’ put it at odds with
its biggest Slavic neighbor, the Russian empire. Furthermore, the annexation of
Bessarabia by the Russian empire in 1812 raised questions about the geopolitical in-
terests of the latter (Boia, 2007). To a certain extent, it could be said that Russia – as
the largest Slavic state – is the constitutive ‘other’ of the Romanian national identity.
But it would be farfetched to suggest that Romanian elites and the Romanian soci-
ety have ever attempted to portray an independent Romania as the alternative to the
Russian dominance, given the power imbalance between the two states. Even in the
twentieth century, communist Romania was careful to walk a fine line that would not
bring it too close to its ‘big Soviet brother’ or create conflicts with him. 
In the latter half of the 19th century, Romanian leaders tried ‘to break from the part
of Europe to which they belonged’ and looked westward (Boia, 2002: 66–67). This
desire to ‘belong’ and ‘return to Europe’, which was connected with feelings of nos-
talgia, would continue well into the twentieth century. Romanians now remember the
Cold War as a time when their ‘destiny was not their own’ (President Iliescu’s speech,
22 August 1994), as a time when Romanians were ‘waiting for the Americans’ who
had previously failed to arrive during World War II to save them (Kast and Rosapepe,
2009: 25–27). After the fall of communism, Romanians’ enthusiasm for their ‘return
to Europe’ (i.e. ‘the West’) was expressed in their high support for their country’s EU
and NATO membership. The paradox of this situation, though, is that Romania has
been wanting to be(come) a Western country, but at the same time it has tradition-
ally been a rural society with patriarchal values and mentalities (Boia, 2002: 67).
ROMANIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1989: THE WESTERN
CONSENSUS
A series of internal and external factors made Romania eventually choose the West-
ern path in order to preserve its security and stability. On the internal front, the in-
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terethnic clashes in Transylvania, the miners’ strike in Bucharest at the beginning of
the 1990s and the precarious economic situation raised the need to consolidate
the country’s democratic credentials and market economy with Western help. On
the international front, the dissolution of the USSR and Romania’s geopolitical lo-
cation between two unstable regions – the Balkans and the post-Soviet space – ef-
fectively eliminated the option of an Eastern orientation and made Romania look
westwards for support and security guarantees (Ivan, 2009: 10).
On Europe’s Day in 1994, President Ion Iliescu emphasized that Romania was
engaged in the ‘decisive step’ of European integration through the adoption of
concrete measures alongside public declarations of support (President Iliescu’s
speech, 9 May 1994). Less than half a year later, he addressed the Council of Eu-
rope and confirmed Romania’s dedication to a ‘return to Europe’ through a Euro-
Atlantic integration, a decision he called ‘normal and natural’, given Romania’s be-
longing to the ‘European culture and civilization’ (President Iliescu’s speech, 4 Oc-
tober 1994). A commission was created in Romania in February 1993 with a man-
date to elaborate a European integration strategy. The resulting political declaration
stipulating this Western consensus was signed by representatives of all the major
Romanian political parties in Snagov on 21 June 1995. It identified Romania’s
membership in the EU as a ‘national strategic objective’ and a ‘crucial point of con-
vergence of the political and social forces of the country, a historic chance to pro-
mote the fundamental interests of the Romanian people, their identity and tradi-
tions’ (Declaratie, 21 June 1995). 
Once the decision to embark on the Euro-Atlantic path was made, the consen-
sus at the elite and society level was unquestioned and unbreakable. This ‘Euro-At-
lantic consensus’ was constantly reiterated in public declarations by the political
class and inscribed in official documents, as Title VI of the 2003 Romanian Consti-
tution (Constitutia Romaniei, 2003) and the 2007 Romanian National Security
Strategy (Strategia de Securitate Nationala a Romaniei, 2007) indicate. In his first
New Year’s Eve address to the Romanian people after the EU accession, President
Basescu emphasized that Romania’s integration had been the result of the desire
of the entire Romanian people to join (President Basescu’s speech, 31 December
2006). The next day, in Sibiu, he re-invoked the leitmotif of Romania’s EU mem-
bership as a ‘return to Europe’ (President Basescu’s speech, 1 January, 2007) – a
theme he reiterated again just a few weeks later in front of the European Parliament
(President Basescu’s speech, 31 January 2007). All these official public declarations
can be seen as an acknowledgement of the Euro-Atlantic institutions in the con-
solidation of Romania’s liberal-democratic political identity.
After Romania fulfilled its foreign policy goal of becoming a member of the Eu-
ro-Atlantic organization, the country had to revise and reformulate its foreign poli-
cy priorities. A collection of speeches and interviews released by Foreign Minister
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Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu – who was in office immediately before and after Ro-
mania’s accession to the EU – offers an insight into the challenges Romania faced
in formulating its foreign policy as an EU member state. In 2006, the year before
Romania became an EU member, Ungureanu offered his vision of this policy:
On the international front, post-2007 Romania will be a European state with the
potential to specialize in specific issues and geographical regions of foreign pol-
icy, and it could play the part of a liaison between the West and certain regions
located in strategic proximity to the Euro-Atlantic space. A European Romania
with a consolidated and selective global vocation is the country we have all
been dreaming of and which we have the historic duty to create (Ungureanu,
2008: 118). 
What were the ‘specific issues’ and ‘geographical regions’ that Romanian diplo-
mats considered to be best fit for the country to tackle? The political class focused
on Romania’s beneficial geography: ‘either the Black Sea or South-Eastern Europe,
a geography in which Romania has competency, a respected presence and, not
least, expertise’ (Ungureanu, 2008: 19). Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu sug-
gested that Romania could become ‘an ideal transatlantic port to the Black Sea’
(Melescanu in Motoc and Cioculescu, 2010: 57). Romanian elites decided to ‘ac-
tively lobby the relevant institutions in Brussels’ to put the two new neighbors – ‘the
Black Sea region’ and Moldova – on the EU’s agenda, especially since the EU
lacked a specific policy for the Black Sea region (Ungureanu, 2008: 72). The Black
Sea would provide the answer to some specific issues that Romania would put on
the table – energy security, tackling ‘new’ threats like organized crime and terror-
ism, and proliferation of narcotics – since the Black Sea region would be the ‘front
line’ for combating the problems (Asmus and Jackson, 2004: 7).
Romania’s post-membership foreign policy was conceptualized through the lens
of its obligations. For example, Chapter 21 of the Romanian 2009–2012 Program
of Government, which sets out Romania’s priorities in both domestic and foreign
policy, begins by putting an emphasis on the need to take advantage of Romania’s
membership in NATO and the EU. It explicitly mentions the need to turn the Black
Sea into a strategically relevant space for the EU and NATO. Also in the same docu-
ment, Romania emphasizes the need to further engage its ‘European partners’ in
order to ‘diversify the EU presence’ in the East European and Caspian regions so
that regional stability would be enhanced and solutions would be sought for the
‘frozen conflicts’ in the regions. It is hard not to notice the difference in the tone of
the document when it addresses the bilateral relations with the U.S. and France, as
opposed to the tone it uses in discussions of other ‘new’ EU member states and
Russia. Whereas for the former, there is a long list of comprehensive examples of
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cooperation, for the latter countries, all references to cooperation are defined as
‘pragmatic’ (Programul de Guvernare 2009–2012). 
Whereas the preceding sections presented the general lines of Romania’s for-
eign policy identity, the second part will focus on some concrete examples of Ro-
mania’s interactions with its neighborhood. The second part will begin by empha-
sizing the role of Romania’s membership in the EU and NATO for consolidating the
country’s liberal-democratic political identity and defining its policy in the neigh-
bourhood. The relations between Romania and Ukraine will be analysed as an il-
lustration of the solidarity resulting from this form of identity. Similarly, the case of
Romania’s relations with Moldova will be analysed as a result of the countries’ his-
torical identities, which are related to their common past. Finally, Romania’s inten-
tion of bringing the Black Sea region into the international limelight will be pre-
sented as a manifestation of Romania’s foreign policy identity, which combines po-
litical interests, more ‘rational’ forms of interest, and some elements of Romania’s
historical identity.
A SELECTIVE ROLE IN THE EASTERN
NEIGHBOURHOOD
THE IMPACT OF THE EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP (QUEST)
ON RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBORHOOD
The pursuit of membership had beneficial consequences for Romania’s domestic
politics and foreign relations, the first of which is in its relation with its neighbor-
hood. As part of its quest for EU and NATO membership, Romania had to sign ba-
sic treaties with all its neighbors, and thus it had to address sensitive issues such as
the delimitation of borders and the treatment of national minorities (Linden, 2000).
Romania’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration also had negative conse-
quences for its neighborly relations, though. For example, President Constantines-
cu’s decision to support the NATO mission in Kosovo – which he saw as a pre-con-
dition for Romania’s accession to the organization – damaged Romania’s relations
with Serbia, one of its closest allies in the region.
The incentive of Euro-Atlantic integration also changed the way Romania car-
ried out its foreign policy. For example, during President Emil Constatinescu’s time
in office (1996–2000), Romania began to increasingly rely on trilateral forms of
foreign policy (e.g. Romania–Greece–Turkey; Romania–Ukraine–Poland; Roma-
nia–Bulgaria–Turkey; Romania–Moldova–Ukraine and Romania–Hungary–Austria).
This approach to the management of foreign relations was based on a vision of ‘vari-
able geometry’ and meant to present Romania as a credible partner in the eyes of
NATO (Ivan, 2009: 128).
The process of ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’ made Romania deeply involved in re-
gional affairs. By the end of the 1990s, the country was fully engaged in numerous
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international forums and meetings, increasing its visibility and exposure to interna-
tional events (Ivan, 2009: 131). President Constantinescu’s first visit abroad was to
Poland, and the Romanian Foreign Minister at the time, Adrian Severin, had a
strategic vision that Poland and Romania would act as NATO’s Northern and
Southern fronts, to the North Sea and the Black Sea respectively (Ivan, 2009:
127–128). In October 2000, it was agreed that Romania would create the first
headquarters of an international organization in Bucharest, the headquarters of the
Initiative for the Cooperation in South Eastern Europe. In 2001, Romania assumed
the OSCE Presidency. The country also became an active participant in the Pact for
Stability for South Eastern Europe, which was created in 1999 after the Kosovo cri-
sis (Ivan, 2009: 130). 
In Romania’s self-perception, federalism is seen as a dangerous solution to its
problems, since it is viewed as the first step towards the dismemberment of the na-
tion (Boia, 2002: 29). This indicates a distrust of not only outside actors, but also of
the country’s internal workings – in this case, the status of national minorities. This
belief is reflected in the Romanian Constitution, which defines the country as a
‘unitary state’, in the tensions with its national Hungarian minority in Transylvania,
and in the country’s refusal to recognize Kosovo and the separatist regions of Abk-
hazia and South Ossetia as independent states. To a certain extent, this view also
explains why Romanians feel strongly about Romanian minorities living abroad and
the special relationship with Moldova.
In general, Romania is in favor of a more coherent and coordinated EU engage-
ment in the region, one that would not preclude the partner countries from even-
tually gaining membership (Ungureanu, 2008: 57). The following sections will be
devoted to exploring Romania’s relations with Moldova and Ukraine and to Ro-
mania’s efforts towards increasing the visibility of the Black Sea region at the inter-
national level. 
RELATIONS WITH MOLDOVA
Among Romania’s neighbors, Moldova is the one with which it has the most affin-
ity and, to a certain extent, the most complicated relations. At the core of the rela-
tionship between Romania and Moldova is the issue of reunification of the two
countries, which have similar languages, histories and cultures. Since 1989, the
evolution of their relations resembled that of a bell curve: while at the very begin-
ning many symbolic gestures were made, the relations became tense after 1993,
and after the tensions passed, the relations have been gradually, but slowly, im-
proving.
The history of Moldovan-Romanian relations is very complex and dates back
many centuries. The territory of the contemporary independent state of Moldova
has been an integral part of the Romanian Moldovan Principality roughly from the
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fourteenth to the nineteenth century. It was part of the Russian Empire for five
decades in the nineteenth century, and then it was an integral part of the Romani-
an independent state for the most part until 1944, when it became part of the So-
viet Union. 
According to Serebrian, these geopolitical shifts have resulted in Moldova’s in-
habitants having a ‘regional’ rather than a ‘national’ identity, as in Moldova, politics
per se has been replaced by discourses about identity (Serebrian, 2010: 218–222).
Indeed, the question of identity is at the heart of the relations between Romania
and Moldova, and the ‘confusion’ as to the nature of the Moldovan identity is to a
certain extent still present today. It can partly explain the ups and downs of Roma-
nia’s relations with Moldova since 1991, when the latter became an independent
country. Romania was the first country to recognize Moldova’s independence and
it soon started referring to it as a ‘Romanian state’. These types of declarations
were followed by many other symbolic gestures which suggested the possibility of
reunification. 
The reunification itself never materialized, though, due to domestic (i.e. eco-
nomic costs) and international reasons (i.e. Romania’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations).
However, the possibility of reunification led to dramatic consequences. In the
words of V.G. Baleanu, ‘it is no secret that the Transnistrian leaders expertly play
the card of their opposition to Moldova’s possible unification with Romania’
(Baleanu, 2000: 14). The possibility of reunification made Moldova’s national mi-
norities very uncomfortable and led to the ‘hot’ war of Transnistria at the beginning
of the 1990s, and the resulting ‘frozen conflict’ is still being perpetuated today. Af-
ter the Transnistrian war, Romania participated in the four-party peace talks, but it
withdrew from the talks in 1993, after its relations with Moldova were severed
(Ivan, 2009: 123). 
The question of identity affected not just the talks about a possible reunification
but more general relations between Moldova and Romania. In 1992, when the two
countries negotiated a basic treaty, they could not agree on what to call it or on
how to define the nature of the relations (whether they are ‘brotherly’ or ‘neigh-
borly’). In the 1990s, as Moldova constitutionally stipulated that Moldovan is its
state language, and Romania released strong declarations criticizing Moldova’s for-
eign relations, Moldova began to visibly detach itself from the politics of the ‘two
Romanian states’ (Ivan, 2009: 123–124). Consequently, when President Ion Iliescu
addressed the Moldovan Parliament, he called the Romanian-Moldovan relations
‘special, privileged’ and said that they were a matter of priority, but he made no ref-
erence to the ‘two Romanian states’ at that point (President Iliescu’s speech, 5 July
1996).
The so-called ‘privileged relationship’ between Romania and Moldova concrete-
ly amounts to no more than an engagement on Romania’s side to promote Moldo-
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va’s integration efforts alongside its own (Baleanu, 2000: 19). Indeed, in a recent
interview with the Romanian newspaper Adevarul, President Basescu declared that
considering the contemporary circumstances, it is not ‘realistic’ to talk about a pos-
sible reunification between Romania and Moldova (Adevarul, September 16, 2011).
When it became clear that the reunification was no longer in the cards, Romania
expressed its support for an ‘open door’ policy of EU enlargement and suggested
that the two countries could ‘reunite in the EU’ (President Basescu’s speech, July 1,
2006).
A sign of the delicate nature of the relations between Romania and Moldova is
the fact that the two countries have been unable to sign a basic treaty. One such
treaty was negotiated and finalized in 2000, but the Romanian Prime Minister Adri-
an Nastase decided not to sign it at the last minute. He justified his decision based
on the fact that there were ‘no disputes’ between the two countries (Ivan, 2009:
134). However, the timing of this treaty speaks of the importance of the Euro-At-
lantic integration: it coincided with some progress being made in Romania’s path
to EU accession and Moldova’s desire to deepen its relations with the EU (Baleanu,
2000: 19). Several years later, Prime Minister Nastase declared that Romania’s Eu-
ropean integration did not mean that it would abandon the territories that used to
belong to it (Nastase quoted in Teodorescu, 2004: 183).
It was Romania’s membership in the EU that brought to the surface another very
sensitive issue in the relations between the two countries – dual citizenship. The
Russian media in Chisinau presented this issue as ‘the tacit assimilation of Moldo-
va by Romania’ (Baleanu, 2000: 18). Romania’s dual citizenship law was mostly
adopted to ‘soften the blow’ of Romania’s EU membership for the freedom of
movement between the two countries. Romania’s accession to the EU meant that
it had to introduce visas for Moldovan citizens – who until then did not even need
a passport to travel to the country. To make the situation easier for Moldovans, the
dual citizenship law made it possible for qualified Moldovans to obtain Romanian
citizenship, but it also meant that Moldovans could now travel visa-free in the
Schengen space. This law was met with protests from other EU member states. Ro-
manian officials responded that the law respected international obligations, and
that Romanian citizenship was granted on a case-by-case basis. It was estimated
that 17,000 Moldovans acquired Romanian citizenship in the first half of 2010 (Eu-
ractiv, 16 August 2010). On a parallel track, negotiations between the EU and
Moldova, led in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
launched in 2003, also helped with the freedom of movement. In October 2007,
the EU and Moldova signed an agreement on visa facilitation on the basis of which
Romania could grant free visas to Moldovan citizens. Moldova is currently imple-
menting the visa liberalization action plan, which should result in visa free travel for
Moldovan citizens. 
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The year 2009 put additional strains on the relations between Romania and
Moldova. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin accused Romania of trying to
overthrow his government and of wanting to annex Moldova in the aftermath of
the protests following the parliamentary elections in April (Euractiv, 9 April 2009).
But the coming to power of the current pro-European Moldovan government has
dissipated some of the tensions with Romania. More rational reasons could also ex-
plain the tense relations between Romania and Moldova, though. In 2011 work on
a gas pipeline between Romania and Moldova began. Discussions about this
pipeline date back to 2007, but the January 2008 gas crisis accelerated the nego-
tiations. The pipeline should help Moldova’s energy security. Symbolically enough,
this project is partly funded by EU money as part of the border cooperation pro-
gram between Romania and Moldova (Hotnews, April 26, 2011).
In terms of economic relations, trade between the two countries has generally
increased since the beginning of the twenty first century, although the trade rela-
tions suffered from the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, while in 2002 trade between the
two countries amounted to almost $200 million, this figure rose to over $1.1 billion
in 2008 and fell to $700 million in 2009. What characterizes this trade dynamics is
the predominance of Romania’s exports to its eastern neighbor. In 2009 there were
650 Romanian companies registered in Moldova, which invested approximately
$68 million in the country (Ambasada Romaniei la Chisinau). According to the
Moldovan Ministry of Economy and Trade, Romania ranked in the top ten foreign
investors in Moldova between 1994–2008, with €38.8 million in investments (Min-
istry of Economy and Trade of the Republic of Moldova). Romania pledged €100m
in aid for Moldova for the period 2011–2014, split into four equal parts. However,
as of May 2011 Romania only donated $7m out of the $25m promised for 2011 –
a fact which can be partly explained by the country’s lack of experience as a donor
(Balkan Insight, 24 May 2011). In other words, Romania is trying to match its polit-
ical declarations with concrete policy and economic measures, although it still
needs to make much progress on this front.
RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE
Relations between Romania and Ukraine were also not very positive immediately af-
ter the Romanian revolution, and their problematic state was foreshadowed by the
two countries’ mutual distrust before the revolution (Baleanu, 2000: 20). The fall of
the Soviet Union brought to the forefront territorial disputes, the issue of the pro-
tection of Romanian minorities in the country’s bigger neighbor and the condem-
nation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Credit for positive progress in the relations
should be partly given to the prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration. As part of Ro-
mania’s bid for NATO accession, it had to have basic treaties with all its neighbors.
Hence, in June 1997, just weeks before the NATO Madrid Summit, where it was to
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be decided whether the organization would open its doors to Romania, the coun-
try signed a treaty with Ukraine. Romanian public opinion was deeply divided over
this signature between those who saw it as a necessary step toward acceding to NA-
TO and those who saw it as ‘historical treason’ against Romania’s reunification ide-
al (Ivan, 2009: 128). The treaty recognized the borders of the Romanian-Soviet
treaty of 1961 (whereby territories that were previously parts of Romania and that
had substantial Romanian populations were recognized as belonging the Soviet
Union), but Romania managed to include Article 1201 of the Council of Europe on
the treatment of minorities in the treaty (Ivan, 2009: 129). However, the treaty did
not solve the issue of territorial waters or the continental plateau.
President Constantinescu paid an official visit to Ukraine in May 1999, which
was the first official visit of a Romanian president to this country. During a press
conference, he declared that an independent, sovereign and powerful Ukraine is
in Romania’s national interest (Baleanu, 2000: 22). After the signature of the treaty,
Romania and Ukraine continued negotiations on a settlement over Snake Island. A
17 hectare piece of land in front of the Sulina arm of the River Danube, this island
became part of Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. Agreement on whether
Snake Island was inhabited or not was critical for exploration and drilling rights in
the Black Sea, as this area was believed to be rich in oil reserves (Baleanu, 2000:
21). Because the two countries could not reach an agreement on their own, Ro-
mania brought this matter in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
2004, and five years later, the ICJ gave a ruling in Romania’s favor.
Although there have been other issues of tension between the two countries,
such as the Ukrainian unilateral decision to begin building the Bastroe Channel to
the Black Sea in 2004, their relations have improved. Besides the territorial tensions
and the treatment of national minorities, relations between the two countries are
generally good. For example, Romania has been a strong supporter of Ukraine’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations. During the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania
supported Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) membership bids.
The Orange Revolution of 2004 engendered much sympathy in Romania. How-
ever, Romania itself was absorbed in its own national elections at this time. After
the first round of elections Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana expressed his con-
cerns about their fairness (Amos News, 24 November 2004). Conversely, on 28
December the newly elected Romanian President Traian Basescu congratulated
Viktor Yushchenko on his electoral victory and expressed Romania’s commitment
to good neighborly relations, given Romania’s position as ‘a neighbor and NATO
member’ (MAE, 2011).
Contemporary economic relations between the two countries are good – but,
just like in the case of Moldova, they have suffered from the impact of the world
economic crisis in 2008. Consequently, while in 2008 the trade relations totaled
Perspectives02_11_text7:PERSPECTIVES  16.12.2011  11:08  Page 134    (Black/Black plate)
ROMANIA’S NEW EASTERN PERSPECTIVES?
135Perspectives      Vol. 19, No. 2      2011
over $1.9 billion, they totaled only $813 million in 2009 – but with a positive trend
since then (in 2010 the total figure of trade relations was over $1.4 billion). As of
31 December 2010, Romania had invested $11.8 million in Ukraine, ranking 52nd in
the list of top contributors of foreign direct investments to Ukraine (MAE, 2011). In
other words, Romania does not distinguish itself among the trading partners of and
investors in the country. This is certainly a reflection of Romania’s economic inter-
ests and considerations, but also of a certain level of its political distrust of – and,
hence, its insufficient political solidarity with – Ukraine. 
CHAMPIONS OF THE BLACK SEA AREA CAUSE?
Romania’s geopolitical influence in the Black Sea region results from its control of
the Danube Delta and its channels (4,200 km) and approximately 245 km of the
sea shore and the corresponding territorial waters. At present, Romania is at-
tempting to promote its own vision of Black Sea cooperation, guided by and in
connection with the objectives of NATO and the EU (Ionescu, 2006: 373). How-
ever, the precise shape of this vision remains to be defined. As noted above, im-
mediately after 1989 Romania’s Western orientation was not a given. The country
turned its attention towards the East, and its first consultations on Black Sea coop-
eration began in 1990 with Bulgaria, Turkey and the Soviet Union (Ivan, 2009: 118).
After its ‘Euro-Atlantic consensus’, Romania started to look at and present the Black
Sea region as one of the geostrategic interests of the transatlantic community.
When addressing the U.S. Congress in 1998, President Constantinescu said that his
country wanted to be ‘an anchor of stability in South-Eastern Europe’ (President
Constantinescu’s speech, 15 July 1998). At the NATO summit in Vienna he em-
phasized the role Romania would continue to play for regional cooperation and
stability in the interest of the transatlantic community (President Constantinescu’s
speech, 21 June 1998).
Historically, initiatives of regional cooperation in the Black Sea region date back
to the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century (Maior,
2002: 115). Cooperation in the Black Sea region has flourished in the twentieth and
twenty first centuries, ranging from the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organi-
zation, the Conference of the Balkan State Foreign Ministers (Balkan Multilateral
Cooperation), the Process of Stability and Good Neighborly Relations in South-
Eastern Europe, the South-East European Cooperation Initiative, and the Stability
Pact for South-East Europe to forms of military cooperation such as BLACK-
SEAFOR, MPFSEE and CENCOOP (Maior, 2002: 116). So far, the main forms of re-
gional integration in the Black Sea area have all been led by other regional actors,
such as Turkey (the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and BLACK-
SEAFOR) and Ukraine (GUAM). In 2007, the European Union launched its own ini-
tiative for the region, the Black Sea Synergy.
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In October 2006, the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and the Center for Se-
curity and International Studies (CSIS) organized an event in Washington DC on the
economic and security cooperation in the Black Sea region. On this occasion Pres-
ident Basescu gave a speech in which he called the Black Sea region ‘indispensable’
for Euro-Atlantic security and emphasized Romania’s commitment to creating a
space of stability and security in the region. In his speech, he suggested that Roma-
nia has matched its words with actions after having launched the Black Sea Border
Security Initiative (BDI) in 2004 by hosting the Center on the Initiative for South-
Eastern Cooperation (SECI). Another expression of Romania’s interest in and com-
mitment to the region was the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF)
in 2006, which was meant to complement existing initiatives and forms of organi-
zation in the region by providing an informal platform for communication. Further-
more, President Basescu emphasized the energy security dimension represented by
the Black Sea region, which at the time provided 50% of the European gas supplies
– and he also took the opportunity to warn against the Russian energy monopoly
and its consequences for Europe. Furthermore, he pledged that Romania would use
the European Neighborhood Policy to support the democratic development of the
neighboring countries (President Basescu’s speech, 31 October 2006). 
Romania’s 2007 National Security Strategy has a chapter specifically dedicated
to the Black Sea region. In it, Romania presents itself as a ‘dynamic vector of demo-
cratic security and stability, as well as economic prosperity’, which has ‘a funda-
mental strategic interest in the wider Black Sea region being stable, democratic
and prosperous, and closely connected to the European and Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures’. As part of this more general interest, the document explicitly mentions the
strategic objective of ensuring a European and Euro-Atlantic engagement in the re-
gion. Far from considering this area a ‘buffer zone’ or a frontier region, Romania
looks at it as a ‘strategically important connector’ for the Euro-Atlantic community
(Strategia Nationala de Securitate, 2007: 32, author’s translation).
No matter what initiatives are undertaken in the Black Sea area, Russia remains
a dominant player there (Ionescu, 2006: 365). Most recently, Romania’s attempts
at mending relations with Russia were followed by a worsening of diplomatic rela-
tions between the two countries. For example, in September 2005, in an address
to a group of the Romanian diaspora, President Basescu said that the Black Sea
should not be turned into a ‘Russian lake’ and argued that Russia was trying to
achieve that because it is afraid of the internationalization of conflicts (9AM News,
17 September 2005). Also, in 2006, Basescu accused Russia of using the monopoly
on gas supplies that it has over Europe as a tool to preclude European cooperation
in the Black Sea region (9AM News, 2 November 2006).
For Romania, the Black Sea region represents not just an area for the consolida-
tion of Europe’s energy security, but also an area for the resolution of the so-called
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‘frozen conflicts’. This is a cause to which the current Romanian presidency is in-
creasingly committed. Its actions in this respect range from attempts to re-engage
in the Transnistria peace talks to the refusal to recognize the independence of Abk-
hazia and South Ossetia. The declarations made by President Basescu on the res-
olution of the Nagorno-Kharabak conflict were based on the principle of territorial
integrity and minority protection, but the declarations were met by Armenian
protests (Gandul, April 20, 2011). Indeed, one of the reasons why Romania gave
only a lukewarm welcome to the Eastern Partnership (EaP), launched in 2009 un-
der the Czech EU presidency, was because it saw it as distracting attention from
the Black Sea region. As evident from official speeches made before the creation
of the EaP, Romania had been a strong supporter of the ‘ENP+’ and the creation of
an Eastern policy of the EU that would include a component for the resolution of
the ‘frozen conflicts’ (Ungureanu, 2008: 57).
Romania has also been a strong supporter of the Black Sea Synergy, the 2007 EU
initiative to enhance regional cooperation with the countries in the Black Sea area
(European Commission, 11 April 2007). Interestingly enough, the rapporteur for
Romania in the German Bundestag criticized Romania for not being more involved
in the elaborating process of the Synergy. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
replied that they were happy with the results because they reflected the Romanian
approach to the region (Euractiv, 12 April 2007). Together with the European Com-
mission, Romania also helped elaborate the Black Sea Environmental Partnership,
which was launched in March 2010. All in all, though, despite official declarations,
the Synergy has made limited progress. It has even been suggested that ‘it is now
almost dead’ as the EaP initiative seems to be developing more (Najšlova, 2010:
34). Romania is also calling for a clear implementation of the differentiating princi-
ples of the Black Sea Synergy and the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Part-
nership (MAE, 2011). 
CONCLUSIONS
Through a selection of speeches, declarations and policy analyses, this article has
shown that contemporary Romania has been in search of its Eastern vocation. Not
since the Middle Ages has the country identified with the values of Eastern Europe
and felt like it belonged there. Since the nineteenth century, the country has adopt-
ed a form of self-identification that brought it closer to Western Europe. This self-
perception helped it reach the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ consensus after 1989 and made it
want to ‘return to Europe’. The consensus and the role of the Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions have helped consolidate Romania’s liberal-democratic political identity post-
1989, which, in its turn, helped enhance its relations with its neighborhood. How-
ever, this form of solidarity was generally limited to a ‘normalization’ of relations
through the signing of status treaties settling territorial disputes and the status of
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minorities (as shown in the analysis of the country’s relations with Ukraine). So far,
Romania has not expressed a form of political solidarity that would lead to closer
regional cooperation in the Eastern neighborhood. So, while the Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration helped Romania institutionalize its forms of interaction with other coun-
tries, it was not sufficient to make it search for a deeper level of cooperation with
other countries in the region. To put it bluntly, Romania is not a part of a group like
the Visegrad cooperation, and even the forms of cooperation it participates in in
the Black Sea region – including the one Romania itself proposed, the Black Sea
Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF) – are fairly loose and informal. 
At the same time, Romania’s historical identity lies at the basis of its relations
with Moldova. As shown in the relevant section analysing their relations, immedi-
ately after 1989 this historical identity manifested itself in a form of solidarity with
Moldova that even went so far as to suggest a reunification of the two countries.
But various different considerations that went beyond identitarian reasons led to a
different outcome. Ironically, it appears that historical identity has actually compli-
cated relations between the two countries, as Romania was unable to sign a treaty
with the other country – unlike in the case of its relations with Ukraine. In a more
recent development, though, Romania’s accession to the EU has opened a new
possibility – that of a ‘reunification’ of Romania and Moldova in the EU, which
mostly translates into Romania’s support for Moldova’s Euro-Atlantic path.
The two policy issues that Romania has been attempting to bring to the Euro-
pean level have been Moldova and the Black Sea region. The issues at stake are
varied, ranging from peace and stability in the region to the resolution of the so-
called ‘frozen conflicts’ and energy security. So far, limited progress has been
achieved on both fronts. Romania lacks the foreign policy experience and the do-
mestic conditions to successfully ‘upload’ these issues on the EU agenda while the
EU itself does not have a unified policy on these foreign policy issues. Individual
member states have different interests, while other actors in the region (e.g. Russia
and Turkey) carry their own foreign policy agendas. However, Romania is at the be-
ginning of its road and, as it has proved since 1989, it is a fast-learner that could
use its traditional negotiation and adaptation skills to engage more successfully
with the Eastern neighborhood.
ENDNOTES
1 The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and sugges-
tions.
2 All the presidential speeches quoted in the text are available online at www.presidency.ro. The trans-
lations of parts of these speeches from Romanian in the text have been made by the author. 
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A Limited Priority: 
Hungary and the Eastern 
Neighbourhood
ANDRÁS RÁCZ1
Abstract: The broader Eastern European region plays only a limited role in Hungarian foreign policy.
Hungarian foreign policy focuses only on two of the six countries of Eastern Europe, na-
mely on Ukraine and Moldova. Azerbaijan, as a third Eastern European country in the Hun-
garian foreign policy, is only present there due to energy security-related considerations.
This prioritization is well reflected in the Hungarian diplomatic presence in the region,
and also in the bilateral development assistance cooperation. However, Budapest is
eager to strengthen and contribute to multilateral institutions and cooperation forums
that are active in the region, such as the Visegrad Cooperation, the Eastern Partnership,
and the Danube Strategy. This preference for multilateral activities is also connected to
Hungary’s serious shortage of financial resources, which indeed limits its bilateral acti-
ons. All in all, the Hungarian foreign policy towards Eastern Europe is dominantly moti-
vated by rational considerations, while the concept of solidarity can be applied to this
case only to a limited extent.
Key words: Hungary, Post-Soviet Region, Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Eastern Partnership, Vi-
segrad Cooperation, identity
This paper intends to give an overview on the foreign policy of Hungary towards
Eastern Europe2 in the post-1989 period by using an approach focusing on the role
of identity. In general, identity plays an important role in a nation state’s foreign
policy, though there are wide debates among various scholars about the exact in-
terpretation of this role. Following the definition given in the introductory chapter
of this special issue, the author will use the categories of first and second order
identities in the overview. First order identity refers to a certain political order. It is
based on a set of political norms that are accepted by all mainstream actors of the
domestic political community. First order identity may originate from both domes-
tic evolution and outside influence. For example, in the East Central Europe (ECE)
region the process of ‘Europeanization’ has significantly changed domestic politi-
cal landscapes and also the norms and institutions of policy-making, including for-
eign policy. However, besides these fundamental norms, history also plays a role in
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a nation’s identity in the form of various narratives and widely agreed (or dis-
agreed) upon interpretations of the nation’s past. These elements are what is re-
ferred to as the nation’s second order identity. The distinction between self and
other, in terms of both first and second order identities, has a key influence on the
definition of a nation state’s foreign policy. 
The link between identity and concrete national foreign policy is studied in this pa-
per through the lens of solidarity. Solidarity here is meant as a mirror expression of
first and/or second order identities. In terms of foreign policy, in many cases it ex-
presses a belonging to various elements of the self that are abroad, let they be his-
torical, ideological or ethnic ones. Solidarity may also be defined against a certain
other that fundamentally differs from the self. In the Hungarian case the solidarity felt
towards some ethnic elements of the self – namely towards the Hungarians living in
the neighbouring countries – has been of key importance for Hungarian foreign pol-
icy since 1989. On the other hand, the titular nationalities of the neighbouring coun-
tries (e.g. Slovaks, Romanians, etc.) are often perceived as others, while their ethnic
difference from the Hungarians living in these countries is taken into account.
The main research questions which the paper seeks to answer are the following.
First, what is the role of first and second order identity elements in the foreign policy
of Hungary towards Eastern Europe? To what extent can the Hungarian foreign poli-
cy towards Eastern Europe be described by using the concepts of solidarity and iden-
tity? Second, are there any other motivations that shape this policy? These two ques-
tions lead to the third one: Which countries are the prioritized countries of the Hun-
garian Eastern policy? In order to answer these questions, the paper discusses not on-
ly the historical connections of Hungary with Eastern Europe, but also the develop-
ment of the Hungarian Eastern policy in the light of key governmental documents on
foreign policy since 1989. The practical implementation of the Hungarian foreign pol-
icy is then analysed by studying the diplomatic presence in the region and the relat-
ed development aid activities in order to define the prioritized countries. 
Most of the sources used for the article are official documents, either those that
were issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1989 or those that are related to
the Hungarian EU presidency of 2011. Besides these, several speeches and declara-
tions of leading politicians are also taken into account. In addition, the article also
examines some articles that were published in scientific journals and periodicals and
written by prominent Hungarian politicians and/or diplomats before and during the
EU presidency. This dominance of primary sources is a consequence of the relative
lack of secondary ones. Modern Hungarian foreign policy in general is surprisingly
under-researched, even in terms of publications in the Hungarian language. Beside
some academic articles, the publications by Dunay and Zellner (1998) and Gazdag
and Kiss (2004) represent the notable exceptions to this lack. Questions of the Hun-
garian foreign policy identity remain even more under-researched by the domestic
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scientific community. Though in the early 2000s a series of three books was pub-
lished by the Teleki László Foundation, and one of these dealt specifically with the
foreign policy identities of countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Kiss, 2003), in-
terestingly enough, the Hungarian foreign policy identity was not discussed at all in
this volume. Furthermore, when it actually comes to studying the Hungarian foreign
policy identity, most of the scientific attention is paid to the historical shock that was
caused by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. The large loss of territory and population is
widely studied by many authors, for example, by Romsics (2001) and Pritz and
Gergely (1998). However, it remains difficult to find academic publications on the
role of Eastern Europe in the Hungarian foreign policy identity.
The paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part the Hungarian foreign
policy identity is discussed in a historical context. The second part studies the con-
cepts and objectives of the Hungarian neighbourhood policy towards Eastern Eu-
rope. Finally, the third part deals with certain concrete aspects of implementing the
Hungarian foreign policy in Eastern Europe. 
THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY
AND EASTERN EUROPE
This part gives an overview of the construction elements of the Hungarian foreign
policy identity towards Eastern Europe. The main argument here is that Hungary
does not have any historical or minority-related elements in its secondary identity
that would particularly connect Hungary to Eastern Europe. In accord with the in-
troductory chapter of this special issue, the relationship with Russia is touched up-
on only marginally.
‘EASTERN WINDS’ – THE CURRENT HUNGARIAN CONCEPT
OF THE EAST
In Hungarian foreign policy thinking, the general term ‘East’ (Kelet in Hungarian)
lacks a widely agreed upon meaning. There is not a single interpretation of the
‘Eastern’ – including Eastern Europe – in Hungarian foreign policy thinking that
would be similar to the Polish ‘Kresy’. When Hungarian officials and analysts speak
about the ‘East’, this may mean any country from Russia to China, or from Turkey
to India. Each and every time the word is used, a separate definition needs to be
given first in order to specify the actual meaning of the ‘East’ in the given context.
All in all, the ‘East’ in Hungarian discourse lacks a particular concrete definition and
may mean practically anything from Ukraine to Japan.
However, in some cases Russia is definitely counted as a country that belongs to
the ‘East’ in the Hungarian discourse. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in power since
May 2010, has declared several times that ‘Eastern winds are blowing in the world
economy’ (Orbán, 2010). As he explained, in terms of Hungarian foreign policy this
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means that Budapest has to intensify her foreign relations with the Eastern coun-
tries, including Russia, China, Japan, South Korea and also Central Asia. The strate-
gic aim behind this idea is to intensify Hungarian foreign trade with these large
partners and also to attract investments from them. (Orbán, 2011) Orbán used the
explicit term of ‘Opening up towards the East’ (keleti nyitás) in Paris in May 2011.
This opening up towards the East also includes plans to intensify relations with
Azerbaijan and open an embassy in Uzbekistan, and frequent visits of Hungarian
high officials to China. Thus, the term ‘Eastern winds’ is, of course, much wider than
the Eastern neighbourhood itself is. 
In this policy-related case the Hungarian concept of the ‘East’ indeed includes
Russia as well. Therefore one may come to the conclusion that it is the Western
borders of the Hungarian concept of the ‘East’ that are uncertain. The current gov-
ernment, just like the previous ones, categorizes Russia as an important partner in
the opening-up efforts; consequently Russia belongs to the East. But the Hungari-
an government is often selective about which Eastern neighbours belong in the
‘East’ as, for example, Ukraine, a direct Eastern neighbour, is hardly ever mentioned
in this ‘Eastern winds’ context.
LIMITED COMMITMENT TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE
Besides the lack of a unified understanding of the East in general, in the case of
Hungary, there is no lasting, historically motivated commitment towards the East-
ern European region like in the case of Poland, as the the Polish polityka wschod-
nia (Eastern policy) originates from Poland’s commitment to Eastern Europe. Hun-
gary has no elements in her second order identity that would connect Budapest to
Eastern Europe. There are practically no shared meanings of history, constitutional
practices and institutions between Hungary and this region. If Hungary has such
ties at all, they are mostly with the Western Balkans region. 
The main reasons of this particular identity are historical and geographical. Nei-
ther the Kingdom of Hungary in the Middle Ages nor the Hungary of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire had any significant ambitions or even a clear strategic vision for
the region now called the ‘Eastern neighbourhood’. The peaks of the North-East-
ern and Eastern Carpathian Mountains have proved to be a firm and stable border
that separated Hungary from the East for centuries. Even after the Ottoman armies
were pushed out of the country in the early 18th century, the Habsburg Empire, to
which Hungary became subordinated, had the Balkans as the main direction of her
Eastern policy, and not Eastern Europe (Romsics, 2007).
Hungary’s minority-related connections are also weak. Following the end of the
First World War, Hungary lost two thirds of her territory and one third of her popu-
lation. Approximately 2,5 million ethnic Hungarians became citizens of other coun-
tries (Romsics, 2001). Since then, a new dimension has emerged in Hungarian for-
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eign policy – the commitment to the national minorities living abroad. This dimen-
sion has always been present in the Hungarian foreign policy thinking and identity
since then, though with varying intensity (Kiss, 2007). Minority policy has been a key
element in the foreign policy identity of the modern, democratic Hungary. 
However, since there are no Hungarian minorities living east of the Carpathians,
this strong minority dimension has not helped when it came to Hungary’s need to
form a comprehensive foreign policy commitment towards Eastern Europe. The only
(partial) exception to this pattern is Ukraine, due to the small Hungarian minority that
lives in the Trans-Carpathian (Zakarpattya) region (approx. 150.000 Hungarians).
In this aspect, the Hungarian case significantly differs from the Polish and Baltic
ones, as neither a shared history nor minority-related issues connect Hungary
strongly to the post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Budapest’s view of Eastern Europe is
that ‘it is different from us.’ Russia, as the most important Eastern other, defines the
Hungarian Eastern policy by moderating it, as the intention not to alienate Russia
limits the Hungarian activities toward the East. The key factors that shape Hun-
gary’s Russia policy are well discussed in the book A Power Audit of EU-Russia Re-
lations (Leonard and Popescu, 2007). However, as this study is focused on the
Hungarian foreign policy towards Eastern Europe, the relationship with Russia is
not going to be discussed here in detail.
It should also be mentioned that Romania is a different type of other in the context
of the Hungarian foreign policy towards Moldova. Hungary has supported those po-
litical forces in Moldova that are pushing for the independence of the country, and
thus for decreasing the Romanian dominance there (Bába, 1994)3. As we will see,
though, this Hungarian attitude was originally motivated by the minority-related
problems between Budapest and Bucharest in the 1990s, as supporting Moldovan
pro-independence forces was a tool for putting pressure on Romania (ibid.). 
THE HUNGARIAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE: CONCEPTS AND
OBJECTIVES
This part focuses on Hungary’s discourse on its neighbourhood policy, which will
be examined together with the relevant strategic documents from the pre-acces-
sion era.
THE HUNGARIAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TOWARDS
EASTERN EUROPE 1990–2004
Following the transition in 1989, the new Hungary has defined her foreign policy
along three main pillars. These were 1) the Euro-Atlantic integration, 2) good rela-
tions with the neighbouring countries, and 3) responsibility towards the Hungarian
minorities living abroad (Hungarian Government, 1990). Some experts argue that
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the first government, though it made important steps towards the Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration of the country, failed to realize how strongly the three priorities were in-
terconnected. Thus minority policy became an absolute priority between 1990 and
1993 (Dunay, 2004). In terms of identity and foreign policy shaping, in this period
the promotion of minority-related norms dominated the Hungarian foreign policy
towards Slovakia, Ukraine and Romania. Yugoslavia was, of course, a different
case, as there the Hungarian priorities quickly shifted from minority rights promo-
tion to a highly securitized discourse.
In the first years after 1989, the Hungarian foreign and security policy was gener-
ally quite securitized. The most important reason for this was the Yugoslav civil war
that went on right in the Southern neighbourhood of Hungary. The instability of
Ukraine in the East and the security challenges of the Russian transition (the coup
d’état effort of August 1991, the October 1993 crisis, etc.) also contributed to the
need of securitization, together with the violent Romanian transition and the peace-
ful Czechoslovak transition. The unstable regional environment was well reflected in
detail in the Parliamentary Decree 11/1993 (III. 12.) on the principles of Hungarian
security policy (Hungarian Parliament, 1993). Without mentioning any country con-
cretely, the document named the main challenges of regional security at the time,
such as the dissolution of federal states, inter-ethnic conflicts, the development prob-
lems of the newly born democracies, the unsettled situation of ethnic minorities, etc. 
In the Soviet times Budapest had established institutionalized diplomatic rela-
tions only with Moscow, while its contacts with the other Soviet Socialist Republics
were very limited. Thus after the Soviet dissolution, Hungary’s relations with the
other newly independent countries of Eastern Europe had to be built up practical-
ly from scratch.
The priority countries then were Ukraine, a direct neighbour of Hungary, and, to
a smaller extent, the Republic of Moldova (Bába, 1994). Supporting the stability of
Ukraine has been in the forefront of the Hungarian foreign policy ever since the
break-up of the Soviet Union. There were both security and value-based motives
behind this attention paid to Kyiv. Budapest strived to ensure the peaceful political
transition of Ukraine, and also to foster the protection of the Hungarian minorities
living in the Zakarpattya region of Ukraine. The agreement on the mutual protec-
tion of national minorities was signed already on 31 May 1991, when Ukraine was
still an entity that belonged to the Soviet Union. The Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic
Treaty was signed in the same year on 6 December (SVKI Institute, 1999).
Hungary established diplomatic relations with Moldova in 1992, and in the same
year an embassy was opened in Chisinau. Following the end of the Moldovan civ-
il war, Hungarian-Moldovan relations started to develop rapidly because of two
main reasons. First, in Moldova the pro-independence political forces were inter-
ested in counter-balancing the influence of Romania, and Hungary seemed to be
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an ideal partner for this when taking into account the tensions in the Hungarian-
Romanian relations during the 1990s over the rights of the Hungarian minority in
Romania. Second, as explained by the well-known analyst and politician Iván Bába,
Hungary was interested in fostering the relations to Moldova in order to counter-
balance her bilateral tensions with Romania (Bába, 1994). According to Bába, Bu-
dapest intended to demonstrate that the problems with Romania were not based
on any historical aversions to Romanians in general, and that they were rather
about concrete questions. Thus Hungary’s good relations with the Romanian-
speaking Moldova were, in a way, the result of the Hungarian-Romanian tensions.
The political situation of today is, of course, fundamentally different than the one
of the early 1990s. Contemporary Hungary is interested in and pushing for the pro-
European reforms in Moldova. Budapest supports Moldovan administrative and ju-
diciary reforms, provides transformation experience to Chisinau, and, in general,
encourages the Europeanization of the country. However, one may say that Bu-
dapest expresses solidarity towards Moldova because it is still interested in keep-
ing Moldova in a state in which it perceives Romania as an other rather than a self. 
In general, Hungary paid very limited attention to the other countries of Eastern
Europe. Diplomatic relations with them were established in 1991–1992, but be-
sides a few mid-level visits, practically no progress was made in this respect during
the early nineties. This was mostly due to the fact that while the Hungarian foreign
policy was looking westwards, concentrating on the NATO and EU integration, the
countries of Eastern Europe oriented themselves mostly towards the East, that is, to-
wards Russia. According to a Hungarian diplomat, this period could be character-
ized as one of mutual indifference: ‘We were not interested in them, and they were
not interested in us. None of us were interested in the other too much.’4
Besides this, Hungary’s foreign policy towards the broader Eastern Europe al-
ways had certain limits. The first limit has been the sheer lack of resources. This
means not only shortages of funding, but also shortages of trained personnel and
infrastructure, and a lack of knowledge. However, theoretically all these shortages
could be reduced or eliminated, though a lasting political commitment would be
necessary. Embassies could be opened or strengthened, new experts and diplo-
mats could be trained or redirected, etc. Nevertheless, there has also been anoth-
er limiting factor in the relations – Russia.
Regarding the role of Russia, in the Hungarian case Moscow is not the other
against which the Hungarian Eastern policy is defined. It is actually the opposite:
Moscow is an other whose opinion has always been taken into account while the
Eastern foreign policy of Budapest was being formulated. In other words, Hungar-
ian foreign policy actions towards Eastern Europe have a specific de facto prereq-
uisite to fulfill: not to alienate Moscow too much. This is particularly true in the light
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of the ‘opening up towards the East’ policy of the current government, which was
mentioned earlier. 
The above mentioned policy of indifference toward the countries of Eastern Eu-
rope started to change with the NATO-integration of Hungary. In 1997, when Hun-
gary got invited to accede to NATO, Hungary started to declare that the Euro-At-
lantic integration of all the neighbouring countries was in the essential interest of
Hungary (SVKI Institute, 1999). However, the still low general importance of the
whole Eastern Europe for Hungarian foreign policy was well documented in the
parliamentary decree nb. 94/1998 (XII. 29.) on the principles of Hungarian securi-
ty and defense policy (Hungarian Parliament, 1998). The document stated that ‘be-
sides the Euro-Atlantic integration, Hungarian foreign policy focuses on the neigh-
bourhood policy and the wellbeing of Hungarian minorities abroad’ (Hungarian Par-
liament, 1998). This meant that out of the six countries of post-Soviet Eastern Eu-
rope, only Ukraine was present on the screen of the Hungarian foreign policy,
while the others were not mentioned at all. However, in the case of Ukraine, a cer-
tain solidarity-related element was present, namely the reference to the well-being
of the Hungarian minorities there.
The new National Security Strategy adopted in 2004 – thus already after the NA-
TO- and EU-accessions – did not change this situation significantly. Regarding East-
ern Europe, it was declared in the document that ‘We consider the situation of Rus-
sia and Ukraine as of crucial importance from the point of view of security in the re-
gion and are therefore particularly interested in the stability of these two states and
in the advancement of their democratic reforms, as well as in the success of their
economic and social modernization processes’ (Hungarian MFA, 2004). One may
note that in this particular case, Russia was included in the definition of Eastern Eu-
rope yet again. About Ukraine the strategy specifically stated that ‘Hungary has an
interest in the successful socioeconomic transformation of an independent and
democratic Ukraine’ (ibid.). However, neither Moldova nor Belarus was mentioned
in the document at all. The South Caucasus was addressed only in a very general-
izing way, basically by listing the security-related problems of the region, while
none of its countries were concretely mentioned. Generally speaking, the Nation-
al Security Strategy of 2004 used a security-based and thus rather functional ap-
proach towards Eastern Europe, with not much presence of any solidarity element.
HUNGARIAN AND EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN THE
POST-ENLARGEMENT CONTEXT: PARTIALLY OVERLAPPING
PRIORITIES
Compared to the pre-2004 period, since the EU accession Hungary has signifi-
cantly intensified its presence and activities in Eastern Europe. The EU accession of-
fered Hungary the chance to become a policy maker, and thus to depart from the
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pre-accession position of a policy taker. This applied also to the neighbourhood
policy dimension. However, the priorities of the European Neighbourhood Policy
and those of the Hungarian neighbourhood policy were only partially overlapping.
While the EU promoted the relationship with both the wider Eastern and the South-
ern Neighbourhood, the Hungarian neighbourhood policy focused on the inte-
gration of Romania and Croatia, and when it came to the Eastern neighbourhood,
it focused only on the reforms conducted in Ukraine and Moldova (Kiss, 2007). 
However, even this post-accession transformation did not start immediately.
Several analysts point out that the Hungarian foreign policy became passive for a
while following the EU accession (Dunay, 2006): the main primary goal was
achieved by 1 May 2004, and the question remained how to go on, make foreign
policy in the European Union, and contribute to the European Neighbourhood
Policy in particular.
The already mentioned National Security Strategy from 2004 concretely named
the opportunity to use the European Neighbourhood Policy for supporting the
Hungarian objectives in Eastern Europe, though interestingly enough, this concept
of Eastern Europe included not only Ukraine, but also Russia (Hungarian MFA,
2004). One has to keep in mind that when this strategy was drafted in 2003, only
the ‘Wider Europe’ concept was planned, and the concept also included Russia (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2003).
As a reaction to the changed environment, the first Gyurcsány government, in
office in 2004–2006, re-shaped the three main pillars of the Hungarian foreign pol-
icy. In an interview given to the daily Népszabadság, the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ferenc Somogyi declared that the EU-accession had transformed the neigh-
bourhood policy of Hungary. As a result, the three traditional pillars of Hungarian
foreign policy also had to be modified. Here again, the minority-focus still pre-
vailed. As Minister Somogyi put it, ‘the well-planned implementation of these three
foreign policy tools may provide good chances for pursuing our political interests
and economic goals and also to realize our efforts aimed at improving the situation
of the Hungarian minority communities’ (Somogyi, 2005). Hereby an element of
solidarity could be tracked, but it applied only to the Hungarians living in the neigh-
bouring countries, and not to Eastern Europe in general. Somogyi also declared
that the geographical focus area of the Hungarian development policy should be
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Besides this, he stated that Hungary should in-
fluence the European Neighbourhood Policy, the enlargement and also the en-
gagement of the EU in the Western Balkans in such a way that these activities
would include a more effective protection of minority rights, and that infrastruc-
tural development projects should focus on the territories populated by Hungarian
minorities (Somogyi, 2005). However, regarding Eastern Europe, this approach in-
cluded only Ukraine and Moldova.
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The other four countries of Eastern Europe were still hardly present among the
foreign policy priorities of Budapest at this point. In relations with them, the unof-
ficial strategy was simply to follow the European mainstream in general, and the re-
gional player Poland in particular. For example, regarding Belarus, a background
strategy document prepared in 2007 in order to draft a new External Relations
Strategy for Hungary suggested that the Hungarian interests regarding Belarus
could be realized best by supporting the political efforts of Poland (Magyarics,
2007). Regarding the three South Caucasian countries, the same document rec-
ognized the value of the 3+3 efforts made by the Baltic States but did not make any
concrete suggestions for Hungary in this respect (Magyarics, 2007). Another back-
ground study from the same group that dealt with the neighbourhood policy dis-
cussed only the three Western countries of Eastern Europe, while the three South
Caucasian ones were only mentioned briefly without specifying any particular
Hungarian interest or action in the region.
All in all, one may well see that there are significant differences between the Hun-
garian and the EU concept of neighbourhood policy. Since the EU-accession of Ro-
mania in 2007, the Hungarian concept of neighbourhood policy applies only to
Ukraine in the East, and Serbia and Croatia in the Western Balkans. In contrast, in
the EU discourse, the countries of the Western Balkans do not belong to the neigh-
bourhood policy, while all the six states of Eastern Europe do. Thus the Hungarian
and EU concepts of the Eastern neighbourhood policy are completely overlapping
only in the case of Ukraine and partially overlapping in the case of Moldova.
The External Relations Strategy, drafted in 2007 and adopted in 2008, prescribed
that Budapest needs to ‘reinforce her presence in the Eastern partner countries of Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy’ (Hungarian MFA, 2008). Moldova and Ukraine are
concretely mentioned as countries whose integration efforts are to be supported by
Hungary. About this element, the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared,
‘We regard strengthening the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood pol-
icy as an important objective, and we regard Ukraine and Moldova as special part-
ners in doing so.’, besides stating that the Euro-Atlantic integration of the neigh-
bouring states, namely of Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine, is a key Hungarian interest
(Hungarian MFA, 2007). The strategy also uses clear wording regarding the role of
the EU in the Hungarian foreign policy: ‘The European Union is the most important
framework for Hungarian foreign policy and action’ (ibid.).
The document concretely mentions not only Ukraine, but also Moldova, stating
that ‘Hungary encourages an effective European Neighbourhood Policy, which
builds balanced relations based on co-operation and risk-handling in the eastern and
southern direction, and leaves open the opportunity for EU accession for East Euro-
pean countries, Ukraine and Moldova among them, helping their preparation by po-
litical and practical means’ (ibid.). Besides expanding the sphere of Hungarian ac-
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tivity in Eastern Europe by concretely adding Moldova to it, the document also clar-
ified the place of Russia: it was to be handled separately from Eastern Europe.
The increased level of engagement prescribed by the External Relations Strategy
was mostly connected to the influence of the EU accession, and also to the expec-
tations originating from the trans-Atlantic partnership with the United States (U.S.).
Regarding the EU, Hungary needed to contribute to the Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy and also to the ENP. Concerning the United States, fostering close bi-
lateral relations with Washington was always a definite priority for Budapest. As the
promotion of democratic values has been high on the U.S. agenda, particularly dur-
ing the two Bush administrations, it also had a prioritized role in Hungarian foreign
policy. As an analytic report prepared by the Republikon Institute think tank put it,
‘Hungary may well count on receiving European and American urges, recommenda-
tions, and sometimes even pressure to play an active, legitimating role in the future
and dedicate resources to reaching the common objectives and supporting activities
aimed at promoting and strengthening democracy and reforms’ (Dérer, 2007).
However, another report, which was written by Gergo Medve-Bálint and pre-
pared in 2010 for the CEU Center for Policy Studies, pointed out that the Hungar-
ian society in general was not very satisfied with the results of the domestic demo-
cratic transition. As a result, public interest in and support for external democracy
promotion were very low. Besides this, as the report stated in connection with the
low domestic support and also the shortage of financial resources, ‘Hungarian of-
ficials do not perceive democracy promotion as a policy that may serve the coun-
try’s interests’ (Medve-Balint, 2010). Thus one may state that the Hungarian en-
gagement in promoting certain first order identity elements (particularly democra-
cy-related ones) in the broader Eastern Europe has mainly been externally motivat-
ed. In fact, a brief look at the bilateral relations indicates that the Hungarian policy
towards the Eastern neighbourhood is more motivated by rational reasons than by
ideational ones.
IMPLEMENTATION OF HUNGARIAN FOREIGN
POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE
The implementation of the increased involvement prescribed in the External Rela-
tions Strategy started already in 2007–2008. New Hungarian embassies were
opened in Baku, Tbilisi and Minsk. In addition to this, Hungary has set up an NGO
called the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT), which deals
specifically with democracy-promotion. This NGO was Hungary’s first insitutional-
ized effort for the promotion of norms of first order identity in Eastern Europe that
are wider than the ‘traditional’ minority rights: democracy, rule of law, etc.
Besides these acts, in order to raise awareness of and increase the level of pop-
ular knowledge about Eastern Europe, a large-scale scientific research program
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that focused on the post-Soviet space was launched in 2007. The project was joint-
ly financed by the Office of the Prime Minister and the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences (HAS) and hosted by the HAS Institute of World Economics (FÁK projekt,
2007). In the framework of the project, several international workshops and con-
ferences were organized, and until now, altogether eight volumes were published
of the newly launched periodical Kelet-Európa Tanulmányok (East European Stud-
ies).
DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AND HIGH-LEVEL VISITS
To have a comprehensive look at the implementation of the Hungarian foreign pol-
icy in Eastern Europe, one needs to focus on the infrastructural background. Out of
the six Eastern European countries, five have Hungarian embassies, as Armenia is
the country that still lacks one, even though Yerevan is covered by the Tbilisi em-
bassy. However, the embassies in Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan were opened
only relatively recently (in 2008).
By far the largest number of Hungarian diplomats in Eastern Europe are working
in Ukraine. Actually Hungary was among the very first countries that recognized
the independence of Ukraine, as Hungary recognized it as early as in December
1991. Besides this, a Hungarian embassy in Kiev was opened immediately after
Ukraine gained its independence. This was achieved by upgrading the Hungarian
general consulate there to the rank of an embassy. In addition to this, Hungary op-
erates two consular representations in the Zakarpattya oblast: in Uzhgorod there is
a general consulate, while in Beregovo a consulate is operating. 
Besides Hungary’s intensive diplomatic presence in Ukraine, several high-level
visits took place between the two countries. Already in September 1990 the then
President of Hungary Árpád Göncz traveled to Ukraine, and the visit was returned
by Leonid Kravchuk in May 1991. The Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic Treaty was
signed in December 1991. Since then, all the Hungarian Presidents and practically
all the Hungarian Prime Ministers (except Péter Medgyessy and Gordon Bajnai, but
these two were in office only for a very short time) visited Ukraine, and the visits
were returned by their Ukrainian counterparts. In addition to these, ministerial and
state-secretary-level visits between the two countries have taken place very often.
Ukraine is the most important external trade partner of Hungary out of the six
countries of Eastern Europe. The Hungarian external trade turnover with Ukraine in
2010 was more than four times higher than the turnover with the other five Eastern
European countries altogether.6 Besides this, technical cooperation is also very in-
tensive between the two countries, particularly in the fields of cross-border coop-
eration, disaster management and environmental protection. All in all, these factors
well demonstrate the primary importance of Ukraine in the Hungarian Eastern pol-
icy.
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In terms of importance for the Hungarian Eastern policy, Ukraine is followed by
Moldova, concerning both the level and the duration of the Hungarian diplomatic
representation there. Since 2007 the first EU Common Application Center has
been in operation in the Hungarian embassy in Moldova. Here one may apply for
short-term (type A and C) Schengen visas to travel to fifteen EU countries6 that ei-
ther have no diplomatic representation in Chisinau or work only with a very limit-
ed personnel in this respect. Moldovan high-ranking officials are frequently visiting
Hungary, especially since the pro-Western turn in Moldovan domestic politics in
2009. Since then, Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs Iurie Leanca visited Bu-
dapest six times already in addition to several lower-level delegations that were ex-
changed between Budapest and Chisinau. Hungary also plays an active role in sup-
porting the administrative and judicial reforms in Moldova. Plus, the EU Special
Representative to Moldova was Hungarian, and so was the first commander of the
EUBAM mission. 
In the case of Belarus, the relations have been very moderate since Alexander
Lukashenko came to power. A slow improvement in the relations has started in
2007, though, in parallel to the efforts of the Belarussian foreign policy to open up
to the West. This tendency became further intensified following the 2008 war in
Georgia. In this period a Hungarian embassy was opened in Minsk, Belarussian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Martynov visited Hungary, and several Hungari-
an visits took place in Belarus (the visiting Hungarians had the ranks of state sec-
retary and deputy state secretary). However, since the December 2010 elections
in Belarus and the brutal repression of the opposition demonstrations, the Hun-
garian-Belarussian political relations have become practically frozen. 
Out of the three South Caucasian countries, Hungary has by far the most inten-
sive relations with Azerbaijan, though this intensification in the relations has begun
only in 2007. Since then, a Hungarian embassy was opened in Azerbaijan, and sev-
eral high-level visits between the two countries also took place, including the visits
to Azerbaijan of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in 2010, Prime Minister Ferenc
Gyurcsány in 2008 and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinga Göncz in 2007. Besides
these visits, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev visited Hungary in 2008. This was
the first ever Azerbaijani presidential visit to Budapest (Hungarian Embassy in Azer-
baijan, 2011). However, one has to add that the Azerbaijani-Hungarian diplomatic
relations are focused almost exclusively on economic issues, or more concretely on
energy issues. Hungarian foreign policy decision-makers perceive Azerbaijan as a
source of natural gas supplies that may mean an alternative to the current double
dependency on Russia as a supply country and on Ukraine as a transit route. The
Hungarian-Azerbaijani relations have started to become more intensive in 2007,
following the shock of the first Russia-Ukraine ‘gas war’ that also affected Hungary.
In May 2007, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinga Göncz visited Baku, while Azerbai-
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jani Minister of Energy Industry Natiq Aliyev attended the first Nabucco confer-
ence organized in Budapest in September of the same year. In the last three years
there were two Hungarian Prime Minister-level visits to Baku. In 2008, Ferenc
Gyurcsány travelled to the Azerbaijani capital, and Viktor Orbán visited Baku in
September 2010, when he attended the Ministerial Meeting of the AGRI (Azerbai-
jan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector) gas transit project and made Hungary join it.
The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, also paid two visits to Hungary: he was
invited by the then President of the Republic László Sólyom in 2008, while in 2009
he participated in the second international Nabucco conference, which was orga-
nized in Budapest.7
The two other South Caucasian countries, Armenia and Georgia, receive very lit-
tle attention in the Hungarian foreign policy. This tendency is highly unlikely to
change, even though Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili paid a visit to Hun-
gary in 2011. Both people-to-people contacts and trade activities between Hun-
gary and these two countries are very limited.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
As declared in the External Relations Strategy, Hungary intends ‘to actively support
the broad respect for democratic values’ and ‘support democratic development’
(Hungarian MFA, 2008). However, as Áron Horváth points out in his paper on
Hungary’s democracy assistance policy (Horváth, 2008), a clear strategy defining
the objectives, priority areas, options and ways of the democracy assistance is still
missing. Though the government intends to coordinate its democracy-related ac-
tivities with international development cooperation, not much has been seen of the
realization of such plans. There is no separate budget for democracy assistance
programs; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handles the funding for these programs
together with the development cooperation funds. According to the criticism of
the AidWatch Report 2011, the structure of the programs is overly fragmented, and
the management of the funds is not very transparent (Aid Watch, 2011).
Some outlines of the Hungarian development policy, in a document titled ‘Hun-
garian International Development Cooperation Policy’ (Hungarian MFA, 2006),
were adopted by the government in 2003. This strategy prescribed that providing
transition experiences should be one of the main focus points of the Hungarian de-
velopment cooperation, besides assistance in education, knowledge-transfer, agri-
culture, healthcare, water management and infrastructure planning. The strategy
openly declared that the Hungarian development assistance should be planned in
accord with the coming EU-accession and that the EU and OECD development
principles should be taken into account in the process (ibid.). 
The geographical focus of the international development cooperation and
democracy assistance conducted by the Hungarian government is oriented most-
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ly towards the Balkans. Out of the Eastern European countries, Moldova and
Ukraine are the main partners. Until 2008, both were declared to be strategic part-
ners, but due to the financial crisis, the funding for the partnership was cut; thus
now the status of Ukraine is that of a project-based partner country. 
The overall share of Eastern Europe in the Hungarian bilateral development co-
operation represents only 10% of its budget. As compared to the approx. 406 mil-
lion HUF spent on Eastern Europe, Afghanistan alone, which was the absolute pri-
ority for Hungary, received more than 1700 million HUF in 2009. Out of the six
countries of Eastern Europe, clearly Ukraine and Moldova were the prioritized
ones. In the case of Ukraine, most of the expenses were related to the procurement
of health care equipment, while in Moldova the Hungarian development coopera-
tion was much more diverse and ranged from humanitarian aid to democracy pro-
motion. The other four countries of Eastern Europe were represented only by
marginal sums in the budget. This tendency also reflects Hungary’s choice of pri-
ority countries in Eastern Europe. 
Though Hungary is not too active in the other four countries of Eastern Europe
in terms of bilateral relations, the multilateral dimension of its relations is different.
The recent Hungarian governments, regardless of their party composition, have al-
ways been in favor of the Visegrad cooperation and the International Visegrad
Fund (IVF) in particular. Even in times of the financial crisis, it was beyond question
in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the IVF contribution was always to
be paid fully and completely.8 Budapest has always been supportive to the sugges-
tions – which usually came from Poland – that the International Visegrad Fund
should extend its presence and activities in Eastern Europe. As an example, one
may name Hungary’s political and financial support for the scholarship pro-
grammes for Ukrainian and Belarusian students provided by the IVF (Visegrad
Group, 2011). 
Another particularly recent example is the V4-Eastern Partnership cooperation
that was launched on 16 June 2011 in Bratislava. Hereby the four Visegrad states
agreed to raise the budget of the Fund by 250.000 EUR per country and dedicate
this sum to various cooperation projects in the Eastern Partnership framework
(Visegrad Group, 2011). The motivation behind Hungary’s support for this is prob-
ably three-fold. First, Budapest is interested in strengthening the Visegrad Cooper-
ation in general, and a more active presence in Eastern Europe on its part also con-
tributes to the overall strength of the cooperation. Second, Hungary’s contribution
may also be accounted as an EU-level contribution to the Eastern Partnership.
Third, by supporting the Visegrad initiative, Budapest may well compensate her
limited activities outside of Ukraine and Moldova. 
The Eastern Partnership project enjoys general support in Hungary, just like the
Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Európai Tükör, 2011).
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One has to add, though, that even in the Eastern Partnership framework Budapest
pays the most attention to Ukraine and Moldova (Rácz, 2010). 
Another multilateral project that is of high importance for Budapest is the
Danube Strategy (European Commission, 2010), which gives Hungary an oppor-
tunity to link the two prioritized regions of its neighbourhood policy. Both the
Western Balkans in the South and Ukraine and Moldova in the East lie along the
Danube River, and thus they are included in the strategy.
In summary, one may well conclude that in terms of democracy promotion in
Eastern Europe in the broader sense – concerning both content and geographic fo-
cus – Hungary is more engaged in multilateral frameworks than in bilateral ones.
This corresponds to the above mentioned trend in which Hungarian democracy
promotion acitivies are mostly externally motivated. Hungary’s bilateral activities
focus more on technical assistance and knowledge transfer through the activities
of the ICDT, even if they are not limited to this area. 
CONCLUSION
The wider Eastern European region plays only a limited role in the foreign policy of
Hungary. This is partially due to the lack of historical connections, which also re-
sults in a vague and often unsure conceptualization of the ‘East’ in the Hungarian
political discourse. Another hampering element is the fact that the EU and Hun-
garian interpretations of the ‘neighbourhood’ differ significantly. For Budapest, the
term ‘neighbourhood’ currently means the Western Balkans in the South and
Ukraine in the East. Before her EU-accession, Romania also belonged to the Hun-
garian Eastern neighbourhood policy. Out of the two regions, clearly the Western
Balkans is the priority region. In contrast, in the EU discourse, the Western Balkans
does not belong to the neighbourhood policy at all. Thus the Hungarian and EU
concepts of ‘neighbourhood’ only partially overlap as the two common priorities
are Ukraine and, to some extent, Moldova.
An additional reason for the limited Hungarian attention to Eastern Europe is that
there are practically no Hungarian minorities living in the region. Though the re-
sponsibility towards the Hungarians abroad has been one of the defining factors of
the Hungarian foreign policy since the democratic transition, due to the lack of
Hungarian minorities in Eastern Europe, this factor did not play a policy-shaping
role in Hungary’s relations with it. The only exception to this pattern is Ukraine, as
there is a Hungarian minority in the Trans-Carpathian (Zakarpattya) region, which
is south-west of the Carpathian Mountains. 
Another Eastern European country that is a priority for Hungary is Moldova. In
the early nineties the Hungarian-Moldovan relations started to develop mostly be-
cause both countries had certain tensions with Romania, and this made them nat-
ural allies. Since Hungary’s EU-accession, Moldova has become the only country
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in Eastern Europe where Hungary may aspire to a ‘policy shaper’ role due to Hun-
gary’s very active involvement in supporting the pro-European political and ad-
ministrative reforms in the country.
Thus, if one intends to answer the first research question, when it comes to Hun-
gary’s relations with the six countries of Eastern Europe, the concept of solidarity is
a motivation for Hungary only in its national foreign policy action towards Ukraine
and, to a limited extent, Moldova.
Concerning the second research question, while the concepts of identity and
solidarity are only of limited use in describing the Hungarian foreign policy towards
Eastern Europe, one may also point to the rational motivations that shape this pol-
icy. Thus, energy security is the answer to the second research question, as energy
considerations also influence the Hungarian foreign policy towards Eastern Europe.
They particularly influence the foreign policy towards Ukraine and Azerbaijan.
Ukraine contains the only transit route through which Russian oil and gas supplies
can reach Hungary. Hungary is heavily dependent on the security of the Ukrainian
transit, as was demonstrated during the 2009 gas crisis. On the other hand, Azer-
baijan is perceived by Hungarian decision-makers and analysts as a possible alter-
native source of energy supplies. The growing importance of Azerbaijan in Hun-
garian foreign policy is well demonstrated by the opening of a Hungarian embassy
in Baku in January 2009, and also by the September 2010 visit of Viktor Orbán to
Baku. However, except for the energy security ties, the Hungarian-Azerbaijani re-
lations in general remain very limited. 
Thus, as an answer to the third research question, Ukraine and Moldova clearly
represent the two priority countries of the Hungarian Eastern policy. This prioriti-
zation is reflected also in the infrastructural background of the Hungarian foreign
policy making, e.g. in the size of the embassies and the number of diplomatic per-
sonnel. The development assistance of Budapest in Eastern Europe is also concen-
trated on these two countries (Ukraine and Moldova), with Belarus receiving a mi-
nor share of the development assistance that is smaller than their shares. Howev-
er, in terms of its foreign policy engagement towards Belarus and the three South
Caucasian countries, Budapest relies mostly on a multi-lateral regional coopera-
tion, namely on the Visegrad Cooperation and EU-level actions such as the Eastern
Partnership.
ENDNOTES
1 The views expressed here are the author’s own, and they in no way represent the official position of
the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.
2 The post-communist Eastern neighbourhood includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldo-
va and Ukraine.
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3 Interview with former Hungarian ambassador to Moldova, 5 May 2011, Budapest.
4 Interview with Hungarian diplomat, Budapest, April 2011.
5 The figures are retrieved from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) (2011). 
6 Common Application Center. Online: www.cac.md/about_en.html. 
7 Information retrieved from the website of the Hungarian Embassy in Baku. Online: www.mfa.gov.hu/
kulkepviselet/AZ/en/mainpage.htm1. 
8 Interview with a Hungarian diplomat, 12 October 2010.
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Slovenia and the Eastern 
Neighbourhood
POLONA BUNIČ AND ZLATKO ŠABIČ
Abstract: Slovenian foreign policy with regard to the Eastern Neighbourhood is a research topic that
would have been difficult to conceive before 2004. Due to geo-strategic and economic
concerns, Slovenia’s focus before 2004 was primarily on the Western Balkans. However,
the post-EU membership era shows a slight departure from the traditional focus as Slove-
nia became more attentive to the needs of the Eastern Neighbourhood and began to di-
rect a part of its bilateral ODA away from the Western Balkans, e.g. by assisting in the
development of perhaps the most vulnerable country in the Eastern Neighbourhood –
Moldova. The findings in this chapter show that Slovenia may not be playing a big role in
assisting the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood but it does play a role in assisting
them nonetheless. It has formulated its development assistance policies, and these are in-
fluenced partly by the countries' historical experience (the Western Balkans) and also partly
by the European Union’s own development assistance programmes and initiatives from the
time period after Slovenia had become a member. 
Key words: Slovenia, ODA, Western Balkans, OSCE, Moldova
INTRODUCTION
It is impossible to begin a study of Slovenia’s foreign policy and development as-
sistance with regard to the Eastern Neighbourhood1 without first asking the basic
question of what Slovenia’s perception of its place in Europe is. Identity is impor-
tant, no matter how ‘imagined’ the community to which we feel we belong may be
(Neumann, 1999: 147). Slovenia sees itself as a European state – throughout its in-
tegration process, which started with its membership in the Council of Europe and
ended with its accession to the European Union, Slovenia was considered as hav-
ing adopted European norms and values. Furthermore, Slovenia has also success-
fully represented the European Union (EU) when it was the holder of the Presi-
dency of the Council of the European Union (cf. Kajnč, 2011). Of course, Slovenia
has other identities too. As pointed out by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Dimitrij Rupel, Slovenia also sees itself as a Mediterranean state and ‘above all a
Central European state’ (Rupel, 2011: 336). Although the EU enlargement has had
implications for the Central European co-operation, he believes that Central Eu-
rope retains a particular importance for Slovenia (Rupel, 2011: 339). 
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Conspicuously absent from this ‘list’ is the Balkans, with which Slovenia shares
the largest portion of its borders. Indeed, as one author has said, the (Western)
Balkans was seen primarily as an ‘obstacle’ to identity formation in Slovenia (Boji-
nović, 2005: 20; see also Patterson, 2003). However, this is in stark contrast with
the empirical data that suggest where Slovenia truly ‘sees itself’. The figures about
official development assistance (ODA)2 are just one of various indicators (for trade,
see, e.g., Šabič and Drulák, 2010) that suggest a close relationship between Slove-
nia and the Western Balkans. In 2010, Slovenia directed 74% of its bilateral ODA
(9.48 million EUR) to this region, and only roughly 2% or 0.27 million EUR to East-
ern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia combined (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Slovenia – hereinafter also MFA, 2011k). 
Economists and political scientists in Slovenia agree that Slovenia’s orientation to-
wards the Western Balkans is driven not by sentiments or solidarity, but primarily by
pragmatic and strategic motivations. History (between 1918–1990, Slovenia was a
part of Yugoslavia), geographical proximity, political instability, business networks,
and Slovenia’s knowledge of the market and local habits of the Western Balkans are
listed as factors that stimulate a proactive policy towards that region (National As-
sembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 1999; Jazbec et al., 2002; MFA, 2011a). In July
2010, the Slovenian government further emphasized its interest in the Western
Balkans by adopting a set of guidelines aimed at pursuing three objectives: stability
of the region; EU accession; and a positive climate for doing business in the region
(Government of Slovenia, 2010: 1). This approach to the Western Balkans was sub-
sequently confirmed by the Slovenian Parliament in a declaration that it made in Ju-
ly 2010 (National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010b). 
So how is the Eastern Neighbourhood featured in this picture? Until recently,
very little information has been available to suggest that Slovenia might consider a
departure from its foreign policy orientation towards the Western Balkans and,
consequently, a redistribution of its development assistance. Slovenia has an over-
all regional approach to the Western Balkans; this is not the case with regard to the
Eastern Neighbourhood. In fact, at the time of writing, no political document con-
cerning the Eastern Neighbourhood has been adopted either by the Slovenian
Government or by the Parliament.3 Recent developments indicate, however, that
Slovenia began to direct part of its bilateral ODA away from the Western Balkans.
Out of the eight bilateral agreements on development cooperation that Slovenia
has concluded, two of them are with countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood – the
agreements with Moldova (signed in 2004 and ratified by Slovenia in 2007) and
Ukraine (signed in 2008 and ratified by Slovenia in 2009). 
In the context of the present special issue, it is worth evaluating these recent de-
velopments. What has contributed to Slovenia’s (timid) orientation towards the
Eastern Neighbourhood? Why would Slovenia, a Mediterranean and Central Euro-
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pean country with a traditional strategic and business focus on the Western Balka-
ns, be at all interested in assisting countries such as Ukraine and in particular
Moldova, which has little strategic importance for Slovenia, a weak economy and
no impact on the stability in the Western Balkans? 
We will attempt to answer these questions under the assumption that European
integration is a complex process that would be hard to sustain without an active
foreign policy and assistance towards countries that share borders with the Union.
We will argue that Slovenia already contributes a fair share of its assistance to coun-
tries of the Western Balkans. However, since it is a member of the European Union,
Slovenia’s external borders are shared not only with the Western Balkans; conse-
quently, it is to be expected that Slovenia will offer its assistance to other regions
as well. Further, we will analyse the claim that to evaluate Slovenia’s interest in as-
sisting countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, focusing on the normative aspects
of the Slovenian development assistance policy towards Eastern Neighbourhood is
not enough, and other considerations, such as strategic and commercial interests,
should not be overlooked.
In the article, we will examine various factors affecting Slovenia’s development
assistance policy towards the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, in particu-
lar history, solidarity, identity, domestic constraints, Europeanization and other
forms of international socialization, commercial interests and actions of third coun-
tries.
The article will be structured as follows. The first part will look at the develop-
ment of the Slovenian foreign policy discourse on development assistance in gen-
eral and the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood in particular. The second part
will look at the concrete implementation of Slovenia’s assistance policy with re-
spect to all of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, and the specific factors
that affect the content and the dynamics of that assistance. A greater amount of at-
tention will be paid to Ukraine and especially Moldova. These two countries from
the Eastern Neighbourhood have been mentioned explicitly in official documents
of the Parliament and the Government concerning Slovenia’s assistance policy as
well as other Slovenian foreign policy discourses more often than other countries.
We will also look at the (in)coherences between discourse and policy implemen-
tation. Following that, we will offer some concluding remarks to our study. 
SLOVENIA’S FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE ON
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND THE
COUNTRIES OF THE EASTERN
NEIGHBOURHOOD
Political discourse is particularly relevant for an analysis of the ideational factors
that might have affected a country’s assistance policy, be they endogenous (histo-
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ry, solidarity, identity, domestic constraints) or exogenous factors (Europeanization
and other forms of international socialization). 
Table 1: Factors affecting the development of Slovenia’s assistance policy to-
wards the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood 
After gaining its independence, Slovenia was preoccupied with defining its own
foreign policy identity. The first strategic Slovenian foreign policy document, the
‘Key Elements for a Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia’, which was
adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in March 1991,4 outlined
Slovenia’s foreign policy orientation – to facilitate co-operation with Central Eu-
rope at all levels and the membership in the European Union (National Assembly
of the Republic of Slovenia, 1991). This orientation was shared by other former
communist countries; in the literature on Central Europe it is often argued that co-
operation among Central European states in the 1990s was ‘a viable way of re-Eu-
ropeanizing the area’ (Schöpflin, quoted in Neumann, 1999: 147). The ‘Declaration
on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia’, adopted by the Slovenian Parliament
in 1999, sees Slovenia primarily as a Central European country with one mission –
to help stabilize South Eastern Europe (SEE). The same vision of Slovenia’s foreign
policy emerges from the document ‘Ten Years of Independent Slovenian Foreign
Policy’, which was prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000 (MFA,
2011j). The Stability Pact for SEE, which was launched at a Summit Meeting in
1999, included Moldova, which is still its only member to belong to the Eastern
Neighbourhood; Ukraine was granted an observer status.5 Slovenia, which was al-
so a member, attached a considerable importance to the Pact, although its atten-
tion was mostly focused on the members of the Pact from the Western Balkans
area (MFA, 2011a).
In October 2002, a document called ‘Appropriate Foreign Policy’ was adopted
by the Slovenian Government (Jazbec et al., 2002). It saw Slovenian foreign policy
as being focused on the following pillars: the EU and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), which were seen as essential; the neighbouring and SEE countries,
which were considered as key; and countries of the Arab world, Israel, Asia, Africa
and Latin America, which were viewed as important. The document also stated
Endogenous Exogenous
Ideational History Europeanization
Solidarity Other form of international socialization
Domestic constraints
Identity
Material Commercial interests Action by third countries
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that within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
Slovenia should focus on the SEE and the Mediterranean, since the Slovenian
knowledge of the situation in the region represented a great advantage for Slove-
nia that could in turn benefit the European Union (ibid.). The document also men-
tioned that international development assistance should become an important part
of Slovenia’s foreign policy. 
The Eastern Neighbourhood did not enter into the Slovenian foreign policy dis-
course until 16 April 2003, when Slovenia signed its Accession Treaty with the EU,
which, in turn, made it an insider in the European integration process. Consequently,
the Slovenian government began to develop its own agenda regarding the continu-
ation of the enlargement and the relations with the countries neighbouring the EU. 
In his speech on 14 May 2003, during a visit to Slovakia, Slovenian Foreign Min-
ister Dimitrij Rupel reiterated Slovenia’s traditional foreign policy orientation to-
wards the SEE and the Western Balkans. However, in another speech, on 13 Octo-
ber 2003, he reacted to the Commission’s paper on ‘Wider Europe’, published in
March 2003, which outlined a plan for co-operation with the ‘new neighbours’.6 In
response to this document, Rupel mentioned that as a future member of the Euro-
pean Union Slovenia should pay attention to other areas in the EU neighbourhood
as well (MFA, 2011a). 
In 2004, Slovenia continued to support the concept of Wider Europe, which be-
came the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Ukraine was mentioned as an in-
creasingly important economic partner. Plus, it was emphasized that Slovenia
would try to assist with the stabilization of the SEE region, the Mediterranean and
the countries of the new EU neighbourhood (MFA, 2011a). 
On 12 May 2004, the Slovenian Parliament adopted the ‘Declaration on Posi-
tions for the Functioning of the Republic of Slovenia in EU Institutions in 2004’. Two
other annual declarations of this sort were adopted in 2005 and 2006 respective-
ly. In 2007, the practice of adopting one-and-half-yearly declarations began, so that
the adopted declarations would be in line with the trio Presidencies. The impor-
tance of these declarations should not be underestimated. They represent Slove-
nia’s internal political agreement concerning its orientations on issues in the EU de-
cision-making process. At the same time, during the period for which a declaration
is adopted, government representatives are bound by the declaration, and their po-
sitions expressed within various EU bodies have to be in line with it. 
In this respect, it is worth pointing out that the Declaration for 2004 continued
to voice Slovenia’s support to the ENP as well as to the inclusion of the countries
of the Southern Caucasus in it. It also mentioned that as Slovenia would hold the
OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) chairmanship in
2005, it would devote special attention to Eastern European countries such as
Moldova and Belarus. 
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The OSCE chairmanship had a notable impact on shaping Slovenia’s support
and development assistance policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. Recalling
the adoption of the Action Plans with the ENP countries,7 the Parliament Declara-
tion for 2005 emphasized that, among other things, it would be important to have
a coherent policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood if the OSCE chairmanship
were to be successful. As can be seen from the documents and speeches during
the OSCE chairmanship, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did indeed pay more at-
tention to the Eastern region. Thus, the Foreign Minister mentioned his visits to
Ukraine and the role the OSCE could play in helping Moldova and resolving the
Transnistrian problem. He reiterated the importance of the ENP in the OSCE region
with respect to economic growth as well as the OSCE’s contribution to the peace-
ful settlement of the disputes in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (MFA, 2011a).
In this context, he also recalled the commitment agreed at the External Relations
Council in May 2005 that new member states would increase their development
assistance to at least 0.17% of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2010 and to
at least 0.33% of the GDP by 2015. He also stressed the importance of the ENP, in
lieu of the EU membership, for Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus as well as for the
countries of the Southern Caucasus (ibid.). 
In 2006, the Parliament agreed in its Declaration that Slovenia should participate
actively in the implementation of ENP Action Plans and strive for a deepening of its
relations with ENP countries as well as a stronger relation between the EU and Rus-
sia as one of the key factors for the stabilization of the EU Eastern border. The Dec-
laration also provided that Slovenia would increase its GDP share of ODA. 
The period from 2006 to 2008 brought about the concretization of Slovenia’s
development assistance policy.8 In June 2006, the International Development Co-
operation Act was adopted by the Slovenian Parliament; in July 2008, the Resolu-
tion on International Development Cooperation until 2015 followed. The Act pro-
vided that the national coordinator of Slovenia’s international development policy
would be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Resolution confirmed that, with re-
spect to its economic development and EU membership, Slovenia had become a
donor of ODA, and that, as an EU Member State, Slovenia had made a commit-
ment to strive to increase its share of ODA to 0.17% GDP in 2010 and 0.33% GDP
in 2015. It defined three geographical priority areas for Slovenia’s ODA (the West-
ern Balkans; Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia; and Africa). It also pro-
vided that within the second priority area, the cooperation in the short term would
be focused on Ukraine and Moldova (National Assembly of the Republic of Slove-
nia, 2008b).
The 2008 Slovenian EU Presidency did not play a particular role with regard to
Slovenia’s policy towards the EU’s Eastern neighbours. In the more or less inherit-
ed agenda, jointly agreed with the other two countries of the Presidency Trio, Ger-
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many and Portugal, Slovenia focused primarily on the Western Balkans and the
Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the Slovenian Presidency Program made reference
to the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, and in the final report, the implementation of
the initiative was positively evaluated (MFA, 2008a and 2008b). 
Finally, in 2009 and 2010, two framework programmes of international develop-
ment cooperation and humanitarian assistance were prepared by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The first programme was adopted for 2010, and the second for the
period 2011–2012. In the Programme for 2010, 8% of the funds for Slovenian bi-
lateral ODA were earmarked for the second geographical priority, where activities
were mainly focused on Moldova and Ukraine. However, within the Programme
for 2011–2012, only Moldova is mentioned regarding the second geographical pri-
ority, in the sense that it is one of the four partner countries (the others being
Macedonia, Montenegro and Cape Verde) with which Slovenia is going to devel-
op a programmatic development cooperation in the period 2012–2015. This kind
of cooperation entails the preparation of a strategic programming document,
which means it will be more intense than the usual project-based bilateral devel-
opment cooperation (MFA, 2011c and 2011d).
The Parliament Declaration for the period July 2008–December 2009 expressed
support to the Eastern and Southern dimensions of the ENP as well as to the East-
ern Partnership (EaP) initiative. In addition, the last Parliament Declaration, for the
period January 2010–June 2011, finds that with respect to Slovenia’s economic in-
terest in Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus, Slovenia should support the European in-
tegration of these countries. In his speeches during these two years, while men-
tioning Slovenia’s partner countries in development cooperation, the Slovenian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Samuel Žbogar also underlined the need for a stronger
connection between Slovenia’s development assistance policy and its economic
diplomacy (National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2008a and 2010a; MFA,
2011a).
The timeline of the changing focus of Slovenia’s foreign policy orientation and
development assistance to the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood suggests
that the year 2004 was the ‘turning point’. As a new member of the European
Union, Slovenia quickly responded to the situation by supporting the ENP. The
OSCE chairmanship in 2005 provided an additional significant experience for
Slovenia, as it found itself in a dual role – the role of an advocate of the EU’s ENP
and that of a ‘pupil’ who was learning about the policies, interests, and preferences
of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. By 2010, the support to EU initia-
tives aiming at co-operation with the Eastern neighbours became institutionalized,
and concrete decisions regarding Moldova and Ukraine were adopted.9 By looking
at the available data in the next section, we will further analyse the nature of Slove-
nia’s assistance to the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. Is the assistance
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EU-driven, are there endogenous (commercial) interests behind it, and why is
Slovenia focusing on Moldova in the most recent years? 
SLOVENIA’S ASSISTANCE POLICY TO THE
EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
A general overview of trade between Slovenia and the countries of the Eastern
Neighbourhood shows that the combined trade of Slovenia with these countries is
less than 1% of Slovenia’s total trade. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the trade
has increased substantially in the last decade, in particular the trade with Ukraine
and Belarus. The trade with Georgia has experienced the largest fluctuations. The
trade with Moldova has been growing steadily since 2001, but in relative terms, it
lags much behind the trade with Belarus and Ukraine.10 This, in turn, suggests that
Slovenia’s decision to offer development assistance to Moldova has little if any-
thing to do with economic incentives.
If we look at the substance of the development assistance, we see that there is
little consistency; individual projects seem to prevail. For example, the funds di-
rected to Georgia in 2006 can be attributed to factors other than a structured de-
velopment cooperation. Namely, the amount of bilateral ODA to Georgia in 2006
included the costs of care for migrants (116.923 EUR), co-financing of assistance
programmes for refugees within the framework of the European Refugee Fund
(18.458 EUR) and projects within the framework of the International Trust Fund
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance – ITF (16.692 EUR) (MFA, 2011f,
2011g, 2011h and 2011i). In 2008, the funds were directed to care for migrants
and conflict assistance, and in 2009 to cooperation in the EU Monitoring Mission
and care for migrants. With respect to its development cooperation with Ukraine,
Slovenia contributed to the establishment of a national programme of clean pro-
duction (299.000 EUR), scientific cooperation (11.335 EUR), and rehabilitation of
children (19.604 EUR) in 2006. Projects in 2007 and 2008 included rehabilitation
of children, scientific cooperation and care for migrants; funds were also used for
high school education and assistance with respect to the new flu outbreak. Con-
cerning Moldova, the development cooperation during this period included the
cooperation in the framework of the South Eastern Europe Health Network, tech-
nical assistance, care for migrants, and seminars. In the same period, other funds
were directed to co-financing within the framework of the European Refugee
Fund as well as scholarships, co-financing of research cooperation and care for
migrants (Belarus) and projects within the framework of the ITF (Armenia and
Azerbaijan).11
Recent developments suggest that Slovenia plans to move from an ad hoc to
a sustained support for individual countries, Ukraine and particularly Moldova.
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In 2007 and 2009 respectively, the government of Slovenia ratified co-operation
agreements with the two governments (National Assembly of the Republic of
Slovenia, 2007a and 2009). The Framework Programme of International Devel-
opment Cooperation prepared by the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
2010 provides that within the second geographical priority area of Slovenia’s
development assistance, Moldova and Ukraine should be the focus (MFA,
2011d). 
However, the programme for 2011–2012 focuses solely on Moldova. The docu-
ment projects a preparation of a strategic programming document which will, for
the period of 2012–2015, define the financial framework, areas, dynamics and im-
plementing bodies of the cooperation. The programme provides that in the year
2011, 122.500 EUR of development assistance will be given to Moldova; of these
funds, 47.500 EUR are earmarked for the co-financing of activities of Slovenian
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Moldova, 40.000 EUR for ac-
tivities concerning trade liberalization, 30.000 EUR for a training and education
project in the field of e-governance and 5.000 EUR for supporting local NGOs
working for the empowerment of women (MFA, 2011e). This signifies a more struc-
tured development cooperation that is in line with Slovenia’s thematic priorities in
development cooperation (cf. MFA, 2011b).
Slovenia’s assistance to the region of the Eastern Neighbourhood focusing on
Moldova might seem a bit difficult to explain, particularly if we take into account
that Moldova has not been one of those Eastern Neighbourhood countries that
have received the highest amount of Slovenia’s assistance in the past and that
Moldova has almost always been mentioned together with Ukraine in Slovenia’s
discourse on the Eastern Neighbourhood. Authors who have studied the orien-
tations of the New EU Member States regarding development assistance men-
tion similar historic experiences, geographical ties, high levels of political rela-
tions, absence of other donors and comparative advantages such as transition
know-how among the factors that could explain why particular New Member
States decide to include particular (in our case, Eastern Neighbourhood) coun-
tries among the main recipients of their development assistance (Bučar et al.,
2007: 39; Lovitt and Rybková, 2007: ii). Some of those criteria would bring Slove-
nia ‘close enough’ to Moldova, the only Eastern neighbour country member of
the Regional Cooperation Council, the successor of the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, the concrete reason for prioritizing Moldova over Ukraine seems
to be more prosaic – it stems from the given political realities. The report on Slove-
nia’s development cooperation in 2009, prepared by the Slovenian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, states that the agreement on development cooperation between
Slovenia and Ukraine (which was signed in 2008) has not yet been ratified by
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Ukraine (MFA, 2011i: 4). This statement is repeated in the report on Slovenia’s de-
velopment cooperation in 2010 (ibid., 2011k: 9). Both statements appear as foot-
notes to texts in which Slovenia’s decision for a closer development cooperation
with Moldova is described. In other words, it appears that Slovenia’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is explaining the choice to give preference to Moldova through the
fact that Ukraine was not available for a closer development cooperation. This has
actually been confirmed through an interview.12
How much will Moldova actually benefit from this assistance? The overall situa-
tion in the world is difficult, considering the global financial crisis, which started in
2008 and, at the time of writing, shows no sign of ending. The Programme for De-
velopment Cooperation in the period 2011–2012 itself became a victim of the
Slovenian government’s restructuring of its budget due to the ongoing financial cri-
sis in Slovenia as it is planned to be reduced by 25% (MFA, 2011e: 2). Moreover,
the 2010 report on Slovenia’s development cooperation was conspicuously silent
on furthering the development cooperation with Moldova (ibid., 2011k). As the
government plans further budget cuts in the future, it is unrealistic to expect that
any major shift in the Slovenian bilateral ODA policy would take place in the given
circumstances and in the immediate future. Nevertheless, we can conclude that ac-
cording to the available data and in spite of the economic difficulties in recent
years, a slight diversification of the direction of the Slovenian bilateral ODA has tak-
en place after all. 
In this respect, it is worth adding that Slovenia’s bilateral ODA is not implement-
ed only by various Ministries and Government Services, but also by six different in-
stitutions that have been founded or co-founded by the Slovenian Government.
These are the Centre for European Perspective (CEP), the Centre of Excellence in
Finance (CEF), the ITF, the ‘Together’ Foundation – the Regional Centre for the Psy-
cho-social Well-being of Children, the Centre for International Cooperation and
Development, and the Centre for eGovernance Development (CeGD). Each of
these institutions has been created to cover the day-to-day implementation of par-
ticular areas where Slovenia has identified its partners’ development needs (e.g.
mine clearance) or its own strengths as a donor (such as good governance, expe-
riences with the EU, and human rights). Three of these institutions (the CEF, the ITF,
and the CeGD) are cooperating with countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood,
among others (CEF, 2011; CeGD, 2011; ITF, 2011a and 2011b).13
In addition, as mentioned above, NGOs are becoming involved in Slovenia’s de-
velopment cooperation with the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. In the
years 2008 and 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with other Min-
istries and Government Services, has prepared public tenders for NGOs in the field
of development cooperation in excess of 350.000 EUR. Within these public tenders,
22 projects were selected, covering Africa, the Western Balkans, and the Eastern
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Neighbourhood. This practice continued in 2010, when 60.000 EUR were earmarked
for the activities of Slovenian NGOs in Eastern Europe (MFA, 2011b and 2011c). 
Finally, in recent years, tenders have been published for the involvement of com-
panies in the implementation of development assistance. The question whether
such a large number of institutions involved in the implementation of development
assistance in Slovenia might increase the risk of fragmentation and loss of focus
would thus be well placed. Indeed, as Bučar (2011) argues, with respect to Slove-
nia’s assistance to the region of the Western Balkans, for example, the actual im-
plementation of development assistance shows results that are markedly different
from the declared priorities; while Montenegro and Macedonia have been official-
ly chosen for a closer – programmatic – development cooperation, most aid is ac-
tually being channelled to Croatia. If we compare these findings to Slovenia’s de-
velopment policy concerning the Eastern Neighbourhood (cf. the latest report on
Slovenia’s development assistance, MFA, 2011k), there is a striking resemblance:
while on the political-declaratory level, Moldova is prioritized, most of the funds
have gone to Georgia and Ukraine. 
This short review shows that if we look at the region of the Eastern Neighbour-
hood as a whole, the concrete Slovenian policy implementation concerning the
Eastern neighbours has been quite consistent at the declaratory level: Slovenia has
officially begun to channel part of its assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood,
even if only after its own entry into the EU. However, the official discourse has not
been consistent with the actual policy implementation, which becomes evident
when we look at which countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood have received the
most assistance from Slovenia. So far, there are no signs that the situation might
change in the future, although the current global economic crisis will arguably in-
fluence the dynamic of that change if and when it comes. 
CONCLUSION
The article has shown that the Slovenian foreign policy focus has been rather tra-
ditional in most of the years since Slovenia gained its independence. Due to po-
litical-strategic and economic reasons, Slovenia’s main preoccupation was and
still is the Western Balkans. By the same token, Slovenia’s development assis-
tance has been largely offered to countries in that region too. However, in the
past few years, Slovenia’s foreign policy discourse and development assistance
policy have seen some changes – more attention is paid to the development
needs of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. The change has taken
place due to a set of endogenous and exogenous factors, both ideational and
material. As far as development assistance programmes are concerned, Slove-
nia’s identity per se played a rather marginal role. Slovenia sees itself as a (demo-
cratic) European, Central European and Mediterranean state. Still, if we do not
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take into account EU and NATO membership, which for years has been in the
core of the Slovenian foreign policy, most of its attention went to the region of
the Western Balkans – to which Slovenia does not see itself as belonging. This
was due to historical reasons, given that Slovenia had been part of Yugoslavia for
more than seven decades. 
The shift in Slovenia’s development assistance policy, albeit a modest one, took
place only after Slovenia accomplished EU membership in 2004. As an EU mem-
ber, Slovenia was quick to embrace EU preferences in this regard. Consequently, it
can be said that Europeanization played an important role in making Slovenia at-
tentive to the development needs of other countries that share borders with the
Union, in particular Ukraine and Moldova. On the other hand, solidarity does not
seem to have played a major role; most of Slovenia’s development assistance was
project-driven. In other words, and reflecting the introduction to this special issue,
although there have been some signs of solidarity towards the countries of the
Eastern Neighbourhood (particularly Moldova) in Slovenia’s foreign policy dis-
course and policy implementation, this kind of solidarity is not connected to any
kind of second order (Marcussen, 1999) or historical identity – it is, if anything, of
much more recent origin. 
In addition, our findings suggest that commercial interests did not play a role in
identifying the recipients of Slovenia’s development assistance; nor can it be said
that Slovenia’s assistance was driven by actions or consideration of important third
countries such as Russia. This should come as no surprise, since Slovenia was one
of the constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until
1991. Yugoslavia defined itself as a ‘non-bloc’ country after its expulsion from the
Cominform in 1948 and went on to become a co-founder of the Non-Aligned
Movement in 1961. Because of this, Slovenia, unlike some of the other new mem-
ber states of the EU, did not come to see the Soviet Union as a threatening Other.
On the other hand, the non-action by Ukraine (its non-ratification of the agreement
on development policy) has played a role in Slovenia’s ‘choice’ of Moldova for fu-
ture closer development cooperation.
Furthermore, the role of wider international socialization through international
institutions, notably within the OSCE, was an important factor that helped to artic-
ulate the interest of Slovenia in the Eastern Neighbourhood. And last but not least,
one should also mention the domestic consensus; the Slovenian Parliament has
continuously showed support not only for assisting the Western Balkans but also
for the Eastern Neighbourhood.
In sum, Slovenia may not play a big role in assisting the countries of the East-
ern Neighbourhood – but it does play one. It has formulated its development
assistance policies, which were influenced partly by the historical experience
(the Western Balkans) and partly by the European Union’s own development as-
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sistance programmes and initiatives from the period when Slovenia had be-
come a member. Finally, Slovenia is working on a concrete programme to assist
in the development of perhaps the most vulnerable country in the Eastern
Neighbourhood – Moldova. Even though Slovenia’s focus on Moldova has so
far not been as consistent as its gradual turning towards the Eastern Neigh-
bourhood as a region in need of assistance, the development assistance to
Moldova can also be seen as a symbolic gesture that exemplifies Slovenia’s
growing sense of identity as a responsible partner in the processes of European
integration. 
ENDNOTES
1 It is worth recalling that the European Neighbourhood Policy has two dimensions – a Southern one
and an Eastern one. The Southern Dimension was very much present during Slovenia’s EU Presiden-
cy in the first half of 2008 (which also culminated in the inauguration of the European Mediterranean
University in Slovenia in June 2008), but it has become less prominent after the 2008 elections, in
which the centre-right Social Democratic Party of Slovenia lost to the centre-left Social Democrats,
who went on to form a new government. 
2 Hereinafter, the ODA will be considered as a bilateral assistance which includes all those forms of as-
sistance that are directly given by the donor country to the recipient country (Mrak et al., 2007: 52).
3 Currently, Slovenia’s approach to the region of the Eastern Neighbourhood is limited to sectoral de-
velopment policy stemming from the Resolution on International Development Cooperation (Nation-
al Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2008b).
4 Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991, which means that the Elements were actually a doc-
ument of one of the republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They are, however, im-
portant because they delineated the basic orientations followed by Slovenia’s foreign policy until the
adoption of the Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia by the Slovenian Parliament
in 1999. 
5 The Pact was replaced in 2008 by the Regional Cooperation Council, which has 46 members – coun-
tries, organizations, and international financial institutions. Online: www.stabilitypact.org and
www.rcc.int. 
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Wider Europe
–Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’,
COM(2003) 104 final of 11 March 2003. This document is not to be confused with the Wider Europe
Initiative launched by Finland in 2009.
7 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was elaborated by the Commission in the Communica-
tion ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, COM(2004) 373 final of 12 May 2004. It target-
ed the Eastern as well as the Mediterranean neighbours of Europe and recommended the preparation
of an Action Plan between the EU and each of the neighbouring countries. These Action Plans would
be concerned with defining priorities for action and the ways of implementing them. 
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8 Slovenia had been a donor before becoming an EU member (it helped, for example, Bosnia and
Herzegovina – cf. Mavko, 2006), but the consolidation of its development policy began only after it
had started accession negotiations.
9 It therefore appears that Slovenia is differentiating between two dimensions of the Eastern Neigh-
bourhood at least when it comes to development policy, since Ukraine and Moldova are repeatedly
mentioned in the discourse, but not, for example, Georgia, Armenia or Azerbaijan. 
10 For aggregate data on exports and imports see ‘Some Important Statistics on Slovenia’, Statistical Of-
fice of the Republic of Slovenia, p. 23. Online: www.stat.si/doc/pub/PSP/00-PS-912-1104.pdf.
11 The reports on Slovenia’s development cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Slovenia, 2011d, 2011e, 2011f, 2011g, 2011h, 2011i, and 2011k) do not mention Slovenia’s role in the
EU or other multilateral programmes in the region apart from the participation of two Slovenian elec-
tion observers within an OSCE project in 2009. This may be attributed to the fact that Slovenia, as a
new donor, still gives the majority of its development assistance (62 percent of all ODA or 27.49 mil-
lion EUR in 2010) in the form of multilateral ODA, most of which (78% of all Slovenian multilateral
ODA) goes to the EU development programmes. 
12 The non-ratification of the agreement is the main reason why Ukraine was dropped (interview with
an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2011).
13 Examples of such cooperation include the Regional Mine Victims Rehabilitation Programme in Azer-
baijan; the setting up of the mechanical demining capacity in Armenia and the General Mine Action
Assessment in Georgia (ITF, 2011c and 2011d); the ICT Summit to discuss international and national
trends and challenges facing the ICT industry (Centre for eGovernance Development, 2011); and the
Project Capacity Building on Public Accounting in Moldova (Centre for Excellence in Finance, 2011b). 
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CLARA PORTELA: EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS AND
FOREIGN POLICY. WHEN AND WHY DO THEY WORK?
London / New York: Routledge, 2010, 206 pages, ISBN: 978-0-415-55216-5. 
While a large body of literature has developed in the 1990s and 2000s on con-
ditionality and sanctions, works on sanctions in the foreign policy of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) remained rather scarce. From the leading works on the topic,
one might mention the articles published by T. de Wilde d’Estmaël on econom-
ic coercion or older publications which now lack actuality. Clara Portela’s at-
tempt at embracing all aspects of EU sanctions in all parts of the world was an
ambitious task, but she mastered it without difficulties. But besides the listing of
all possible situations of EU sanctions, she had larger ambitions, as she aimed to
explore the efficacy of EU sanctions. This is, again, what was missing so far in the
literature in EU studies and what this book, based on a doctoral thesis, brings to
the lectors. 
The monography starts with a chapter on sanctions and their efficacy. It then
proceeds with a review of the literature on sanctions and explains which method-
ology can be used to measure their efficacy. The author first distinguishes eco-
nomic from political effectiveness, and then she ascertains the goals of sanctions.
In order to go beyond the simplified dichotomy of ‘success and failure’, she relies
on the existing literature on sanctions to define several criteria and a control for the
‘sanctions contribution’, ‘concomitant policies’ and the use of force. Political state-
ments are also mobilized to provide evidence of the success or failure of sanctions.
In a further chapter, Portela focuses on the evolution, legal framework and policies
of EU sanctions. After looking at the origins of the sanctions and their link with con-
ditionality, she establishes a catalogue of EU sanctions and identifies an ‘EU-way’
or ‘double-track’ approach, which respects ‘a distinction between those responsi-
ble for the violation of electoral standards and human rights, and the population at
large, which benefits from strong EU support’ (p. 31). 
Chapter 3 concentrates on what determines the efficacy of EU sanctions. To an-
swer this questtion, Portela reviews a series of related variables, which she then
adapts to the EU context. With the use of qualitative comparative analysis, she
identifies five variables: (1) the (anticipated) economic harm to the target; (2) the
extent to which sanctions endanger the leadership’s permanence in power; (3) the
coherence in the EU’s management of the sanctions tool; (4) international support
for EU demands; and (5) the contribution of sanctions towards a positive outcome.
This last variable does not refer to compliance by the target, as is often expected in
mainstream literature on democratization, but to the contribution made by EU
sanctions towards compliance. 
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With this grid in mind, the author goes on to analyse the efficacy of the sanctions
imposed under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. She lists the various as-
pects of CFSP sanctions and goes into the details of their practice by going through
all the identified empirical cases. In each case, the outcome and efficacy of the
sanctions are evaluated with the help of the grid presented in chapter 3. An over-
all evaluation of the CFSP sanctions is then presented before turning, in chapter 5,
to ‘informal’ sanctions like diplomatic sanctions, deferrals of signing an agreement,
suspensions of aid, etc. China, Cuba, Russia, the Palestinian Authority, Pakistan, Pe-
ru, Guatemala, Serbia and Turkey are taken as examples to measure the efficacy of
‘informal’ sanctions on the ground. A further similar step is taken in chapter 6, as
this chapter evaluates development aid suspensions in the context of the partner-
ship agreements between the EU and the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) coun-
tries (article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement). Finally, chapter 7 looks at withdrawal
of trade privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences, in its legal frame-
work and practice, before proceeding to a thorough evaluation of several exam-
ples. All the cases taken under review are listed in a table at the end of the book,
with a control for the five variables. This table highlights the fact that among the 62
cases listed, the EU sanctions could contribute to some changes in only 32 of them.
An explanation for this outcome is given in the conclusion: there is a strong ‘con-
nection between the legal framework under which the sanctions are yielded and
their efficacy’ (p. 162). As a matter of fact, sanctions have been much more suc-
cessful in the framework of suspensions of agreements with ACP countries under
article 96 than in the CFSP or informal measures. The reasons for this finding are
further discussed in the conclusion. 
This book is without a doubt empirically grounded and offers a thorough study
of the existing literature. While it explores the stronger aspects of EU external rela-
tions, it not only contributes to the debate on what the EU is (a civilian, soft or nor-
mative power), but also to the debate on what the EU does. If one considers the
two aspects of EU conditionality, negative and positive conditionality, one could
say that this book offers knowledge on the more negative aspects of EU condi-
tionality as well as on its possible lack of efficiency. Therefore, it greatly comple-
ments the literature in EU studies, which so far looked mainly at positive condi-
tionality and its convergence effects. If one understands the book correctly, it is to
say that non-convergence or non-compliance can also represent an interesting ob-
ject of study. Beside a methodology which would require more explanation, the
lack of a more qualitative inquiry into each case because of the choice made for a
more quantitative approach is certainly one of the negative points of the publica-
tion. But beyond this criticism, the analysis has identified a real research agenda
here.
Elsa Tulmets
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GÉRARD CHALIAND AND ARNAUD BLIN (EDS.): THE
HISTORY OF TERRORISM: FROM ANTIQUITY TO AL QAEDA 
Berkeley / Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2007, 483 pages, ISBN: 978-
0-5202-4533-4 (hardcover) and ISBN: 978-0-5202-4709-3 (paperback).
The September 11th, 2001 the day of the terrorist attacks on the American home-
land, was the bloodiest day in American history in nearly 150 years. Al Qaeda’s
highly coordinated attacks were instrumental in producing a fundamental shift not
only in American foreign policy, but also in the manner in which states address is-
sues of national security and securitization on a global level in the years that fol-
lowed. The unprecedented destruction and wholesale loss of life, however, were lit-
tle more than a continuation of the violent tactics that revolutionaries and insur-
rectionists have employed for centuries in attempts to confront what has been per-
ceived as political, social, and economic injustice. In many cases the miscellany of
objectives and techniques of terrorists have produced a corpus of challenges for
students and analysts alike within the fields of terrorism, counterinsurgency, and
studies of extremism. 
Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin’s volume The History of Terrorism: From Antiq-
uity to Al Qaeda is one of the latest contributions to a growing list of academic
work on terrorism and asymmetric force. As many of the aims and motivations of
terrorists and political extremists have been either missed or misread, the editors
and authors of this compilation have set out to correct our false impression about
a practice as old as warfare itself. According to the editors, the essays within this
volume speak to the tendency in the West and elsewhere, ‘to label an action “ter-
rorist” when it is deemed to be illegal’ (p. 7).
The boundaries between top-down terrorism and bottom-up terrorism represent
the primary point of departure for the analysis presented in the introduction of this
work. Chaliand and Blin argue that ‘as a tool, whether it be top-down or bottom-
up, terror espouses the same strategic principles: to bend one’s adversary’s will
while affecting his capacity for resistance’ (p. 7). However, the difficulty facing
those studying issues within this complex and deeply nuanced field of scholarship
hinges on two distinct and highly problematic verities. First, the boundaries be-
tween top-down and bottom-up terrorism are oftentimes imprecise, becoming ei-
ther purposely or inadvertently distorted. Second, there exists an alarming and dan-
gerous confusion regarding the substance of this field given that our moral inter-
pretation remains subject to a wave of externalities including political ideologies,
the terrorist movement as a phenomenon, and religious fanaticism. These forces
are compounded and ultimately lost in what the editors refer to as the ‘labyrinth of
terrorist movements’ (p. 7). ‘The nature of that opposition’, according to Chaliand
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and Blin, often defines a movement’s character. ‘Where the state apparatus is es-
sentially rational, the terrorist party will tend to appeal strongly to emotion. Where
the state machinery operates on the basis of “realist” policies and an understand-
ing of the balance of power, the terrorist movement will imbue its politics with a
powerful moral tone (whose codes varies depending on the ideology in play) and
a weak-versus-strong strategy reliant for the most part on its psychological impact
on the adversary’ (p. 6).
The first section of this three-part volume is comprised of two chapters, both
written by Chaliand and Blin. These chapters address the prehistory of terrorism,
the philosophical perspective of political assassination, the idea of tyrannicide,
despotism, and challenges facing political authority. Investigating the origins of
state terrorism and terror in warfare, the authors underscore the importance of the
Mongol Empire and the atrocities that took place during the course of the Thirty
Years’ War, illustrating that both catalogued distinct campaigns of terror amid an
atmosphere of general violence. In the introductory section to the roots of terror-
ism, the reader might notice a strong deficit in the diversity of cases used to sup-
port their argument.
The editors also discuss the implications of civilians and noncombatants in unin-
hibited violence and military action. ‘Wars of religion, civil wars, and wars of “opin-
ion”’, according to Chaliand and Blin, ‘all have one thing in common: they involve
the civilian population. The wars of religion that erupted in Europe in the 16th cen-
tury differed from “chivalric” wars in their violence and most especially in their lack
of “discrimination,” which made favored targets of noncombatants, in contraven-
tion to all precepts of “just war”’ (p. 88). At the end of this section, the assertion is
made that, ‘modern terror was born with the French Revolution – and with it the
expression “terrorism”’ (p. 92). Their limited analysis initially neglects to support
their position that terrorist parties appeal strongly to emotion. The French Revolu-
tion, however, presents a strong example of early terrorists appealing to the virtues
of peoples belonging to a state swept under by political and social turmoil. Ac-
cordingly, this section would benefit from the authors drawing a distinction be-
tween terrorism and internalized warfare.
The second section presents an examination of modern terror in the aftermath
of the French Revolution, anarchist terrorism of the 19th century, Russian terrorism
during Russia’s late-imperialist age, sources of state terrorism during the era of So-
viet Russia, and terrorism during instances of international warfare. These six chap-
ters introduce new lines of division that seek to inform a greater understanding of
instances when national terrorist agendas shifted in order to address problems of
the day. Chaliand and Blin reason that the Second World War marked a significant
shift in terrorist activity, arguing that the war ‘marked a strategic break with the past
and changed everything, among other things transforming terrorism into an in-
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strument of resistance’ (p. 208). One overriding conclusion that can be drawn from
this section is that the range of cases used to depict this transformation is rather
short. Chapter ten, ‘Terrorism in Time of War’, offers an account of ethics and ter-
rorism, using the Just War doctrine as a model for understanding the general con-
demnation of terrorist acts. Noting a division between the acceptance of wars that
are undertaken by a bona fide state and the condemnation of action taken against
noncombatants, Chaliand and Blin assert that ‘lacking a well defined ethical con-
text in which to consider terrorism per se, we fall back on a political ethic that
judges an act by its consequences’ (p. 211). These assertions, however, fail to flesh
out further controversies surrounding the elements that ‘judge’ such acts. Two ob-
vious factors are not addressed in this sense. In the first place, the authors disre-
gard the social and psychological weight of acts and the potential consequences
that such acts ultimately avoid, even though a loss is still incurred. 
In spite of adding important arguments to the existing literature, the second sec-
tion of this work reveals a major weakness – the range of experts in the field here
is insufficient. The majority of the essays found in section two are contributions by
the editors themselves. Although they widely navigate the moralistic and funda-
mental characteristics of the subject matter, the underlying message that the read-
er is left with is that both of the editors are considered the primary experts on these
topics. The ultimate aim of a volume of this nature and importance should be the
creation a robust pool of analysts proficient in the topics under consideration. Un-
fortunately, this banal section punches above its own emancipatory elements,
dwelling too much on the historical dimensions of terrorism and terrorist acts
rather than focusing on the political and social impacts in varying societal contexts.
A further shortcoming of this section rests in the obvious lack of primary sources
utilized in each chapter as well as the absence of a liberal serving measure of sec-
ondary sources. It should be incumbent upon the contributors of a volume that
seeks to be an enriching source on a broadly impacting field to incorporate a more
appreciable breadth of resources.
Comprised of seven chapters, the third section of this work concentrates on ter-
rorism from 1968 to the present day. It is by far the most diverse section in terms
of topics covered and the range of contributors, but the papers that Chaliand and
Blin have included disappointingly favor the Islamic movement in terrorism as well
as Islamic radicalism. One of the recurrent problems is the lack of bibliographic di-
versity and inclusion of primary sources to provide a fresh dynamic to our under-
standing of this taxonomy. Another major dilemma of this section is the monopo-
listic focus on terrorist movements as they relate strongly to an American reader-
ship.
François Géré charts the history and trajectory of suicide operations, what he
terms ‘homicidal self-sacrifice’, in chapter 15. Providing an extensive history of sui-
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cide operations from Roman times to the contemporary period, Géré casts an an-
alytic spotlight on the religious current in this phenomenon. However, in the fight
against terrorism, Géré overlooks the distinction between religious motivations
and political or philosophical action. Many researchers conclude that religion
serves neither as cause nor explanation of suicide terrorism. Instead of offering the
reader with a deep and careful definition of suicide terrorism, Géré presents a
rather superficial reading of this act, painting it as little more than killing oneself to
achieve a specific goal. The topicality of the analysis in this chapter suggests that
suicide operations undertaken by members of the Asian community and Shiite
Muslims need only be explained in terms of trends and tradition. Moreover, at no
point in this chapter does the author acknowledge the existence of push and pull
factors that lead individuals to the act of suicide terrorism. In this sense, it seems as
though the West is absolved of connivance in this movement. 
When dealing with a topic of such critical importance, particularly as the field of
international relations has experienced a revolution in terms of studies of conflict,
warfare, and asymmetric force, a volume such as the one prepared by Chaliand
and Blin requires an investigative scope far more illuminating and causative than
what is found throughout its pages. The historical character of this volume, while
praiseworthy in several regards, overtakes the loosely formed thesis and the ana-
lytic methodologies that are required to determine the explanatory factors for the
diversity and variation in terrorist operations. Devoid of a strong empirical element,
and short on the qualitative end of the analytical stick, it cannot be considered a
universal source for all academic researchers and analysts. But even though the de-
bates presented by the authors are somewhat restricted by the scope of hindsight,
and fall victim to a narrow and predictable lens of analysis, this volume of papers
still enables the reader to build an understanding of the historical context of ter-
rorism. Its scope renders it an interesting reference for scholars of all levels.
Scott Nicholas Romaniuk
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